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Introduction 
 
Over the last three decades, autobiography has become the most popular literary 
genre of our contemporary culture (cf. Miller, 1). In a way, this is not surprising, for 
autobiography captures a range of contemporary concerns, such as the status of the 
subject, issues of gender, and – perhaps most importantly – the individual’s 
relationship with his or her past (cf. Gudmundsdóttir, 1). 
Who am I? What distinguishes me from other people? These are the kinds of 
questions addressed in autobiography, and everybody can relate to them, because – 
as one autobiographer observes – ‘[t]here is nothing more important than one’s 
identity’ (Keenan, 141). Our ever-present desire to investigate our sense of self and 
to communicate it to other people is part of what makes us human. Most of us will 
probably never get round to putting down our lives on paper, but this does not mean 
that we are not familiar with the autobiographical process. In fact, we all engage in 
the art of self-storytelling on a daily basis. Through interacting with other human 
beings, telling them how we feel and what we have done recently, we do exactly the 
same as autobiographers do, albeit on a non-literary level: we embark on a journey of 
self-discovery,  reflect on and reshape our identities.  
Remembering and sharing stories is a universal human need. Even though 
‘[w]e know perfectly well that life certainly isn’t a story, at least not in any simple 
[…] sense, and we also know that a person isn’t a book’ (Eakin, How Our Lives 
Become Stories, 99), we use stories to make sense of the flux of experiences that our 
lives present us with. Reading other people’s stories gives us the opportunity to 
accompany them on their journey to their inner beings and identify with their 
feelings and experiences. Despite the high chance that our lives may be very 
different from the autobiographers’, we read ourselves into their stories. Perhaps it is 
‘precisely [this] process of [] identification that sends readers to the biography 
section (which is where you find autobiography) in such large numbers’ (Miller, 3). 
As Martin Amis observes in his autobiography, Experience, which will be discussed 
in this thesis, ‘[e]xperience is the only thing we share equally, and everyone senses 
this.’ (Amis, Martin, Experience, 6)  
In the preface to his novel The Picture of Dorian Gray (1891), Oscar Wilde 
famously declares that ‘[i]t is the spectator, and not life, that art really mirrors.’ 
(Wilde, 6) This statement is interesting, for it affirms the very notion that audiences 
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tend to recognise themselves in autobiographers’ experiences and their narrative 
search for the self. Since autobiography deals with true events and real people, 
however, Wilde’s dictum has to be adapted in this context: In an attempt to account 
for the genre’s referential claims, autobiography can thus be said to be a special form 
of art which mirrors both the spectator (or the reader) and life. Apart from his 
allusion to the spectator’s emphatic identification process with a work of art, it is 
intriguing that Wilde uses the metaphor of the mirror. In fact, the autobiographical 
process has been compared to the act of looking into a mirror ever since literary 
theory started to acknowledge autobiography as a genre of its own right. Georges 
Gusdorf, for example, who is recognised as one of the first theorists of 
autobiography, draws on the mirror metaphor as early as 1956, noting that 
‘autobiography is the mirror in which the individual reflects his own image’ 
(Gusdorf, 33).  
Writing an autobiography is indeed like looking into a mirror, in which the 
autobiographers see – or seek to detect – who they have been, who they are now and 
who they may become. However, this process of reflecting one’s identity through 
self-storytelling is by no means a simple endeavour, which is why the phenomenon 
of autobiography has kept scholars busy for over half a century. Not only do works 
of autobiography offer many avenues for exploration (cf. Gudmundsdóttir, 1), but it 
is also not clear how exactly ‘the self and its experiences may [] be represented in a 
text.’ (Eakin, How, 99) As it is the mission of this thesis to explore ‘this linked 
notion of self and story’ that ‘is lurking whenever autobiographical practices are 
engaged’ (Eakin, How, 99), questions of genre, identity and narrative will be tackled 
both theoretically and practically. The presented theoretical concepts, which are 
taken from autobiography studies as well as narrative theory, are subsequently 
applied in an analysis of three contemporary texts of autobiography, namely 
Kingsley Amis’s Memoirs (1999), Martin Amis’s Experience: A Memoir (2000) and 
Elizabeth Jane Howard’s Slipstream: A Memoir (2002).  
Contrary to what may be expected from the enumeration of the primary 
authors’ names in the thesis title, it is not the purpose of this paper to conduct a 
comparative analysis of the primary texts, but rather to employ the concepts 
compiled in the theory part and put them to the test. Thus, each primary text featured 
in the analysis part will be examined individually from the double perspective of 
autobiography studies and narrative theory. Despite the fact that no comparative 
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approach is followed here, it makes sense to perceive the chosen primary texts and 
their authors as a group. As the identical surname of Kingsley and Martin Amis 
indicates, this pair of writers is related: Kingsley is Martin’s father, and both of them 
are established novelists. The third author, Elizabeth Jane Howard, who is also a 
successful novelist, has no blood relation with either Amis père1 or fils, but she is 
Kingsley’s ex-wife and Martin’s former stepmother. Consequently, the three primary 
authors are a family of British novelists who have experimented with the form of 
autobiography. Due to these autobiographers’ intimate acquaintance with one 
another, their texts tell partly overlapping stories, and can thus be seen as co-texts or 
mutual commentaries. It would be a mistake, however, to reduce these 
autobiographies to their thematic interrelatedness, as each memoir follows a different 
agenda that deserves to be analysed separately.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 While Kingsley Amis (b. 1922) died in 1995, Martin Amis (b. 1949) and Elizabeth Jane Howard (b.  
   1923) are still practising novelists.  
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Theory 
 
 
1. Theorising autobiography as a genre 
 
Most fundamentally, autobiography refers to ‘the writing of one’s own history, the 
story of one’s life written by oneself’ (Winslow, 3). While the word autobiography 
did not enter the English language until the late eighteenth century, the genre itself 
has a much longer history; indeed autobiography has been practiced from ancient 
times onward. (cf. Gunzenhauser, ‘Autobiography’, 75)  
The term autobiography was first used in 1797 in a review attributed to 
William Taylor of D’Israeli’s Miscellanies in the British Monthly Review. Taylor had 
suggested ‘autobiography’ as a substitute for the hybrid word ‘self-biography’ which 
had been employed by D’Israeli. Despite this first recorded usage by William Taylor, 
however, it is the poet Robert Southey who is commonly thought to have coined the 
term in 1809 when he described the work of a Portuguese poet, Francisco Vieura. (cf. 
Anderson, 7 and Winslow, 3) Felicity Nussbaum maintains that the word 
autobiography had become generally established and was frequently used by the 
1830s, but definitions of what it might denote were by no means stable (cf. 
Nussbaum, The Autobiographical Subject, 4-5).  
The theoretical debate about autobiography was initiated in the second half of 
the twentieth century with Georges Gusdorf’s seminal essay ‘Conditions and Limits 
of Autobiography’ (1956). Since then, an impressive body of work has accrued on 
the subject of autobiography, but it is in the last three decades – under the influence 
of structuralism and poststructuralism – that autobiography studies has particularly 
flourished (cf. Gudmundsdóttir, 1).  
 
 
1.1. Genre as a working hypothesis 
 
Despite the fact that autobiography has been heavily theorised across various 
disciplines such as literary studies, philosophy, history, anthropology and brain 
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science, scholars have not managed to arrive at a unified generic definition of 
autobiography. This does not mean, however, that theory has failed altogether. On 
the contrary, autobiography’s tendency to eschew definition does have a reason 
which is well-documented in the theoretical body: the evasiveness of autobiography 
as a genre can be explained by the fact that it is situated on the crossroad between 
history and fiction, or – in generic terms – biography and the novel. Thus, I would 
hold with Paul John Eakin when he affirms that  
[d]efinitions of autobiography have never proved to be definitive, but they are 
instructive, reflecting characteristic assumptions about what may well be the 
slipperiest of literary genres’ (Eakin, How Our Lives Become Stories, 1f.). 
 
Eakin proceeds to ask whether ‘indeed autobiography can be said to be a genre in the 
first place’ (Eakin, How, 2). It goes without saying that this question is immensely 
difficult to settle. Since the 1970s a lively debate has been going on about this issue, 
as theorists have tried to shed light on the liminal space autobiography occupies, and 
the next few sections will be devoted to giving an overview of this theoretical 
development. Preliminarily, however, it is important to say a few words about the 
working hypothesis and the concept of genre which underlie this thesis:  
Even though some theorists have claimed that autobiography does not lend 
itself well to a generic approach at all,2 I maintain that the concept of genre is useful 
as a frame of reference from which to examine the subject of autobiography and the 
various issues related to it. Borrowing Gunnthórunn Gudmundsdóttir’s approach in 
Borderlines: Autobiography and Fiction in Postmodern Life Writing (2003), I work 
from the premise that there are generic differences between autobiography and other 
forms of writing (cf. Gudmundsdóttir, 3). Gudmundsdóttir draws on Ann Jefferson to 
argue that it is crucial  
to presuppose that there are generic distinctions […] since […] generic 
differences need to be respected as an effect of reading, even if they cannot be 
defined as intrinsic qualities of the texts in question. (Jefferson, 109 as cited in 
Gudmundsdóttir, 3)  
 
But what is genre? Broadly speaking, genre refers to ‘a type of literary work 
characterized by a particular form, style or purpose’ (OED2). According to Linda 
Anderson, it denotes ‘a specific type of artistic or cultural composition, identified by 
codes which the audience recognize’ (Anderson, 136). Anderson claims that the 
                                                 
2 Cf. Paul de Man’s view summarised in Linda Anderson’s Autobiography: ‘According to de Man,  
   autobiography ‘always looks slightly disreputable and self-indulgent in the company of the major  
   genres – the novel, poetry and drama – never quite attaining aesthetic dignity nor even providing an  
   empirically useful way of understanding texts since each specific instance seems to be an exception  
   to the norm’’ (de Man as cited in Anderson, 12).   
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question is not only ‘what kind of genre is autobiography’, but more importantly 
‘how does the ‘law of genre’, to take the title of Jacques Derrida’s famous essay, 
work to legitimize certain autobiographical writings and not others?’ (Anderson, 9). 
As far as Derrida is concerned, it lies in the nature of genre to be conceptualised in 
terms of ‘norms and interdictions’ (Derrida ‘Law’, 203, as cited in Anderson, 9). 
These rules, however, are not implemented in an absolutist manner; they are to be 
understood as frontiers that are meant to be crossed, for ‘the law of genre can only 
operate by opening itself to transgression.’ (Anderson 9f.) By means of creating 
parallels, genre can make use of the reader’s recognition of a pattern shared by 
different works. It draws on what is already known, thereby organising and 
regulating the meanings of a text for the reader. (cf. Anderson, 10) In the last 
analysis, genre is thus an effect of reading, and ‘could […] be seen as a way of 
creating a dynastic relation between texts, encoding tradition in formal features 
which operate like ‘family characteristics’’ (Anderson, 10, citing Fowler, 32).  
 
 
1.2. Structuralism 
 
1.2.1. Before structuralism: Georges Gusdorf’s ‘Conditions and Limits of Autobio- 
graphy’ 
 
The value of George Gusdorf’s ‘Conditions and Limits of Autobiography’ (1956) is 
undeniable. As early as in the 1950s, it opens up a space for autobiography to be 
discussed theoretically. It does not, however, discuss the subject of autobiography in 
generic terms, even though Gusdorf once uses the term ‘literary genre’ (Gusdorf, 39).  
The generic approach is taken up in the 1970s by the structuralists3, notably 
Philippe Lejeune, who, following Saussure’s theory of language, ‘prioritize the mode 
of representation over the thing represented’ (Prosser, 248). According to Prosser, 
the structuralist project of  
distinguishing autobiography involved attending to the rules and forms of 
writing, analysing the relations between textual structures, and drawing up 
resultant typologies; structuralism considers relations between structures, 
locating meaning in the system or langue (Prosser, 248). 
 
                                                 
3 Cf. ‘The earliest attempts at generic definition of autobiography are in ideal structuralist’ (Prosser,  
   248).  
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Gusdorf’s attempt to delineate the conditions and limits of autobiography 
points towards the arrival of structuralism, which was recognised by James Olney 
when he included the essay in Autobiography: Essays Theoretical and Critical. (cf. 
Prosser, 248) Despite this theoretical undertow, however, Gusdorf’s essay is not 
structuralist in the pure sense of the word, as it ‘delimits autobiography less through 
its intratextual properties than through its historical and cultural conditions.’ 
(Prosser, 248) Essentially, Gusdorf restricts ‘autobiography properly speaking’ 
(Gusdorf, 37) temporally and geographically. ‘First of all’, he maintains, ‘it is 
necessary to point out that the genre of autobiography seems limited in time and 
space: it has not always existed nor does it exist everywhere.’ (Gusdorf, 28f.) He 
distinctly characterises it as ‘a late phenomenon in Western culture’ (Gusdorf, 29), 
therefore excluding autobiographical writings from the antique traditions, such as 
Epicureanism or Stoicism, from his definition (cf. Gusdorf, 34). Furthermore, he 
identifies the ability of self-reflection as a consequence of the secularisation of the 
Christian tradition of self-examination – i.e. the emergence of individualism. In the 
Christian belief system, Gusdorf explains,  
[e]ach man is accountable for his own existence, and intentions weigh as 
heavily as acts – whence a new fascination with the secret springs of personal 
life. The rule requiring confession of sins gives to self-examination a character 
at once systematic and necessary. (Gusdorf, 33) 
 
In autobiography, which represents the secularised version of such a confession, the 
writer ‘assumes the task of bringing out the most hidden aspects of individual being. 
The new age practices the virtue of individuality’ (Gusdorf, 34).  
 
1.2.2. Philippe Lejeune’s ‘The Autobiographical Pact’ 
 
Structuralist theory as applied to autobiography has given precedence to the graphe 
(writing) and rendered it determinant of the autos (self) and the bios (life). In 
structuralist theories of language (such as Saussure’s), writing is seen to precede and 
construct reality, not simply reflect it. Thus, language and writing are prioritised over 
historical context. (cf. Prosser, 248)  According to Prosser, it is Philippe Lejeune’s 
‘The Autobiographical Pact’ which initiates the ‘structuralist project on 
autobiography, particularly since [it] […] draw[s] on linguistic theories to refine that 
task of autobiographical definition.’ (Prosser, 248) Lejeune calls upon the linguist 
Emile Benveniste’s theories on utterance and enunciation when he affirms that ‘the 
personal pronouns (I/you) have real reference only within discourse, in the very act 
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of enunciation.’ (Lejeune, ‘Pact’, 8). According to Benveniste, ‘there is no such 
concept as ‘I.’ The ‘I’ refers, each time, to the person who is speaking and whom we 
identify by the very fact that he is speaking.’ (Lejeune, ‘Pact’, 8f., emphasis original)  
Thus, Lejeune’s essay constitutes the archetypal structuralist statement on 
autobiography:  
Not only does Lejeune suspend history and context […] to define 
autobiography exclusively through text, but his mode of argument and 
conveyance is itself highly structured, his essay punctuated with mathematical 
formulae and schematic diagrams (Prosser, 248).  
 
In ‘The Autobiographical Pact’ (1973), Lejeune seeks to map the boundaries 
of autobiography against both biography and the novel, thereby establishing it as a 
discrete genre while also anchoring it in a world beyond the text (cf. Eakin, Stories, 
2). Lejeune draws precisely on the aforementioned reader’s recognition of 
autobiographies as separate from other categories of texts that Anderson, citing 
Derrida and Fowler, recognises as the characteristic function of the ‘law of genre’ 
(cf. Anderson, 9f.), thus creating ‘a reader-based poetics of autobiography’ (Eakin, 
‘Foreword’, ix). At the outset of ‘The Autobiographical Pact’, Lejeune asks himself 
whether it is indeed ‘possible to define autobiography’ (Lejeune, ‘Pact’, 3), and 
proceeds to do exactly that, in remarkably clear-cut fashion:  
Retrospective prose narrative written by a real person concerning his own 
existence, where the focus is his individual life, in particular the story of his 
personality. (Leujeune, ‘Pact’, 3, emphasis original) 
 
As Eakin notes, Lejeune emphasises that his definition was specifically aimed at 
distinguishing autobiography proper from a number of adjacent types of 
autobiographical writing in related genres, such as the autobiographical novel, the 
diary, the autobiographical poem, and memoirs. (cf. Eakin, ‘Foreword’, viii) Thus, 
Lejeune’s definition in ‘Pact’ is followed by a decidedly formalist demarcation of 
autobiography against other genres. 
Interestingly, ‘The Autobiographical Pact’ (1973) was not Lejeune’s first 
attempt to solve ‘the thorny problem of establishing a boundary between factual and 
fictional modes of discourse’ (Eakin, ‘Foreword’, ix). He had already introduced the 
notion of le pacte autobiographique two years earlier in L’Autobiographie en France 
(1971). Essentially, the autobiographical pact is  
a contract between author and reader in which the autobiographer explicitly 
commits himself or herself not to some impossible historical exactitude but 
rather to the sincere effort to come to terms with and to understand his or her 
own life. (Eakin, ‘Foreword’, ix) 
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Reviewing his first endeavour to delineate the pact, however, Lejeune concedes that 
the contract between writer and reader was not enough to determine a text 
definitively as autobiography. His feeling that the autobiographical pact – as it was 
standing then – was insufficient derived from his deep belief that  
autobiography is necessarily in its deepest sense a special kind of fiction, its 
self and its truth as much created as (re)discovered realities, and given his 
lively awareness that the novel has often imitated the posture of self-referential 
intention in all sorts of pseudo, mock, or otherwise fictive autobiographies. 
(Eakin, ‘Foreword’, ix) 
 
Thus returning to the seemingly insoluble problem of drawing a generic line between 
autobiography and fiction in ‘The Autobiographical Pact’, Lejeune proclaimed a 
decisive alteration of the stance he had taken in L’Autobiographie en France: his 
discovery of the author’s proper name as ‘the deep subject of autobiography’ 
(Lejeune, ‘Pact’, 20). Through the ploy of including the title page – formerly 
overlooked – as a constituent and integral part of the text, Lejeune was now able to 
pin down a textual criterion by which to differentiate between autobiography and 
fiction, namely the identity (‘identicalness’ (Lejeune, ‘Pact’, 14)) of the proper name 
shared by author, narrator, and protagonist. (cf. Eakin, Foreword, ix) ‘In order for 
there to be autobiography’, Lejeune maintains, ‘the author, the narrator, and the 
protagonist must be identical.’ (Lejeune, ‘Pact’, 5) The autobiographical pact thus 
signifies ‘the affirmation in the text of this identity, referring back in the final 
analysis to the name of the author on the cover.’ (Lejeune, ‘Pact’, 14) 
 According to Lejeune, it is only by way of reference to the proper name that a 
valid distinction between autobiography and fiction can be achieved, because it is 
‘the only mark in the text of an unquestionable world-beyond-text, referring to a real 
person.’ (Lejeune, ‘Pact’, 11) The existence of this person is ‘certified by vital 
statistics and verifiable[…] [H]is existence is beyond question.’ (Lejeune, ‘Pact’, 11) 
Lejeune tries to account for his previous blindness to the implicit yet apparent 
connection between autobiography and the real world through the proper name, 
conceding that it had a good reason: in L’Autobiographie en France he was looking 
for answers in the wrong place, because if ‘we limit ourselves to the text minus the 
title page’, then ‘there is no difference’ (Lejeune, ‘Pact’, 13, emphasis original) 
between autobiography and the novel; they both make use of the same structural 
patterns and narrative techniques. ‘All the methods that autobiography uses to 
convince us of the authenticity of its narrative’, Lejeune asserts, ‘can be imitated by 
the novel, and often have been imitated.’ (Lejeune, ‘Pact’, 13) Thus, ‘on the level of 
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‘structures, modes, and narrative voices’ (Lejeune, ‘Pact’, 29) autobiography and the 
novel are indistinguishable. But since every reader nevertheless experiences 
autobiography as a distinct genre, Lejeune proposes a solution by introducing the 
proper name as the ‘essential element of the contract’ (Lejeune, ‘Pact’, 29). By doing 
so, he establishes autobiography as a ‘referential genre’ (Lejeune, ‘Pact’, 25).  
 
 
1.3. Poststructuralism  
 
1.3.1. Philippe Lejeune’s ‘The Autobiographical Pact (Bis)’ 
 
Conceiving of writing as fluid and intransitive, poststructuralism shows a rising 
scepticism about autobiography’s status as a distinct genre and even questions its 
very possibility; thus, poststructuralist theories deconstruct the neat structures of 
autobiography. (cf. Prosser, 249) The growing uncertainty of poststructuralism with 
regard to the status of autobiography is best exemplified by Lejeune’s return to the 
autobiographical pact in ‘The Autobiographical Pact (Bis)’ (1982), in which he 
performs a dazzling reversal of the former essay’s structuralist approach. (cf. Prosser, 
249)  
By criticising the ‘essentially linguistic and formal point of view’ (Lejeune, 
‘Bis’, 130), Lejeune overthrows the very structuralism of the former essay. Thus, he 
exposes the ‘undeniable normative aspect of ‘Le Pacte’’ and its ‘cut-and-dried 
presentation’ (Lejeune, ‘Bis’, 121) to a searching critique. Moreover, he finds fault 
with the desire manifest in ‘Pact’ to systematise autobiography, questioning whether 
such a goal can indeed be achieved. He unmasks his definition as ‘dogmatic’ and as 
having ‘a rather uncertain theoretical status’ (Lejeune, ‘Bis’, 120). In ‘Bis’, Lejeune 
laments his previous failure of taking into account ‘what happens when the 
seemingly ideal structures of the text encounter the unstable contexts of its 
reception.’ (Prosser, 249) Acknowledging that texts are necessarily embedded in the 
context of their reception and can never exist outside it, Lejeune concedes that 
autobiography cannot be definitively isolated – notably from fiction –, for readers 
can and do read texts differently. (cf. Prosser, 249) 
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1.3.2. Paul de Man’s ‘Autobiography as De-facement’ 
 
In poststructuralist theory, autobiography has been remodelled as a project of 
‘poesis’ by being rendered ‘constructive and self-referential, and thus never fully 
distinct from fiction.’ (Prosser, 249) According to Prosser, it is this blurring of 
distinctions between autobiography and fiction which represents poststructuralism’s 
key contribution to autobiography studies (cf. Prosser, 249). Paul de Man 
encapsulates the poststructuralist position on autobiography in his famous essay 
‘Autobiography as De-facement’ (1979) when he notes that ‘the distinction between 
fiction and autobiography is not an either/or polarity but […] finally undecidable.’ 
(de Man, as cited in Prosser, 249) He uses the metaphor of autobiography as 
prosopoeia – as face- or figure-making – to unveil the fictiveness of autobiography’s 
reference: autobiography is not a reflection but a created product; it is not revelatory, 
but a form of persona or mask – ‘‘the illusion of a reference’, ‘a correlation of the 
structure of the figure’, ‘something akin to fiction’.’ (de Man as cited in Prosser, 249)   
As Paul John Eakin observes, Paul de Man’s consequence of observing this 
interrelatedness between autobiographical and fictional modes is to question the 
legitimacy of the generic approach: according to de Man, the concept of genre is 
ultimately futile when applied to autobiography. Complaining of the ‘distressing 
sterility of generic discussions of autobiography’ (Eakin, ‘Foreword’, vii), he argues 
that ‘empirically as well as theoretically, autobiography lends itself poorly to generic 
definition’ (de Man, as cited in Eakin, ‘Foreword’, vii).  
 
1.3.3. Michael Sprinker’s ‘Fictions of the Self: The End of Autobiography’ 
 
Similarly to de Man, Michael Sprinker also considers structuralism’s attempt to 
define autobiography as a distinct genre a hopeless task. In ‘Fictions of the Self: The 
End of Autobiography’ (1981), he illustrates his conviction that ‘autobiography [is] 
fundamentally unstable and hence unclassifiable, a shifting borderless locale’ (Eakin, 
How Our Lives Become Stories, 2, citing Sprinker, 342). Threatening the very 
existence of the genre, ‘Fictions of the Self: The End of Autobiography’ (1980), 
constitutes poststructuralism’s most extreme encounter with autobiography. Sprinker 
goes one step further than de Man, annulling the distinction between autobiography 
and fiction altogether.   
In order to drive home his view that in autobiography, ‘concepts of subject, 
self and author collapse into the act of producing a text’ (Sprinker, 342, as cited in 
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Eakin, How, 2) Sprinker draws on Nietzsche’s biting analysis of the subject in The 
Will to Power: 
‘The subject’ is the fiction that many similar states in us are the effect of one 
substratum: but it is we who first created the ‘similarity’ of these states […]. 
The fundamental false observation is that I believe it is I who do something, 
suffer something, ‘have’ a quality.’ (Nietzsche as quoted in Sprinker, 333f., 
emphasis original)  
 
Following Nietzsche’s argument, autobiography as defined by Lejeune could not 
pass for a ‘literature of fact’ (Eakin, How, 3) despite its reference to the proper name. 
However historically manifest the proper name of the author-narrator-protagonist 
may be, the ‘I’ referring to that name ‘remains no less than a creature of fiction’ 
(Eakin, How, 3). In concluding his analysis of Sprinker’s essay, Eakin maintains that 
‘[w]ithout an ‘I’ to perform actions, to possess feelings and qualities, the possibility 
of ‘having’ a story of one’s ‘own existence’ to tell simply evaporates.’ (Eakin, How, 
3) After unmasking the fictitiousness of the subject, Sprinker pulls the plug on life 
writing by announcing the end of autobiography (cf. Eakin, How, 3). 
 
 
1.4. Emerging from poststructuralist cynicism 
 
Structuralist and poststructuralist theories have dominated our understanding of 
autobiography in the last three decades of the 20th century. Yet at the beginning of 
the new millennium, we seem to be leaving behind ‘poststructuralist cynicism’ 
(Prosser, 249); poststructuralism’s denial of autobiography’s ability to provide a 
means for representing the self is ultimately unsatisfactory. The fact that 
autobiography has not ceased to exist, as proclaimed by Sprinker, and continues to 
flourish ‘as a form irreducible to fiction’ (Prosser, 249) points to the shortcomings of 
poststructuralism in relation to the experience of writing and reading autobiography. 
According to Prosser, all autobiographies, no matter how heavily cross-fertilised they 
are by fiction, are assigned a separate space in our experience of reading them and 
remain distinct from works of fiction by the same authors. (cf. Prosser, 249) 
 
1.4.1. Philippe Lejeune’s ‘Bis’ revisited 
 
Despite theory’s demonstration of ‘a Lacanian fragmentation and imaginariness of 
selfhood and a Derridean conception of writing as self-referential’ (Prosser, 249), 
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autobiography continues to prosper in both theory and practice. Lejeune’s ‘The 
Autobiographical Pact (Bis)’ is archetypally poststructuralist as it topples the very 
structures of the original definition. However, Lejeune observes that ‘[i]n spite of the 
fact that autobiography is impossible, this in no way prevents it from existing.’ 
(Lejeune, ‘Bis’, 131f.) Thus, ‘Bis’ does not accept poststructuralism’s attempt to 
declare autobiography’s death. (cf. Prosser, 249) Lejeune recognises the paradox of 
the reality of individual experience on the one hand, and the fiction of this same 
experience on the other hand, as it is caught up in and can only be accessed via 
textual representation. The relevant passage will be quoted at length, for it illustrates 
so very precisely what Eakin has called ‘the conceptual impasse that confronts 
theorists in the age of postmodernism’ (Eakin, How, 3):  
It’s better to get on with the confessions: yes, I have been fooled. I believe that 
we can promise to tell the truth; I believe in the transparency of language, and 
in the existence of a complete subject who expresses himself through it; I 
believe that my proper name guarantees my autonomy and my singularity […]; 
I believe that when I say ‘I,’ it is I who am speaking: I believe in the Holy 
Ghost of the first person. And who doesn’t believe in it? But of course it also 
happens that I believe in the contrary, or at least claim to believe it. (Lejeune, 
‘Bis’, 131) 
 
 
1.4.2. Paul John Eakin and Tonya Blowers 
 
According to Prosser, the most recent theoretical encounters with autobiography 
have been concerned with the nature of the very reality that poststructuralism 
marginalised. Prosser metaphorically extends Freud’s concept of fetishism in order to 
shed light on the experience of reading autobiography after the disillusionment of 
poststructuralist theory (cf. Prosser, 249):  
Like Freud’s fetishistic little boy who denies what he knows to be true in order 
to go on living, after theory we accept the impossibility of autobiography and 
go on reading and writing (and writing about) autobiography as if we still 
believed it had something of the real to offer us that fiction does not. (Prosser, 
249)  
 
Two of Eakin’s works, Touching the World: Reference in Autobiography (1992), and 
How Our Lives Become Stories: Making Selves (1999) exemplify ‘the return of 
poststructuralism’s repressed referent’ (Prosser, 249) that Prosser assigns to recent 
theories of autobiography.  
In Touching the World, Eakin asks the pivotal question of why autobiography 
has not vanished into fiction even though poststructuralism had written a premature 
obituary of autobiography. He maintains that it is ‘autobiography’s referential 
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aesthetic’ (Eakin, Touching, as cited in Prosser, 249) that keeps it separate in the 
mind of the reader. Thus, autobiography has an unquestionable ability to refer to the 
real; as an ‘aesthetic’, however, it is intricately tied to representation. (cf. Prosser, 
249) In his analysis of Touching the World, Prosser observes that Eakin intends to 
‘reopen the file on reference in autobiography’, while not seeking to return to a 
‘naïve prestructuralist reference’ (Prosser, 249).  
Tonya Blowers takes a similar stance in her essay ‘The Textual Contract: 
Distinguishing Autobiography from the Novel’ (2000), which reconsiders and 
remodels Lejeune’s pact between the author and the reader. She postulates that there 
is a model of autobiography which succeeds in taking on board ‘autobiography’s 
claims to ‘truth’ […] whilst also highlighting the transformative process inherent in 
recollecting and representing such truth’ (Blowers, 113). Blowers claims that we read 
autobiographies as a textual contract, acknowledging on the one hand the proper 
name of the author-narrator-protagonist, knowing that it signifies a distinct mode of 
reading – autobiography, not fiction. On the other hand, we can also see the proper 
name as mere adornment which refers to ‘no person, no thing, no history, other than 
that which it creates for the complicit reader in the text.’ (Blowers, 115) 
Consequently, the reader has a sense of the real world outside the text while being 
aware at the same time of the constructed nature of that reality within the text. (cf. 
Blowers, 115) Thus, Blowers pointedly concludes that ‘the textual contract provides 
a means of having our cake (there is a historical reality) and eating it (a text is pure 
representation).’ (Blowers, 115)    
In his introduction to How Our Lives Become Stories: Making Selves, Eakin 
tries to tackle the question of why it is that autobiography has proved to be so 
impervious to the manifold deconstructions of the subject suggested by Nietzsche, 
Lacan, and others. (cf. Eakin, How, 3) If we accept the testimony of most 
autobiographies, he maintains, people do base the conceptions of their lives on 
Nietzsche’s ‘fundamental false observation [...] that I believe it is I who do 
something’ (Eakin, How, 3, emphasis original), thus acknowledging that this belief is 
deeply ingrained in human experience. Eakin calls on the philosopher John Searle to 
account for autobiography’s remarkable resilience. Searle creates a conceptual arch 
between the self as an experiential reality on the one hand and the Nietzschean 
subject as a fiction on the other hand by refuting Daniel C. Dennet’s denial of the 
existence of consciousness: 
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Couldn’t we disprove the existence of these data [inner qualities and mental 
states, annot.] by proving that they are only illusions? No, you can’t disprove 
the existence of conscious experiences by proving that they are only an 
appearance distinguishing the underlying reality, because where consciousness 
is concerned, the existence of the appearance is the reality. (Dennet, 58, as 
cited by Eakin, How, 2f., emphasis original) 
 
In his body of work, Eakin has devoted a great amount of attention to studying the 
reality of consciousness and selfhood. Two thirds of How Our Lives Become Stories, 
deal with the question of what it means to be a self; yet I do not wish to deepen my 
examination of selfhood at this point, as it will be the purpose of the next chapter to 
explore the role of the self in writing and reading autobiography. Instead, I want to 
conclude my discussion of autobiography as a genre by trying to come up with a 
working definition of autobiography which is specifically aimed at the three 
autobiographies I have chosen for my analysis in the second part of this thesis.  
 
 
1.5. Arriving at a working definition 
 
1.5.1. Lejeune’s definition in ‘The Autobiographical Pact’ 
 
In trying to provide a working definition that should serve as a generic point of 
reference for my analysis, I am once more drawing on Lejeune’s classic structuralist 
concept of autobiography:  
DEFINITION: Retrospective prose narrative written by a real person 
concerning his own existence, where the focus is his individual life, in 
particular the story of his personality. (Leujeune, ‘Pact’, 3, emphasis original) 
 
With Lejeune’s definition in mind and by borrowing Gudmundsdóttir’s approach, I 
read autobiography as a referential genre, without denying the complexities involved 
in that referentiality (cf. Gudmundsdóttir, 3), which is inclusive of fictional modes of 
writing. It is important to take into consideration, however, that Lejeune himself has 
subjected the seemingly normative function of his definition to continuous re-
evaluation. He is perfectly aware that an entire genre cannot be reduced to a 
definition which is no longer than a dictionary entry. As Eakin points out, Lejeune 
views his work as a theorist of genre in the context of genre criticism at large, whose 
purpose it is not to construct absolute, intemporal generic categories but to describe 
how the law of genre and historical developments co-determine each other and how 
genres operate and evolve over time. (cf. Eakin, ‘Foreword’, xv)      
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 Notwithstanding the fact that Lejeune’s definition of autobiography as a pact 
between reader and writer is unavoidably a simplification and ignores fascinating 
areas of intersection between autobiography and fiction, it is useful in that it provides 
a straightforward technical means of defining the genre. (cf. Blowers, 105) After 
overthrowing the very structures of his own definition in ‘The Autobiographical Pact 
(Bis)’, Lejeune confesses that he nevertheless has ‘no regrets’ (Lejeune, ‘Bis’, 121) 
for having dressed autobiography in such a tight generic corset in ‘The 
Autobiographical Pact’: ‘After all’, he argues,  
if we rely on this definition, it is because it corresponds to a need. Far from 
reproaching my readers for having followed my lead, which would be 
ungrateful, I will take their approval as a sign of relevance. (Lejeune, ‘Bis’, 
121)  
 
By coming up with a suitable definition that is applicable to the three primary texts I 
have chosen, I am in effect acting on Lejeune’s advice. Indeed, Lejeune postulates 
that ‘[a]nyone who goes on about autobiography (or about any literary genre 
whatever) is obliged to confront the problem of definition […] by choosing what to 
talk about.’ (Lejeune, ‘Bis’, 121)  
 
1.5.2. Contracting the scope: British author-autobiography 
 
In one sense, my definition is narrower than Lejeune’s, as I focus on the specific case 
of British author-autobiography. Thus, I limit myself geographically as well as 
generically; all three texts come from Great Britain, and they have all been written by 
established authors. Even if I have not come across the term author-autobiography in 
my research, I prefer it to the hazy word ‘literary autobiography’ (Gunzenhauser, 
‘Literary Autobiography’, 562). According to the Encyclopedia of Life Writing, 
literary autobiography ‘often refers to autobiography written by a self-defined or 
publicly recognized writer’ (Gunzenhauser, ‘Literary Autobiography’, 562), which is 
the usage I apply. But the term also seeks to establish a distinction between 
autobiographies that are of literary value and ones that are not (cf. Gunzenhauser, 
‘Literary Autobiography’, 562), which is a meaning that has no relevance for my 
concern.   
 
1.5.3. Expanding the scope: memoir and the relational life 
 
On the other side of the spectrum, my definition is also wider than Lejeune’s, as only 
one of my primary texts – Elizabeth Jane Howard’s Slipstream (2002) – qualifies as 
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an autobiography in the Lejeunian sense. One of the other two works, Martin Amis’s 
Experience (2000), does not fully comply with the identity of the author, the narrator, 
and the protagonist. Amis does not exclusively focus on his individual life, as the 
definition demands, but is also concerned with the lives of his father Kingsley Amis 
and his cousin Lucy Partington. Lejeune admits in ‘Bis’ that through formulating the 
identity-criterion as a sine qua non, he was occupying an extreme position: ‘I tended 
to fix on an ‘all or nothing’ position, when in reality many intermediary positions are 
possible’ (Lejeune, ‘Bis’, 125). By calling on Gudmundsdóttir, I justify my decision 
to read Experience as an autobiography, for in her study on the borderlines between 
autobiography and fiction in postmodern life writing Gudmundsdóttir also includes a 
number of texts in which the author writes on the life of his or her parent(s). This 
kind of text, she claims, constitutes a large part of recent life writing, especially in 
Britain, where it is widely published and discussed as part of autobiographical 
writing. (cf. Gudmundsdóttir, 2)  
The third and last text of my trio of primary literature is Kingsley Amis’s 
Memoirs (1991). As remains to be seen, it is debatable whether Memoirs can truly be 
said to be an autobiography, as Kingsley4 not only abandons the traditional approach 
of delivering a continuous narrative, instead presenting many mini-narratives, but he 
also barely tells the story of the personality or focuses on his individual life, because 
the mini-narratives that make up the individual chapters – at least on the surface level 
– primarily deal with other people. Nevertheless, as Linda Anderson reminds us, ‘the 
law of genre can only operate by opening itself to transgression.’ (Anderson 9f.) 
Based on the fact that, essentially, genre is an effect of reading, I include Memoirs in 
my corpus of texts and maintain - similarly to Gudmundsdóttir (cf. 8) – that 
transgression is probably a good term to be employed; Memoirs may not qualify as 
autobiography proper, but its autobiographical qualities as experienced by the reader 
are unquestionable.  
There is a final generic issue that demands clarification: All three works I 
discuss in this thesis feature the word ‘memoir’ in their titles. Kingsley Amis’s book 
is simply called Memoirs, while Martin Amis and Elizabeth Jane Howard’s works 
are both labelled A Memoir in their respective subtitles. How, then, can I justify 
                                                 
4 I herewith establish the habit of calling the authors of my primary texts – Kingsley Amis, Martin  
   Amis and Elizabeth Jane Howard – by either their full or only their first names. The use of their  
   Christian names is not meant as a gesture of disrespect, but should avoid confusion, since Kingsley  
   and Martin share the same surname.  
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reading texts that openly bear the generic marker of the memoir as part of my 
definition of autobiography?  
Some scholars, such as Helen M. Buss, are anxious to maintain memoir as a 
genre independent from autobiography and lament the memoir form’s recent 
tendency of being subsumed within autobiography (cf. Buss, 595f.), even though the 
two terms tend to be used interchangeably by writers, theorists and editors alike. 
Buss highlights ‘two principal features’ that separate the memoir from 
autobiography: ‘its incremental, episodic structure and its preoccupation with the 
physicality of a materially located place in history and culture’ (Buss, 595). 
According to Buss, the memoir tends to concentrate on the times in which the 
subject-author has lived and the ‘significant others of the memorist’s world’ (Buss, 
595), while traditional autobiography focuses on the individual life (cf. Buss, 595).  
Interestingly, Buss defines the memoir as a ‘form that often  presents itself as 
being about a significant other and about history, but is always also about the self of 
the writer’ (Buss, 596). Recent theoretical works on autobiography have made 
exactly the same point from the reverse position: insofar as autobiography is about 
the self, it is also always necessarily about others and about the historical context 
embedding the individual’s life. As far as the ‘significant other’ (Buss, 596) is 
concerned, the memoir parallels the specific kind of autobiography that 
Gudmundsdóttir includes in her study: autobiography as dealing with the life of the 
author’s parent(s). In the same vein, Eakin calls this variation of the genre ‘a 
relational life’ (Eakin, How, 69, emphasis added), defining it as featuring  
the decisive impact on the autobiographer of either (1) an entire social 
environment (a particular kind of family, a community and its social 
institutions – schools, churches, and so forth) or (2) key other individuals, 
usually family members, especially parents. (Eakin, How, 69) 
 
Moreover, Eakin informs us in How Our Lives Become Stories that his conception of 
autobiography has considerably changed over the years: 
I find myself approaching life writing in the 1990s in a way that is quite 
different from my approach when I first began work on it in the 1970s […]. 
[Memoirs], which I once found peripheral to my concerns […] now seem to me 
central to the genre.’ (Eakin, How, 61)  
 
Observing that present-day autobiographers often refuse being confined to the ‘clear 
formal conventions’ (Gunzenhasuer, ‘Autobiography’, 75) of autobiography proper, 
Eakin feels ‘increasingly uncomfortable about the mismatch between contemporary 
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life writing on the one hand and received categories of […] genre on the other’ 
(Eakin, How, 57). 
The recent hybridisation of autobiographical texts, which incorporate 
autobiographical, fictional, historical and biographical elements alike, has also partly 
affected the primary texts that feature in my analysis. As a consequence, I will follow 
Eakin and Gudmundsdóttir in their inclusive approaches to autobiography, including 
autobiography proper as well as memoirs in my definition. In order to both preserve 
genre as a useful concept and respond to the fact that both autobiography theory and 
practice have opened up to surrounding discourses, I conceive of autobiography not 
as a single, hermetic category, but as a ‘cluster of genres and subgenres’ 
(Gudmundsdóttir, 1). 
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2. Concepts of the self in autobiography 
 
As has been outlined above, the generic borders of autobiography have been opened 
up considerably over the last two decades. Naturally, this process has not occurred in 
a theoretical vacuum. Scholars have not only relaxed their comfort zones as far as 
genre is concerned; they have also reshaped their ideas about what role the self plays 
in autobiography. It does not come as a great surprise that these changes have taken 
place simultaneously, for the issues of genre and selfhood in autobiography are 
thoroughly intertwined. Notably, Paul John Eakin has defined autobiography as ‘the 
story of the self’ (Eakin, How, ixf.), which illustrates just how central conceptions of 
the self are to the genre. Autobiographers may not always directly address selfhood 
as a theme, but questions of identity5 certainly ‘run[] through life and its various 
accounts’ (Brockmeier, ‘Identity’, 455), for identity is indeed ‘one of the functions 
and motives of writing a life’ (Brockmeier, ‘Identity’, 455).  
Human self-experience is an endlessly complex matter (cf. Eakin, How, x), 
which is why autobiography studies has not managed to come up with a unified 
picture of what the autobiographical self might look like. As Olshen explains, 
‘[m]uch of the difficulty in understanding the self is that, if it is granted meaning at 
all, its meaning will of necessity be entirely experiential, entirely subjective’ 
(Olshen, 799). This general intricacy is reflected in the hazy terminology that 
overshadows the entire discourse of selfhood. According to Brockmeier, the 
‘concepts of ‘I’ and identity, the self and the ego, tend to be used without clear-cut 
definitions and distinctions’ (‘Identity’, 455). This lack of conceptual accuracy might 
be unsatisfactory, but it echoes ‘an essential quality of human identity itself: namely, 
its open, fleeting, and elusive nature’ (Brockmeier, ‘Identity’, 455).  
Traditionally, the theoretical debate about the self in autobiography is rooted 
in positions formulated in philosophy, literary theory and the social sciences. More 
recently, new insights from cognitive science and neurology have also fed into the 
discussion. It is not a direct consequence of this multidisciplinary input, however, 
that the nature of the self has been examined from various standpoints in 
autobiography studies; rather, the fact that the discourse is so multi-faceted, mirrors 
the very nature of selfhood. Due to its complexity, identity offers many doors from 
which to enter its examination. In order to both assure clarity and preserve a feel for 
                                                 
5 Also see Introduction.  
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the multifariousness inherent in selfhood, I will try to break down the discussion into 
three dimensions in the sections that follow: (1) the self as autonomous vs. the self as 
relational, (2) the self as accessible, constant, and unitary vs. the self as evasive, 
changing, and multiple, and (3) the self as a representational fiction vs. the self as 
narratively constructed. Through this approach, I hope to give sufficient attention to 
each aspect and shed light on how ideas have changed in the course of the debate. 
Moreover, the term dimension is meant to reflect the notion that these features are 
part and parcel of the same phenomenon and do not exist in isolation. 
 
 
2.1. Dimension 1: the self as autonomous vs. the self as relational  
 
2.1.1.Georges Gusdorf: the autonomous self 
 
Throughout a large part of its history, autobiography theory has fostered a model that 
conceives of the self as an autonomous entity. (cf. Eakin, How, 47) In this 
emphatically individualistic approach, which is based on Georges Gusdorf’s 
groundbreaking essay from the 1950s, ‘Conditions and Limits of Autobiography’, 
the self is perceived as ‘separate and unique’ (Friedman, 34). According to Gusdorf, 
autobiography is a product of the Enlightenment6 and can only be found in the 
Western hemisphere. Friedman observes that 
[f]or Gusdorf, the consciousness of self upon which autobiography is premised 
is the sense of ‘isolated being,’ a belief in the self as a discrete, finite ‘unit’ of 
society. Man must be an island unto himself. Then, and only then, is 
autobiography possible.’ (Friedman, 36) 
 
Paradoxically, Gusdorf claims that it is within ‘social space’ (Gusdorf, 32) that the 
human child develops a sense of his or her individuality: approximately at the age of 
six months, ‘the infant […] distinguishes that which is without from his own within, 
he sees himself another among others’ (Gusdorf, 32). Yet here, the community 
within which a person becomes a self only serves as a social ‘mirror’ (Gusdorf, 33) 
against which a person can recognise his individuality and does not shape or 
influence the self in any other way. Gusdorf also presents the flipside of his argument 
of individualism as a prerequisite for autobiography: in his train of thought, true 
individual identity – and by implication autobiography – cannot emerge if ‘the 
                                                 
6 As Eakin observes, the same argument was still pursued in the 1970s by Lejeune and Weintraub who  
   also ‘traced the rise of modern autobiography to Rousseau and Enlightenment individualism’  
   (Eakin, How, 47).  
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individual does not oppose himself to others’ and ‘does not feel himself to exist 
outside others, and still less against others, but very much with others in an 
interdependent existence’ (Gusdorf, 29).  
 
2.1.2. Susan Stanford Friedman: a feminist critique of Gusdorf’s approach 
 
It was not until the 1980s that – in the wake of feminism – the universalising claims 
of Gusdorf’s model of selfhood were repudiated. According to Eakin, Mary Mason 
‘was the first of a long line of feminist critics to […] question its place in the history 
of the genre’ (Eakin, How, 47). In her essay, ‘The Other Voice: Autobiographies of 
Women Writers’ (1980), Mason conceded that the individualistic concept of the self 
as endorsed by malestream scholars might be applicable to the lives of Augustine 
and Rousseau, but it does not suitably describe how women autobiographers 
experience what it means to be a self (cf. Eakin, How, 47). In order to correct this 
‘gender bias’ (Eakin, How 47), Mason came up with an alternative model of the 
female self, i.e. ‘identity through relation to the chosen other’ (Mason, 210, as cited 
in Eakin, How, 47). Subsequently, feminist scholars such as Domna Stanton, Bella 
Brodzki, Celeste Schenck, and Susan Stanford Friedman picked up on Mason’s 
concept of ‘relational identity as the distinguishing mark of women’s lives’ (Eakin, 
How, 47f.). They asked, as Domna Stanton’s essay title suggests, ‘Is the [female] 
subject different?’, answering the question in the affirmative. In the feminist 
deconstruction of the ‘Gusdorf model’ (Eakin, How, 47), the female subject and her 
life story are indeed perceived to be endemically distinct from male selfhood and 
male autobiography (cf. Eakin, How, 48).  
Most famously, Friedman’s7 article ‘Women’s Autobiographical Selves: 
Theory and Practice’ (1988) subjects the Gusdorf model to a feminist critique and 
notes that the individualistic concept underlying Gusdorf’s autobiographical self 
raises significant ‘theoretical problems for critics who recognize that the self, self-
creation, and self-consciousness are profoundly different for women’8 (Friedman, 
34). According to Friedman,  
                                                 
7 My discussion of the feminist reassessment of the autonomous model of selfhood focuses on Susan  
   Stanford Friedman’s essay, since her reversal of Gusdorf’s male individualism is particularly  
   illuminating. 
8 It shall be noted here that Friedman also extends her concept of women’s relational identity to  
   ‘minorities and many non-Western peoples’ (Friedman, 34), but she does not elaborate on this  
   aspect. 
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[t]he very sense of identification, interdependence, and community that Gusdorf 
dismisses from autobiographical selves are key elements in the development of 
a woman’s identity. (Friedman, 38, emphasis original)  
 
Friedman puts forth two arguments to suggest that the individualistic model of the 
self is fundamentally inapplicable to women: first, the prominence that is given to 
individualism ignores the ‘importance of a culturally imposed group identity for 
women’ (Friedman, 34); and second, it neglects ‘the differences in socialization in 
the construction of male and female gender identity’ (Friedman, 34f.). Since 
women’s individuation process is different, women tend to develop ‘collective and 
relational identities’ (Friedman, 35) rather than autonomous ones. Friedman therefore 
concludes that due to their upbringing, ‘women’s sense of self exists within a context 
of a deep awareness of others’ (Friedman, 34). She capsizes Gusdorf’s argument, 
thereby establishing a model that does account for female subjectivity: 
To echo and reverse Gusdorf once more, this autobiographical self often does 
not oppose herself to others, does not feel herself to exist outside others, and 
still less against others, but very much with others in an interdependent 
existence that asserts its rhythms everywhere in the community. (Friedman, 56) 
 
 
2.1.3. Paul John Eakin: the relational self  
 
In How Our Lives Become Stories: Making Selves, Eakin notes that the feminist turn 
in autobiography theory created overdue space for the serious and sustained study of 
women’s autobiographies, which had formerly been excluded from the canon. This, 
he argues, is the ‘single most important achievement of autobiography studies’ 
(Eakin, How, 48) in the 1980s. The one lamentable if unavoidable consequence of 
feminists’ reversal of Gusdorf’s individualistic model of selfhood and their creation 
of a female alternative, however, was ‘an unfortunate polarization by gender of the 
categories we use to define self and self-experience’ (Eakin, How, 48). Thus, a set of 
male-female binaries was established according to which men had individualistic and 
autonomous conceptions of self, and – for an unspecified reason – produced their life 
stories in narrative fashion, while women’s sense of identity was said to be collective 
and relational, resulting – equally unaccountably – in ‘non-linear, discontinuous, 
nonteleological forms’ (Eakin, How, 48).  
Among other critics such as Sidonie Smith and Nancy K. Miller, Eakin was 
unhappy with ‘the sterile binary logic of categories aligned strictly by gender’ 
(Eakin, How, 50), which has resulted in the present rejection of such black and white 
thinking. In How, he informs us that he keeps encountering both evidence of 
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relationality in men’s autobiographies as well as women’s autobiographies that are 
strikingly individualistic and narrative in character (cf. Eakin, How, 50). As a 
consequence of these observations, he combines the two extreme positions by 
proposing that ‘regardless of gender, ‘all identity is relational’ (Eakin, How, 43, 
emphasis original). 
 The self is defined by and lives in relation to others (cf. How, 43). Indeed, an 
individual cannot survive on his or her own, as Eakin convincingly demonstrates 
with the story of Christopher McCandless, a young American who sought a life of 
complete isolation in Alaska and consequently died of starvation – ‘a radically 
autonomous identity gone wrong’ (Eakin, How, 45). As a result of reading about 
McCandless’s tragic death Eakin ‘began to think about autobiography in a new way’ 
(Eakin, How, 46). He draws on Paul Smith to maintain that ‘none of us lives without 
reference to an imaginative singularity which we call our ‘self’’ (Smith, 6, as cited in 
Eakin, How, 46) and that we can indeed not exist without this sense of self. (cf. How, 
46). The longevity of ‘the myth of autonomy’ (Eakin, How, 61) is no great 
astonishment, for ‘autobiography promotes an illusion of self-determination: I write 
my story; I say who I am; I create my self’ (Eakin, How, 43, emphases original). 
Nevertheless, it is paramount that autobiography studies fully addresses the 
relationality of all human identity (cf. Eakin, How, 57). As long as we conceive of 
the individual as ‘a closed system’ (Benjamin, 49, as cited in Eakin, How, 52) we are 
caught up in our own reductive categories and the discrepancy between the model 
and the lives we encounter cannot be bridged. Thus, Eakin emphasises that the 
definition of the genre and its history needs to be stretched in order to reflect 
adequately ‘the kinds of self-writing in which relational identity is characteristically 
displayed’ (Eakin, How, 43f.), as the Gusdorf model only allows for one type of 
autobiography, excluding everything else from the discourse; it is a limiting 
interpretative instrument that needs to be adapted. As Susanna Egan maintains, ‘we 
need as theorists to […] recognize what autobiographers are writing and respond to 
that’ (‘Encounters’, 598, as cited in Eakin, How, 55). On the positive side, Eakin has 
observed a ‘growing acceptance of a relational model of identity’ (Eakin, How, 74f.) 
in both theorists as well as autobiographers in recent years, which is ‘conditioning us 
to accept an increasingly large component of ‘we’-experience in the ‘I’-narratives we 
associate with autobiography’ (Eakin, How, 75).  
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2.2. Dimension 2: the self as accessible, constant, and unitary vs. the self as  
        evasive, changing, and multiple  
 
2.2.1. The self as accessible vs. the self as evasive 
 
Standard theories of autobiography have been based on the assumption that the 
autobiographical self is unitary and does not change over time. Furthermore, the 
subject is said to have unique access to his or her own consciousness. Because of this 
privileged position, the account of one’s life, if written by oneself, is more 
authoritative and reliable than anyone else’s could ever be. (cf. Olshen, 799) Even 
early scholars such as Gusdorf, however, realised that such a clear-cut concept of the 
self was necessarily a simplification. It is true; Gusdorf did believe that the 
individual holds a unique key to his self. He claimed that ‘no one can know better 
than I what I have thought, what I have wished. I alone have the privilege of 
discovering myself from the other side of the mirror’ (Gusdorf, 35). But he was also 
aware that the writer’s vision of his self is necessarily limited. Autobiography cannot 
be a mimetic mirror image of the writer’s self, because 
[a]ny autobiography is a moment in the life that it recounts; it struggles to draw 
the meaning from that life, but it is itself a meaning in the life. One part of the 
whole claims to reflect the whole but it adds something to this whole of which 
it constitutes a moment. (Gusdorf, 43) 
 
 
2.2.2. The self as constant vs. the self as changing 
 
Theorists have wondered how autobiography can faithfully replicate ‘the unity of a 
‘life’ across time’ (Olshen, 800). How can a person both change continually and 
remain the same? (cf. Olshen, 799) Philippe Lejeune, who has also been puzzled by 
this paradox, formulates the problem as follows: ‘is it really the same person, the 
baby who is born in such and such a clinic, in an era of which I have no memory 
whatsoever – and me?’ (Lejeune, ‘Pact’, 9, emphasis original) We do indeed think of 
ourselves as having a continuous self. According to Brockmeier, this aspect of 
identity is a protective barrier we build ‘against a background of instability. In the 
flux of time, identity is something firm that develops, or manifests itself against the 
backdrop of change and temporality’ (Brockmeier, ‘Identity’, 455). As Eakin notes, 
it is ‘through the use of the first person, autobiography’s most distinctive – if 
problematic – generic marker’ that most autobiographers ‘proclaim the continuous 
identity of selves early and late’ (Eakin, How, 98). Consequently, the impression is 
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fostered that ‘the ‘I’ speaking in the present – the utterer – is somehow continuous 
with the ‘I’ acting in the past – the subject of the utterance’ (Eakin, How, 98).  
Eakin calls upon John Updike to examine why exactly we cherish the notion 
of a continuous identity and thus create this double reference in autobiography to the 
past and the present, which he unmasks as ‘a fiction, the primary fiction of all self-
narration’ (Eakin, How, 93). According to Updike, the need to write down our life 
stories is a way of coming to terms with the otherwise ‘‘unbearable’ knowledge ‘that 
we age and leave behind this litter of dead, unrecoverable selves’’ (Eakin, How, 93, 
citing Updike, 226). Our sense of continuous identity might be ‘an existential fact, 
necessary for our psychological survival amid the flux of experience’ (Eakin, How, 
94), but it is also an illusion, a trick played on us by memory: in the last analysis we 
cannot hold on to this fantasy, for ‘the body changes, consciousness changes, 
memories change, and identity changes too, whether we like it or not’ (Eakin, How, 
93f.).  
As I have pointed out by citing Gusdorf, autobiography is part of the life it 
seeks to map out, for ‘human identity formation’ is a ‘lifelong process of making 
selves that we engage in daily and that informs all autobiographical writing’ (Eakin, 
How, 1). Gusdorf already identified the constructed nature of identity; he informs us 
that the writer’s self is reflected while simultaneously being constructed in the 
autobiographical process: ‘Autobiography is […] never the finished image or the 
fixing forever of an individual life: the human being is always a making, a doing’ 
(Gusdorf, 47). According to Eakin, it is memory which allows us to uphold the 
illusion of a continuous identity. (cf. Eakin, How, 93) Memory ‘reforge[s] the link 
between selves past and present’ (Eakin, How, 94), thus binding different periods of 
our personal history together. Yet the Neural Darwinist9 Israel Rosenfield, whom 
Eakin quotes, claims that memory, contrary to general belief, does not enigmatically 
stock past events on the shelves of the mind. On the contrary, Rosenfield is 
convinced that ‘memories are perceptions newly occurring in the present rather than 
fixed and stored in the past and somehow mysteriously recalled to consciousness.’ 
(Eakin, How, 18f.) He maintains that memories – like all other brain events – are 
constructed: remembering is a kind of perception, ‘and every context will alter the 
nature of what is recalled’ (Rosenfield, 89, as cited in Eakin, How, 19, emphasis 
                                                 
9 According to Neural Darwinism ‘the brain’s neural organization is constantly modified – both  
  phylogenetically and ontogenetically – to adapt to the ever-changing demands of experience.’  
  (Eakin, How,  13) 
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added by Eakin). The conclusion that Eakin draws from Rosenfield’s insights is that 
we intuitively resort to identity-sustaining structures in order to deal with the 
overwhelming impact of the continually changing nature of self-experience. (cf. 
Eakin, How, 20)  
 
2.2.3. The self as unitary vs. the self as multiple  
 
In autobiography, the use of the first person promotes the illusion that our selves 
remain the same as we age. This, however, is not the only fantasy it cultivates; it 
makes ‘our sense of self in any present moment seem more unified and organized 
than it possibly could be’ (Eakin, How, ix). We tend to forget that the pronoun ‘I’ 
ultimately refers to a subject which is ‘neither singular nor first, and we do well to 
demystify its claims’ (Eakin, How, 43). Indeed, as Brockmeier has us know, the self 
is not at all a uniform entity. Rather, identity comprises a whole set of different 
selves – or voices of the self –, which do not only come into play one after another 
but operate simultaneously (cf. Brockmeier, ‘Identity’, 455). Similarly, Eakin asserts 
that ‘[s]elf and self-experience […] are not given, monolithic, and invariant, but 
dynamic, changing and plural’ (Eakin, How, xi, emphasis added). In the introduction 
to this chapter, I have said that Eakin has characterised autobiography as ‘the story of 
the self’ (Eakin, How, xi). In fact, he has come to revoke this definition as an 
oversimplification, since his research in cognitive science has taught him just how 
very complex human self-experience is. Thus, he maintains that instead of speaking 
of the self, ‘[w]e do better […] to speak of ‘registers of self-experience’, for there are 
many stories of self to tell, and more than one self to tell them.’ (Eakin, How, xi)  
 There has been a general tendency in autobiography studies to oversimplify 
concepts of the self. One of the reasons for this theoretical shortcoming, Eakin 
argues, is the long tradition in Western philosophy to think of the subject as distinct 
from the body. Most prominently, seventeenth-century philosopher René Descartes 
defined the subject as ‘the disembodied linchpin of conscious experience’ (Eakin, 
How, 1). Inspired by new theories from cognitive science which perceive human 
identity as grounded in the body,10 Eakin repudiates the traditional mind-body split, 
taking on an ‘anti-Cartesian posture’ (Eakin, How, 1). By adopting psychologist 
Ulric Neisser’s model of the self for the study of autobiography, he seeks to reopen 
                                                 
10 Note that Neural Darwinism also works with a biologically informed model of the self, rooting self- 
   experience in the body. (cf. Eakin, How, 20)  
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the debate so as to arrive at a more open-minded, pluralistic and dynamic conception 
of selfhood in the autobiographical discourse. In his essay ‘Five Kinds of Self-
Knowledge’ (1988), Neisser distinguishes between the following selves: 
  
 
(1) the ecological self: the self perceived in a physical environment 
(2) the interpersonal self: the self as engaged in immediate social interaction 
(3) the extended self: the self of memory and anticipation 
(4) the private self: the self of conscious experiences that are not available to 
anyone else 
(5) the conceptual self: the extremely diverse forms of self-information – social 
roles, personal traits, theories of body and mind, of subject and person 
 
(cf. Eakin, How, 22f., citing Neisser 36-50) 
 
The ecological and interpersonal selves precede the other three selves in the child’s 
development. Neisser maintains that the ‘ecological self is present from the first 
(Neisser, 40, as cited in Eakin, How, 23), and that the interpersonal self is usually ‘in 
place by the time the infant is 2 months old’ (Neisser, 42, as cited in Eakin, How, 
23). By then, the child is immersed in ‘a very rich form of intersubjectivity’ (Neisser, 
42, as cited in Eakin, How, 23). What makes the existence of the ecological and the 
personal selves as separate registers so important is that – unlike Neisser’s other 
three selves – they are established before language acquisition and thus remain 
completely ‘unmediated by reflexive consciousness of any kind’ (Eakin, How, 23) 
for they are grounded in the infant’s immediate, direct perception of persons and 
objects of the physical environment (cf. Eakin, How, 23). By contrast, the extended, 
the private and the conceptual selves cannot be obtained before the child has 
mastered language. Consequently, they are influenced by the conceptual models 
available in the child’s environment and culturally encoded (cf. Eakin, How, 25).  
The main advantage of Neisser’s model is – according to Eakin – that by 
dividing the self into five different categories, it avoids getting caught in the same 
trap of simplification as the Cartesians (cf. Eakin, How, 22). Furthermore, bodies and 
selves are viewed as intertwined and inseparable (cf. Eakin, How, 29), and none of 
the five registers of self occupy a privileged position. Eakin favours Neisser’s model 
as – more than any other concept – it emphasises the previously neglected early 
modes of experience that are essential for the individual’s development of a sense of 
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self. Overall, it provides ample evidence that the time is ripe for abandoning 
restrictive concepts of the self, paving the way for a much more open, experientialist 
approach to the fascinating mystery of the self. (cf. Eakin, How, 25)  
 
 
2.3. The self as a representational fiction vs. the self as narratively constructed 
 
2.3.1. The self as representational fiction 
 
In postmodernist theories of life writing, human subjectivity emerges exclusively as 
a problem of textuality. By conceiving of identity merely as a construction of 
language (despite the fact that this constructivist process is influenced by historical 
and social forces) postmodernism has reduced the self to a mere product of 
representation – a textual signifier that is part of nothing more substantial than the 
volatile process of signification. (cf. Olshen, 799) Much of this semiotic conception 
of the self ‘retraces structuralist and poststructuralist ground reaching back to 
Saussurian linguistics’ (Eakin, How, 21). The governing assumption of this tradition 
is epitomised by Emile Benveniste’s well-known phrase, ‘‘ego’ is he who says ‘ego’’ 
(Benveniste, 224, as cited in Eakin, How, 21). Because the self is said to be entirely 
constituted by language, the meaning of a life is not given or found, but made – it is 
inscribed by language. Following this line of reasoning, postmodernist theory seeks 
to demystify the privileged status of the self in the Western philosophical tradition. It 
proceeds to decentre human subjectivity by highlighting that ‘personal identity is 
constituted by structures that exceed and encompass individual consciousness’ 
(Olshen, 799).  
Such radical doubts about the capacities of selfhood have serious implications 
for the generic status of autobiography. For that reason, the postmodernist debate has 
chiefly focussed on generic issues.11 It questions quite fundamentally if 
autobiography has anything to tell us that fiction does not, for if the self is only a 
representational figure-head, then the ‘I’ in autobiography cannot be distinguished 
from the subject of first-person narrative fiction. In the wake of poststructuralism, the 
autobiographical self indeed turns out to be ‘indistinguishable from fiction, and 
referentiality becomes no more than an illusion.’ (Olshen, 800)     
                                                 
11 Also see 1.3. 
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Eakin asserted in Fictions in Autobiography (1985) – which is one of his 
earlier works – that any ‘knowledge of the self is inseparable from the practice of 
language’ (Eakin, Fictions, 278). From a developmental perspective, he argued, a 
sense of self does not emerge in the child before the acquisition of language. Thus, 
‘self and language […] are mutually implicated in a single, interdependent system of 
symbolic behavior’ (Eakin, Fictions, 192). As has been pointed out in the last section 
of this chapter, however, his position has changed vitally since 1985, for Neisser’s 
fivefold modelling of the self suggests that human identity cannot entirely be 
relegated to language. Primarily, our sense of self is rooted in the body, for both 
Neisser’s ecological and interpersonal selves are in place a long time before the 
infant learns to speak.  
What role then, it is fair to ask, does language play in the lifelong process of 
identity formation? Poststructuralist theory has undeniably produced important 
insights for autobiography, and its merits must not be diminished. Nevertheless, it 
has left most readers, writers, and even theorists of autobiography with a bitter 
aftertaste, as Olshen tellingly remarks: 
[E]ven if we no longer can accept with Rousseau the ‘truth of nature’ or the 
belief in the textual replication of physical reality, this seems insufficient cause 
to swing to [the] opposite extreme, reducing all uses and modes of language to 
the same fiction. (Olshen, 800) 
 
Poststructuralism has taught us that the autobiographical self is but the product of 
discourse, and yet we still like to think that this does not tell the whole story. 
Consequently, we now try to ‘walk a middle path between Rousseau and Jacques 
Derrida’ (Olshen, 800): without wanting to relinquish too much of our hard-earned 
poststructural insight, we cling to autobiography’s referentiality (cf. Olshen, 800). 
Accordingly, most readers and writers of autobiography would still hold with 
Gusdorf’s aforementioned credo of privileged self-knowledge: ‘no one can know 
better than I what I have thought, what I have wished. I alone have the privilege of 
discovering myself from the other side of the mirror’ (Gusdorf, 35).  
 
2.3.2. The self as narratively constructed 
 
Due to the fundamental discontentment with poststructuralism’s language-centred 
view of the self, scholars have recently tried to find new ways of looking at human 
subjectivity. Olshen for instance, wants to rescue the self from being caught up in 
postmodern fictionalisation by differentiating between existence and textuality. 
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‘[H]aving a life’, he claims, is by nature entirely different from ‘writing (or speaking) 
a life’ (Olshen, 800), thus concluding that ‘the autobiographer’s self’ must not be 
confused with the ‘autobiographical self’ (Olshen, 800). The autobiographer’s self 
belongs to ‘the living person, the experiencing subject’, while the autobiographical 
self is ‘bound in text, a textual signifier, […] [a] persona’ (Olshen, 800, emphasis 
original). By contrast, Eakin approaches the problem from an entirely different point 
of view. He rejects the very distinction that Olshen draws between the 
autobiographer’s self and the autobiographical self. Even though he concedes that 
‘[we] know perfectly well that life certainly isn’t a story, […] and we also know that 
a person isn’t a book’ (Eakin, How, 99), he is convinced that such ‘familiar but 
misleading distinctions between experience and expression, content and form […] 
need to be set aside’ (Eakin, How, 99) if we want to break new ground in theorising 
subjectivity. Thus, he observes that the notions of self and story are inherently linked 
in the autobiographical process, for there would be no point in writing our lives if we 
did not believe that human self-experience can somehow be represented in textual 
form. (cf. Eakin, How, 99) 
Drawing on the philosopher Anthony Paul Kerby and on the narrative 
psychologist Jerome Bruner, Eakin introduces a ‘narrative model of the subject’ 
(Eakin, How, 21, emphasis added). The question of whether it is ‘in fact, anything 
more than literary convention that prompts most autobiographers to write their lives 
as narratives’ (Eakin, How, 99) serves as a starting point for this narrative turn in 
Eakin’s search for the self. Answering in the affirmative, he cites Kerby to identify 
‘self-narration [as] the defining act of the human subject, an act which is not only 
‘descriptive of the self’ but ‘fundamental to the emergence of that subject’’ (Eakin, 
How, 99, citing Kerby, 4, emphasis original). In this concept, which Eakin calls 
‘narrative identity’ (Eakin, How, 99), emphasis original), the self is, first and 
foremost, rooted in the body. Thus, the dominance of language that lingers from 
poststructuralist notions of selfhood is put into perspective, for the body features as 
‘both the site of narration and the site of ascription for subjectivity’: ‘In a face-
to-face dialogue it is the other’s ‘body’ that speaks to me […]. This physical 
body, the site of narration, thereby becomes endowed with the status of 
selfhood’ (Eakin, How, 21, citing Kerby, 71).  
 
In Eakin’s approach, narrative is absolutely central to the autobiographical 
enterprise. It is not simply a particular mode of writing, but a form of cognitive and 
phenomenological self-experience; as a consequence, it does not only describe, but 
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rather constitutes part of the ongoing process of human identity-formation. (cf. 
Eakin, How, 100) According to Sacks, ‘[n]arrative and identity are performed 
simultaneously […] in a single act of self-narration’ (Eakin, How, 101). Inspired by 
the insight that our lives are immersed in narrative practices, Sacks forms a radical 
equation: ‘narrative is us, our identities’ (Sacks, 110, as cited in Eakin, How, 101, 
emphasis original). Eakin, however, elaborates on this idea and notes that narrative 
cannot be ‘coextensive with all selfhood’ (Eakin, How, 101), if one takes into 
consideration the multiple registers of the self that Neisser includes in his model of 
identity. It is important to recall that the ecological and the interpersonal selves 
function solely through direct perception, are unmediated by reflexive consciousness, 
and are consequently unavailable for self-representation. (cf. Eakin, How, 102) 
Therefore, narrative is better thought of as ‘a constituent part of self – of the self […] 
that is expressed in self-narrations’ (Eakin, How, 101).  
From a developmental perspective, narrative practices play a determining role 
in the emergence of the first of Neisser’s three reflexive selves, i.e. the extended self, 
the self in time. Eakin claims that the extended self, which normally develops at the 
age of three and is responsible for memory and anticipation,  
constitutes the foundation of the self represented in autobiography, providing a 
proto-narrative, temporal armature, that supports and sustains our operative 
sense of who we are. (Eakin, How, 102) 
 
According to this argument, it is the faculty of memory which holds our sense of self 
intact. Eakin cites the cognitive psychologist Daniel L. Schacter to deepen his 
discussion on memory. Schacter differentiates between three major memory systems: 
‘semantic memory’, which comprises factual and conceptual knowledge, ‘procedural 
memory’, with which we learn skills and form habits, and ‘episodic memory, which 
allows us explicitly to recall personal incidents that uniquely define our lives’ 
(Schacter, Searching, 17, as cited in Eakin, How, 107f., emphases original). Within 
the realm of episodic memory, there is a particular strand called ‘autobiographical 
memory’ (Nelson, Katherine, Language, 162, as cited in Eakin, How, 108, emphasis 
original), which is responsible for chronologically sequencing significant events 
from one’s own life (cf. Nelson, Katherine, Language, 162, as referred to in Eakin, 
How, 108). Autobiographical memory emerges simultaneously with the acquisition 
of language, which is why we normally have no recollections at all before the age of 
three or four. Prior to that, memories are only useful with regard to future behaviour, 
for we have not yet learned to share our memories with others. It is only when we 
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start talking about what we have experienced that memories become valued for 
themselves and can be called autobiographical. (cf. Eakin, How, 108f.)  
Memory – as has been noted before – does not preserve the past. On the 
contrary, it is a kind of perception that is constructed anew in every moment of 
recall. (cf. Eakin, How, 107) The construction of memory, however, is not limited to 
the mental processes: memory is embedded in a social and cultural context, which is 
particularly relevant when it comes to autobiographical memory. Katherine Nelson 
emphasises that ‘the autobiographical memory system is a product of social and 
cultural construction’ (Eakin, How, 109), for exchanging memories with others is a 
fundamental social activity that we learn in early childhood. In this activity, we find 
out what sort of memories are shareable as we create ‘a personal history that has its 
own value independent of the general memory function of prediction and preparation 
for future events’ (Nelson, Katherine, ‘Ontogeny’, 266f., as cited in Eakin, How, 
109). The social constructivist approach to memory has also been supported by other 
scholars. Kenneth J. Gergen, for example, argues that by reporting on our memories 
we engage in an approved form of telling, while Robyn Fivush stresses the relational 
context in which the extended self develops. (cf. Eakin, How, 110f.) According to 
Fivush, the chief function of autobiographical memory is that of ‘organizing our 
knowledge about ourselves, a self-defining function’; furthermore, she maintains that 
‘it is the sense of self that is crucial for autobiographical memory’ (Fivush, 
‘Functions’, 227, as cited in Eakin, How, 111).  
Drawing on Catherine E. Snow and Dennie Palmer Wolf’s analyses of 
‘memory talk’ (Eakin, How, 112), which refers to the conversations a child has with 
his or her caregiver(s) about past experiences, Eakin observes that it is this praxis of 
memory talk which supports the emergence of the child’s sense of extended 
selfhood, ‘for awareness of time is central to both’ (Eakin, How, 112). Thus, the 
development of autobiographical memory in early childhood lays the foundations 
and ‘prepares for the writing of autobiography – when it occurs – in adult life: […] 
both belong to a single, continuous, lifelong trajectory of self-narration’ (Eakin, 
How, 113). By talking about and remembering the past, children ultimately learn to 
‘narrativize their experience’ (Nelson, Katherine, Language, 170, as cited in Eakin, 
How, 115). As Eakin observes, it is particularly interesting with regard to 
autobiography that memory talk allows children to gradually master the double point 
of view that is fundamental to all retrospect: ‘‘the person who identifies with the 
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younger, distant person (the object of memory) and the person who engages in 
recollection (the subject who currently has the memory)’’ (Wolf, 192, as cited in 
Eakin, How, 116). By calling on Wolf, he memorably concludes that ‘[t]he child who 
has learned through ‘memory talk’ ‘to speak as subject and object, author and critic, 
character and narrator’ is a budding autobiographer.’ (Eakin, How, 116, citing Wolf, 
208).   
Although Eakin notes that the subject is essentially ‘an effect of language, of 
the interpersonal12 discourse with parent or caregiver that fosters the emergence of 
the extended self’ (Eakin, How, 139), his concept of selfhood moves away from the 
purely language-centred perspective that poststructuralist theory has embraced. Not 
only does he recognise the body as the temple of the self, he also merges the 
categories of existence and representation, which have had a long tradition of 
separation in Western philosophy. In Eakin’s groundbreaking model of selfhood, 
narrative and identity are so thoroughly intertwined ‘that each constantly and 
properly gravitates into the conceptual field of the other’ (Eakin, How, 100). Both 
early self-narrations as well as the writing of autobiography in maturity are narrative 
practices, and both belong to the lifelong process of identity formation. (cf. Eakin, 
How, 101) Thus, life writing is not necessarily restricted to the page, for ‘we are 
always writing our lives in the act of living them’ (Eakin, How, 123). Narrative – it is 
important to recall – is not only a textual device, but first and foremost an identity-
constructing practice that we perform on a daily basis.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
12 The narrative and the relational dimensions are in fact intertwined in Eakin’s approach, as narration  
    is by nature a relational act, and narrative competence is transmitted intersubjectively. (cf. Eakin,  
    How, 116)  
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3. The role of narrative in autobiography 
 
In the previous chapter, narrative was discussed with regard to its role in the lifelong 
process of identity-formation. Narrative, however, does not only help us shape and 
maintain our sense of self,13 it also looms large in other elements of human 
experience. Therefore, this chapter relies on theories from narratology and 
autobiography studies both in order to examine the concept of narrative on a broader 
scale and to consider autobiography as a specific type of storytelling that makes use 
of various narrative techniques.  
 
 
3.1. The ubiquity of narrative 
 
In Narrtive Fiction: Contemporary Poetics (1983), Shlomith Rimmon-Kenan 
maintains that our lives are immersed in narrative practices:  
Newspaper reports, history books, novels, films, comic strips, pantomime, 
dance, gossip, psychoanalytic sessions are only some of the narratives which 
permeate our lives (Rimmon-Kenan, 1).  
 
Autobiography, we may add here, is another. Michael Hanne makes a similar 
observation when he states that any examination of the connection between narrative 
and life writing must start with ‘an acknowledgement of the ubiquity and centrality 
of narrative to the personal and social existence of all humans’ (Hanne, 634). In his 
view, narrative is one of the most important mechanisms with which we organise and 
make sense of the flux of experience. Narrative is inextricably linked with self-
knowledge, as Hanne demonstrates by citing various scholars (cf. Hanne, 633f.): the 
philosopher Louis Mink denotes narrative as ‘a primary cognitive instrument’; the 
cultural critic Frederic Jameson refers to narrative as ‘the all-informing process […], 
the central function or instance of all human mind’ (Hanne, 634); and the historian 
Hayden White, who observes that the word narrate originates from the same Sanskrit 
                                                 
13 Eakin’s model of narrative identity (see chapter 2), which he discusses in How Our Lives Become  
    Stories (1999), has been tailored specifically for autobiography studies. There is a parallel concept  
    in narratology, which is to be found in Ricoeur’s  Time and Narrative (3 vols., 1984-8). Eakin does  
    not quote Ricoeur in this respect, but the two ideas seem to be closely related, as Michael  
    Sheringham explains: ‘‘L’identité narrative’ does not reduplicate and externalize a process inherent  
    in consciousness: prior to the act of narrative is only the need and demand for narrative  
    understanding […]. Narrative identity is not the product of organic unfolding based on passive  
    intuitive understanding, but a dynamic modelling process driven by active, constructive processes  
    at work in our engagement with the vestiges and enigmas of temporal experience.’ (Sheringham, 
    26, as cited in Gudmundsdóttir, 74). 
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root gna as the Greek and Latin words for to know, claims that there may perhaps 
even be no knowing that does not involve narrating. It is the literary theorist Peter 
Brooks, however, who – according to Hanne – demonstrates most vividly the 
primary role that narrative plays in our daily existence:  
Our lives are ceaselessly intertwined with narrative, with the stories that we tell 
and hear told, those we dream or imagine or would like to tell, all of which are 
reworked in that story of our own lives that we narrate to ourselves in an 
episodic, sometimes semi-conscious, but virtually uninterrupted monologue. 
We live immersed in narrative, recounting and reassessing the outcome of our 
future projects, situating ourselves at the interaction of several stories not yet 
completed. (Brooks, as cited by Hanne, 634) 
 
As a consequence, autobiography should be perceived as a specialised form of the 
much wider human practice by which we use narrative continually to ‘invent and 
reinvent ourselves and the world around us’ (Hanne, 634).  
 
 
3.2. Narrative and temporality  
 
Now that the ubiquity of narrative has been established, it is fair to ask why narrative 
plays such a dominant role in human experience. One answer to this admittedly 
complex question may be found in the fact that human existence and narrative share 
a fundamental feature: both are temporal in nature.14 Rimmon-Kenan defines 
narrative as representing ‘a succession of events’ (Rimmon-Kenan, 2, emphasis 
original). Narration, she maintains,  
suggests (1) a communication process in which the narrative as message is 
transmitted by addresser to addressee and (2) the verbal15 nature of the medium 
used to transmit the message (Rimmon-Kenan, 2).  
 
The key terms of these definitions – succession, event, communication process – all 
point towards this temporal dimension. The sociolinguist William Labov’s concept 
of narrative as ‘any sequence of clauses which contains at least one temporal 
juncture’ (as cited in Hanne, 633), addresses the issue of temporality more directly, 
reminding us of ‘our dependence on narrative for describing lived time’ (Hanne, 634, 
emphasis added).  
                                                 
14 This insight is shared by both scholars of autobiography (e.g. Blowers) as well as narratologists   
    (e.g. Ricoeur, Rimmon-Kenan). 
15 There are narratives such as dance or pantomime which do not use language. However, this thesis is  
    concerned with autobiography, a verbal form of narrative, which is why the specific characteristics  
    of non-verbal narratives will not be dealt with here.  
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As Rimmon-Kenan has us know, time is one of the most crucial categories of 
human existence (cf. Rimmon-Kenan, 43). Some of our notions of time, such as day 
and night or the recurrence of the four seasons, spring from natural processes and 
thus belong to the concept of ‘universal time’ (Blowers, 107). Our civilisation, 
however, has established the model of ‘historical time, which mediates between 
universal time and our experience of lived time’ (Blowers, 107). Contrary to the 
circularity of universal time, historical time is uni-directional and irreversible, thus 
enabling us to measure the passing of time (e.g. with calendars and clocks) and to 
talk about it. (cf. Blowers, 108 and Rimmon-Kenan, 44). In this sense, time is a sort 
of one-way street, in which both the object and the subject of experience are in a 
perpetual flux. (cf. Rimmon-Kenan, 44) Interestingly, both Blowers – who is a 
theorist of autobiography – and Rimmon-Kenan – a narratologist – draw similar 
conclusions from observing the difference between universal and historical time 
(even though Rimmon-Kenan does not use the words ‘universal’ and ‘historical’). In 
the context of showing that narrative, with its dependence on temporality, is a feature 
common to fictional as well as historical discourses, Blowers makes the following 
claim:  
[t]he invention of historical time allows us […] to place ourselves in a 
continuum and compare our lives with those who went before us, even to an 
extent immortalize ourselves by looking back to our ‘forefathers’ in one 
direction and towards our children […] in another. The narrative structure (or 
ways of refiguring time) that we have invented for putting ourselves on this 
historical continuum are the same structures that we use to refigure time in 
fictional narratives. (Blowers, 108) 
 
Following an entirely different endeavour, namely explaining the difference between 
story-time and text-time, Rimmon-Kenan holds that ‘time is not only a recurrent 
theme in a great deal of narrative[s], it is also a constituent factor of both story and 
text’ (Rimmon-Kenan, 44, emphasis added). 
 It may be important to clarify Rimmon-Kenan’s usage of the terms ‘story’ 
and ‘text’. She differentiates between three different aspects of narrative: the events, 
their verbal representation, and the act of telling or writing, which she labels ‘story’, 
‘text’ and ‘narration’ respectively16 (cf. Rimmon-Kenan, 3). ‘Story’ refers to ‘the 
narrated events, abstracted from their disposition in the text and reconstructed in their 
chronological order, together with the participants in these events’ (Rimmon-Kenan, 
3). The ‘text’, on the other hand, is what we read or hear; it is ‘a spoken or written 
                                                 
16 This classification is based on Genette’s distinction between ‘histoire’, ‘récit’ and ‘narration’. (cf.  
    Rimmon-Kenan, 3)  
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discourse which undertakes their telling’ (Rimmon-Kenan, 3). Because the text is 
communicated, ‘it implies someone who speaks or writes it. The act or the process of 
production is the third aspect – ‘narration’’ (Rimmon-Kenan, 4). All three of these 
elements of narrative unfold along the temporal axis: time is constitutive of both the 
means of representation through language (narration, text) and the object represented 
(the events of the story). (cf. Rimmon-Kenan, 12)  
 On first glance, Rimmon-Kenan’s concepts of ‘story’, ‘text’ and ‘narration’ 
mirror the very distinction between existence and representation or content and form 
that has been rebutted by Eakin (see chapter two) as a hindering device in the study 
of autobiography (cf. Eakin, How, 99). However, scrutinising ‘story’, ‘text’ and 
‘narration’ in isolation has no harming qualities in itself; on the contrary, it provides 
a powerful tool for the analysis of narrative texts and has a long-standing tradition in 
narratology. Moreover, Rimmon-Kenan is eager to note that such a threefold concept 
is only a theoretical model which can and should not endeavour a complete 
separation of the individual elements of narrative, for they are part and parcel of the 
same phenomenon. The relevant passage shall be quoted at length, as it will help to 
resolve this seeming opposition between narratological and autobiographical 
perspectives regarding the nature of narrative: 
[T]he text is the only [aspect] directly available to the reader. It is through the 
text that he or she acquires knowledge of the story (its object) and of the 
narration (the process of its production)[…] [H]owever, the narrative text is 
itself defined by these two other aspects: unless it told a story it would not be a 
narrative, and without being narrated or written it would not be a text. Indeed, 
story and narration may be seen as two metonymies of the text, the first 
evoking it through its narrative content, the second through its production. 
(Rimmon-Kenan, 4) 
 
Given the fact that narrative theory clearly acknowledges the interdependence 
between content (story) and form (text, narration), it seems likely that Eakin does not 
criticise the model itself but rather the way it has been applied in autobiography 
studies. In the context of autobiography, the content of a narrative is supposed to be 
‘true’, which may perhaps account for the problematically strict division between 
existence and textuality as found in traditional theories of autobiography. As the 
narratologist Paul Ricoeur points out, however, human action can only be narrated 
‘because it is always already articulated by signs, rules, and norms. […] [I]t is always 
already symbolically mediated.’ (Ricoeur, vol. 1, 57, as cited in Gudmundsdóttir, 83) 
Eakin borrows the very notion of textual and experiential interdependence from 
narrative theory when he observes that ‘‘the picture’ is an intrinsic part of ‘the thing 
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itself’ and cannot be separated out of it’ (Eakin, ‘Narrative and Chronology’, 35, as 
cited by Gudmundsdóttir, 84).   
 Returning to the topic of temporality and recalling Rimmon-Kenan’s and 
Blower’s statements on the connection between time and narrative, we may observe 
that scholars from both autobiography theory and narrative theory recognise the 
temporal structure of narrative and human experience despite their different outlooks. 
In Time and Narrative, Ricoeur formulates this reciprocity between human time and 
narrated time as follows:  
time becomes human time to the extent that it is organized after the manner of 
narrative; narrative, in turn, is meaningful to the extent that it portrays the 
features of temporal experience. (Ricoeur, vol. 1, 3, as cited by Gudmunds-
dóttir, 67) 
 
 
 
3.3. The past, memory and fictionality in the autobiographical process 
 
3.3.1. The inaccessibility of the past 
 
As a specific form of narrative locating ‘the self in time and temporality’ 
(Brockmeier, ‘Time’, 876), autobiography always involves at least two different yet 
interlocked temporal levels, i.e. the past (past experiences as accessed via memory) 
and the present (the writing, and experiences at the moment of writing which in turn 
influence the mnemonic process). (cf. Gudmundsdóttir, 62 and Brockmeier, ‘Time’, 
877) As has been indicated in chapter one, autobiography stands at the generic 
interface between fiction and history, both of which are narratives that seek to 
represent time comprehensibly (cf. Blowers, 106). According to Blowers, any 
successful narrative 
must represent time in a plausible and recognizable way. It is impossible to 
escape the strictures of time whether writing science fiction or biography, since 
without time there is no narrative and, subsequently, no meaning. Even when 
we are not writing chronologically, we still maintain a sense of time, which is 
inherent to the narrative or story or plot. (Blowers, 106) 
 
Rather than merely remembering and representing the past, the autobiographer thus 
refigures time (cf. Blowers, 106). This refiguration, however, is no trivial 
undertaking. For a start, the past is not unproblematically and transparently available 
(cf. Blowers, 109). The novelist Julian Barnes vividly demonstrates this evasiveness 
of the past in his fictional biography Flaubert’s Parrot, in which the main character 
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and amateur Flaubert expert, Geoffrey Braithwaite, contemplates the past 
philosophically: 
How do we seize the past? Can we ever do so? When I was a medical student 
some pranksters at an end-of-term dance released into the hall a piglet which 
had been smeared with grease. It squirmed between legs, evaded capture, 
squealed a lot. People fell over trying to grasp it, and were made to look 
ridiculous in the process. The past often seems to behave like that piglet. 
(Barnes, 5) 
   
The same problem has also been widely discussed in the theory of autobiography, 
albeit in a more academic manner: As early as 1955, Gusdorf is aware of the 
fundamental inaccessibility of the past. In Conditions and Limits of Autobiography, 
he observes that ‘the past is the past, it cannot return to dwell in the present’ 
(Gusdorf, 40). Moreover, he observes that autobiography cannot be a ‘simple 
repetition of the past as it was, for recollection brings us not the past itself but only 
the presence in spirit of a world forever gone’ (Gusdorf, 38). What sets him apart 
from modern scholars, however, is his optimistic attitude despite his recognition of 
the ‘limits’ of autobiography. He is convinced that ‘a sufficiently moral alertness and 
a basic good faith will make it possible to re-establish the factual truth’ (Gusdorf, 
40). According to Gusdorf, who equates the task of the autobiographer to that of a 
historian (cf. Gusdorf, 39), the difficulties one may encounter in retrieving the past 
can be managed ‘through the exercise of critical objectivity and impartiality’ 
(Gusdorf, 40).  
Unlike Gusdorf, contemporary theorists neither have the illusion that 
‘objectivity and impartiality’ can be achieved, nor do they think an objective 
approach desirable in autobiography. In order to visualise the elusiveness of the past, 
Ricoeur introduces the metaphor of the trace: 
On the one hand, the trace is visible here and now, a vestige, a mark. On the 
other hand, there is a trace (or track) because ‘earlier’ a human being or an 
animal passed this way. (Ricoeur, vol. 3, 119, as cited in Gudmundsdóttir, 66) 
 
The trace itself is thus present, but it reminds us of something that is absent, 
something that belongs to the past. The trace, however, can never tell us exactly what 
it is a trace of, nor, for that matter, can it bring back the thing itself. (cf. 
Gudmundsdóttir, 67) In a similar vein, Stanley, asserts that  
‘[t]he past’ is not a time and place that ‘exist’ […] – it does not go on its own 
sweet way whether I visit it or not. Its time is over and done with and it exists, 
now, only in and through representational means. Its ‘then’ no longer has 
existence except through ‘now’ and those moments of apprehension concerned 
with it. (Stanley, 6) 
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If Stanley observes that the past only exists through representational means, she does 
not, however, clarify how we arrive at this representation. The missing link and thus 
the key to the past – or rather to its trace – seems to lie in the faculty of memory.  
 
3.3.2. Memory and fictionality 
 
In Borderlines: Autobiography and Fiction in Postmodern Life Writing, 
Gudmundsdóttir closely examines the role of memory in autobiography. The act of 
self-writing, she maintains, involves ‘a dialogue with […] the voice of memory, 
since […] autobiography is inherently the genre of memory’ (Gudmundsdóttir, 11). 
The problem with human memory is, however, that it is highly subjective and 
fallible. We cannot remember everything that ever happened, not even to ourselves. 
(cf. Blowers, 109) Blowers interprets this imperfect vision we have of our past 
experiences as ‘a prodigious philosophical problem: the individual is more than he 
can know’, since ‘the mind is too narrow to contain itself entirely’ (Blowers, 109). 
Moreover, the process of documenting what we remember is no more accurate or 
transparent. (cf. Blowers, 109) Andreas Huyssen – whom Blowers cites – articulates 
this paradox underlying the mnemonic process when he points out that we perceive 
the past as real, yet it is in fact already always mediated through textual 
representation (cf. Blowers, 109): ‘The past is not simply there in memory, but it 
must be articulated to become memory.’ (Huyssen, 2-3, as cited in Blowers, 109, 
emphasis added) For autobiography, this means that representation is not limited to 
writing; it is also a constitutive element of remembering. Huyssen applies this 
argument to explain that the underlying structures of historical texts are in fact very 
similar to those of fictional texts. As Blowers informs us, he seeks to undermine the 
notion that historical discourse is ‘non-imaginative’ by highlighting that 
‘remembering is itself a creative activity’ because ‘we […] have to imagine 
ourselves into the past’ (Blowers, 109).  
 In a similar vein, Gusdorf observes that ‘autobiography cannot be a pure 
record of existence, an account book or a logbook’ (Gusdorf, 42). On the one hand, 
this necessary incompleteness of autobiography is due to the aforementioned fact that 
we cannot remember everything that ever happened to us. On the other hand, our 
memories are so many and varied that we cannot display all of them in an 
autobiography. We have to select from and structure our memories (cf. Cockshut, 
‘Autobiography and Biography’, 79) in order to arrive at a ‘comprehensive sketch’ 
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(Gusdorf, 35) of the lives we have lived. Thus, structuration and selection are 
powerful creative tools which the autobiographer uses in narrating his own history. 
Significantly, Gudmundsdóttir terms this process of choosing some memories and 
discarding others17 ‘self-invention’ (Gudmundsdóttir, 9), because the narrative 
structure an autobiographer gives his/her text is an important part of the meaning-
making process which autobiography involves. (cf. Gudmundsdóttir, 9) In 
reorganising a selection of memories into a specific form,  
the autobiographer consciously forgets (if that is possible) other interpretations 
of the same event[s], other memories that might contradict the one[s] he or she 
is writing about. (Gudmundsdóttir, 36) 
 
From this observation Gudmundsdóttir draws the conclusion that fiction is an 
inherent part of the forging of autobiographical narratives. Fictional elements are at 
work when we supplement memory gaps as well as when we rearrange and regroup 
events (cf. Gudmundsdóttir, 4 and 59). According to Gudmundsdóttir, ‘real’ stories 
do not exist. Quoting the historian Hayden White to underscore this argument, she 
informs us that ‘[s]tories are told or written, not found. And as for the notion of a 
‘true’ story, this is virtually a contradiction in terms. All stories are fictions.’ (White, 
27, as cited in Gudmundsdóttir, 59) She does not, however, interpret the influence of 
fiction on autobiography as a disadvantage. On the contrary, in her view fiction is 
coextensive with the performative dimension of memory and memory-writing and is 
thus necessary in a good sense. Fiction is perceived as the process of   
making and not just making up […]. It affirms the increasingly highlighted 
‘act-value’ of autobiographical writing at the expense of its traditionally 
supposed ‘truth-value’ (Gratton, 253, as cited in Gudmundsdóttir, 4).  
 
According to Gudmundsdóttir, fictional processes are intrinsic to the 
autobiographical process itself, because writing an autobiography is one specialised 
form of remembering. (cf. Gudmundsdóttir, 54)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
17 From a narratological perspective, the taking on of some memories and casting off of others  
    necessarily leads to information gaps, which Rimmon-Kenan considers a necessary part of  
    narrative, because no story can be told in its entirety (cf. Rimmon-Kenan, 127) This does of course  
    not only hold true for narrative fiction but can equally be applied to autobiography. 
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3.4. Analysing autobiography as a type of narrative 
 
3.4.1. Justifying the narrative approach 
 
Interestingly, Gudmundsdóttir’s revelation of the fictionality of autobiography on the 
basis of memory mirrors Lejeune’s starting point for demarcating autobiography as 
an independent genre.18 Despite the risk of sounding repetitive, it seems essential in 
the present context to restate Lejeune’s ‘insistence that autobiography is necessarily 
in its deepest sense a special kind of fiction, its self and its truth as much created as 
(re)discovered realities’ (Eakin, ‘Foreword’, ix). In L’autobiographie en France 
(1971), Lejeune asserts that ‘autobiography is above all a narrative, which follows in 
time the story of an individual’ (Lejeune, L’autobiographie en France, 33, emphasis 
original). By recognising the importance of the proper name on the title cover in The 
Autobiographical Pact (1973), and the specific consequences of its reference to a 
world beyond the text, Lejeune was able to distinguish autobiography from the 
novel. This differentiation of the specific generic characteristics of autobiography has 
of course been invaluable and indispensible for autobiography studies; however, it 
does not discard Lejeune’s earlier observation that ‘on the level of analysis within the 
text’ (Lejeune, ‘Pact’, 13), meaning ‘on the level of structures, modes, and narrative 
voices’ (Lejeune, ‘Pact’, 29), ‘there is no difference’ (Lejeune, ‘Pact’, 13, emphasis 
original) between autobiography and the novel. Therefore, the analysis of the three 
chosen primary texts in the second part of this thesis will be conducted on the basis 
of narrative theory. This does not mean, of course, that the analysis will cancel out 
the insights from autobiography studies that have been presented above or resort to 
an outdated poststructuralist equation of autobiography and fiction. On the contrary, 
the idea is to operate on two fronts: conducting a narrative analysis while also 
incorporating context-relevant aspects of autobiography theory.19 This procedure 
seems justifiable for the following reasons: 
  
a) narrative is pivotal to autobiography;  
b) there is no narrative poetics designed specifically for autobiography; 
                                                 
18 See 1.2.2. for the discussion of Lejeune’s concept of the autobiographical pact.  
19 The focus of the analysis – there has to be a focus for the sake of clarity and readability – will lie in  
    the examination of narrative structure, but the awareness that we are dealing with autobiography –  
    not fiction – will nevertheless be continually present and have an influence on the outcome.  
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c) there are manifest parallels between fictional and autobiographical narratives; 
and  
d) it is an interesting and challenging experiment to find out how exactly the 
theory of narrative fiction can be applied to autobiography and whether or 
where such an approach has its limitations.  
 
3.4.2. Narrative theory: the toolkit 
 
The analysis will draw on three books of narrative theory: Franz Karl Stanzel’s A 
Theory of Narrative (1979, English version 1984), Shlomith Rimmon-Kenan’s 
Narrative Fiction: Contemporary Poetics (1983), and Dorrit Cohn’s Transparent 
Minds: Narrative Modes for Presenting Consciousness in Fiction (1978). Stanzel 
presents a self-contained, all-encompassing model of narrative fiction, the 
typological circle, which comprises three different narrative situations (authorial, 
first-person and figural) and the techniques with which they operate (cf. Stanzel, xvi 
and 237). Rimmon-Kenan and Cohn, on the other hand, do not come up with 
independent systems of categorisation. While Rimmon-Kenan brings together 
sections of narrative theory from different schools (structuralism, formalism, new 
criticism, the Tel-Aviv school of poetics and the phenomenology of reading) (cf. 
Rimmon-Kenan, 4-5), Cohn has a tighter focus, exploring the narrative rendering of 
mental processes. The following sections will not be an overview of the theoretical 
models Stanzel, Rimmon-Kenan and Cohn elaborate; they will very briefly introduce 
those narrative concepts that tie in with autobiography theory, thus forging a link 
between the two methodological axes of the analysis. 
Rimmon-Kenan’s20 definition of narration as a communication process and 
her theoretical tripartition of narrative into story, text and narration has already been 
touched upon in section 3.1. Within each of the three elements, she explains in detail 
the processes that are at work. Some of these, such as the concepts of time, 
characterisation, narrative levels and speech representation, will be weaved into the 
analysis in one way or another.  
                                                 
20 Rimmon-Kenan makes an interesting remark in her introduction which may serve as an addendum  
    to the justification of my narrative approach in 3.4.1.: Like Stanzel’s and Cohn’s books her  
    approach is directed towards narrative fiction (cf. Rimmon-Kenan, 3). She concedes, however, that  
    while ‘non-fictional verbal narratives, like […] autobiography’ (Rimmon-Kenan, 3) have specific  
    characteristics, ‘some of the procedures used in the analysis of fiction may be applied to texts  
    conventionally defined as ‘non-fiction’.’ (Rimmon-Kenan, 3) 
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In Stanzel’s typological circle, the first-person narrative situation21 is most 
relevant in the context of autobiography. Stanzel distinguishes between the 
peripheral and the quasi-autobiographical first-person narrator; the former is a minor 
character who functions as the biographer of the protagonist or as an eyewitness of 
the main events (cf. Stanzel, 205f.); the latter, on the other hand, is a narrator-
protagonist from whose point of view the events of the story unfold. (Stanzel, 209f.) 
Apart from that, there are two features that stand out in Stanzel’s discussion of the 
first-person narrative situation: the notion of ‘narrative distance’ (Stanzel, 96) and 
the motivation of the act of narration (cf. Stanzel, 93).  
 
3.4.2.1. Narrative distance: the two selves 
In the quasi-autobiographical first-person narrative situation, there is an intrinsic 
tension between ‘the self as hero and the self as narrator’ (Stanzel, 212), or between 
the experiencing and the narrating selves22 of the ‘I’-figure of the narrative (cf. 
Stanzel, 213). The narrative distance that separates the two selves of the narratorial 
‘I’ depends on the amount of time, learning and experience that has taken place 
between the events of the story and its narration. (cf. Stanzel, 213) According to 
Stanzel, the measure of this disparity is therefore ‘also one of the most important 
points of departure in the interpretation’ (Stanzel, 213) of a quasi-autobiographical 
narrative. If a narrator completely identifies with his/her younger self, he/she will 
employ different narrative strategies from a narrating self who feels utterly estranged 
from his/her earlier self (cf. Stanzel, 213).  
These different retrospective techniques of rendering consciousness in the 
first person are the focus of Dorrit Cohn’s Transparent Minds. To one side there is 
the knowing and enlightened narrator who creates a wide gap between his narrating 
and his experiencing self (cf. Cohn, 143) by means of ‘dissonant self-narration’ 
(Cohn, 145). To the other side, an ‘unobtrusive narrator […] identifies with his 
earlier incarnation, renouncing all manner of cognitive privilege’ (Cohn, 155). This 
type of narrator, whose basic technique is called ‘consonant self-narration’ (Cohn, 
153), does not put his present, narrating self in the forefront of concern by adding 
                                                 
21 There are, in fact, autobiographies written in the third person, but neither of my primary texts fall  
    into this category.   
22 For the discussion of the self in autobiography and how it can be perceived as changing over time or  
    staying the same see section 2.2.2. Gusdorf already writes about the distance between selves past  
    and present, although he, of course, does not do so in narrative terms: ‘the man who remembers his  
    past has not been for a long time the same being, the child or adolescent, who lived that past.’  
    (Gusdorf, 38) 
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reflections, judgements or opinions to his past experience (cf. Cohn, 155). Between 
those two extremes, many shades and variations are possible, and a narrator may also 
slide up and down the scale, increasing or contracting the distance between the 
narrating and the experiencing selves as the narration progresses.  
 
3.4.2.2. Motivation and ‘embodiment’ 
Stanzel maintains that most first-person narrators choose not to identify completely 
with the experiencing self. He links the cause of this resistance to the so-called 
‘embodiment’ (Stanzel, 99) of the experiencing self. The narrator strives to distance 
himself/herself from his/her past mistakes or confusions by means of displaying his 
intellectual faculties of cerebration, remembrance and imagination. (cf. Stanzel, 99)  
Contrary to the authorial third-person narrator, a first-person narrator 
‘belongs to the represented reality, the […] world in which the characters live’ 
(Stanzel, 90). He/she is physically and existentially present or ‘‘embodied’ in the 
world of the characters’ (Stanzel, 90). In the quasi-autobiographical first-person 
narrative situation, as Stanzel informs us, this embodiment is characteristic of both 
the experiencing and the narrating selves (cf. Stanzel, 91). As a consequence, the 
embodied narrator’s motivation to tell his story is not – as with the authorial narrator 
– aesthetic but ‘existential’ (Stanzel, 93). This narrative drive originates from the 
joys and frustrations, the feelings and needs the narrator himself experienced. 
Depending on whether he/she feels close or distant to his/her earlier self, the 
narration can either have a fateful, inevitable and compulsive quality or it can be 
used on the part of the mature self to satisfy the need to organise and give meaning to 
the chaos of the past. No matter how big or small the narrative distance, the narrative 
urge is always existentially determined, for the narrator’s experience and the 
narrative process are inseparable. (cf. Stanzel, 93) According to Stanzel, 
the reader is constantly invited to keep in mind this existential unity of the 
experiencing self and the narrating self. Thus the consummation of the life of a 
first-person narrator is only attained with the completion of the narrative act. 
(Stanzel, 93) 
 
 Stanzel’s delineation of fictional first-person narrators’ narrative motivation 
perfectly matches the two main reasons that autobiography theorists connect with the 
fact that memoirs are constantly being written and read: First, narrative provides us 
with a means of establishing causality and continuity and allocating meaning to 
events (cf. Gudmundsdóttir, 59); it has the function of ordering the chaos of our 
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lives. Self-narration, as Gudmundsdóttir informs us, ‘is a basic human practice and 
narrative is there to provide beginnings, middles and ends’ (Gudmundsdóttir, 59). 
The second motivational factor that autobiography theory stresses is ‘the wish to 
avoid oblivion.’ (Cockshut, ‘Autobiography and Biography’, 78) Even though this 
concern with the fear of death is also present in narrative fiction, it seems to be 
specifically highlighted in autobiography, for ‘death is the sanction of everything the 
storyteller can tell. He has borrowed his authority from death.’ (Benjamin, Walter, as 
cited in Hanne, 635). We thus narrate our lives in order to come to terms with the 
fact that we will age and pass away; 
[e]ach of us tends to think of himself worthy of a special interest. I count, my 
existence is significant to the world, and my death will leave the world 
incomplete. In narrating my life, I give witness of myself even from beyond my 
death and so can preserve this precious capital that ought not disappear. 
(Gusdorf, 29) 
 
When we set out to analyse individual works of autobiography, a narrator’s 
motivation for telling his/her story has to be considered anew for each text we 
approach, as ‘the question why one writes is notoriously difficult’ (Gudmundsdóttir, 
24). However, both narrative’s capacity of giving form to what is unformed and the 
inescapability of death are valuable theoretical tools which may serve as a starting 
point for this mission.  
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Analysis 
 
 
4. Kingsley Amis’s Memoirs (1991) 
 
4.1. Macrostructure: narrative approach and structural design 
 
The title cover of Kingsley Amis’s Memoirs shows a photograph of the author.23 
With a beginning smile on his face, Sir Kingsley sits in a comfortable armchair, 
resting his legs on a desk. It seems as if he has done all his work and the time has 
come for him to relax and confidently look back on his life. A photograph can be 
interpreted in many different ways, but it is interesting here that the presence of the 
author’s portrait on the book jacket totally contradicts the approach that underlies 
this autobiography. As Kingsley reveals in the preface, he has tried to ‘focus on 
others rather than [him]self’ and to ‘keep [him]self away from centre stage’ 
(Memoirs, xv). Thus, the first impression of the title photograph is (intentionally?) 
misleading: the author may be on display on his autobiography,24 but once one has 
opened the book, one starts to have doubts whether there is as much of Kingsley 
Amis in his Memoirs as the front cover promises.  
Indeed, Memoirs is not a conventional work of autobiography. One does not 
even have to start reading the book in order to suspect that it may not conform to the 
criteria that are generally expected of the genre. A glance at the table of contents 
suffices to get a first idea of its unusual structural design: with a few exceptions, the 
list of chapters is entirely comprised of names, which either belong to famous people 
(such as Philip Larkin or Margaret Thatcher) or places (such as Oxford or 
Cambridge). It can thus be inferred that Memoirs is no continuous, linear narrative in 
which the events of the author’s life unfold chronologically; instead, it is a 
thematically structured conglomerate of mini-narratives which appear in seemingly 
random order. If one studies the table of contents more closely, further information 
about the structure can be extracted from it: the main body of the book contains 
                                                 
23 See Appendix II. 
24 For the working definition of the autobiographical genre which underlies this thesis see chapter 1.5.  
    Also note that Kingsley Amis’s Memoirs is labelled as ‘autobiography’ on the back cover of the  
    book.  
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forty-two chapters25 which are framed by a preface at the beginning and a section at 
the end called ‘Instead of an Epilogue’. Apart from the text, the author has included 
several photographs throughout the book, most of which show Kingsley Amis and/or 
people he has known. Before the preface, there is a ‘List of illustrations’ which 
catalogues all the images.  
In the preface, the author openly explains the approach that underlies his 
Memoirs. Thus, he warns his readers that ‘this book consists not of a connected 
narrative but of a series of essays or sketches’ (Memoirs, xv, emphasis added) and 
can be classified as ‘allo- rather than autobiography’ (Memoirs, xvi). From such 
direct descriptions, we may infer that the narrator of Memoirs is a ‘teller-character’ 
(Stanzel, 144) who – at least at this point – uses ‘overt mediacy of narration’ 
(Stanzel, 141). A teller-character – as opposed to a reflector-character – is a narrator 
who ‘perform[s] before the eyes of the reader and portray[s] his own narrative act’ 
(Stanzel, 17). According to Stanzel, the presence of a teller-character always draws 
the reader’s attention more strongly to the act of narrative communication, as he 
explicitly mentions why he selects or eliminates parts of the story or why he omits or 
abridges the description of a character, a setting, or an event. Thus,  
[a] teller-character narrates, records, informs, writes letters, includes 
documents, cites reliable informants, refers to his own narration, addresses the 
reader, comments on that which has been narrated, and so on.’ (Stanzel, 144)  
 
When Kingsley Amis categorises the chapters of Memoirs as essays and sketches, he 
does so in his role as a teller-character. Most of the essays, he informs us, are 
portraits of ‘individuals [he has] known more or less well’ (Memoirs, xv). Apart from 
three exceptions, all the essays follow this pattern of concentrating on a single person 
and the author’s relationship with his subject; only the very first chapter, ‘Family’, 
the tenth chapter, ‘Shrinks’, and the eighteenth chapter, ‘Terry-Thomas and Others’, 
are special cases insofar as they deal with several people at once. From the forty-two 
chapters that make up the main body of the book, thirty can be allocated to the 
essays. The remaining twelve chapters belong to the second category, i.e. the 
sketches. The majority of the sketches describe ‘self-contained episodes’ of the 
author’s life, ‘like [his] time in the army or [his] trip to Prague in 1966’ (Memoirs, 
xv). Only two sketches do not conform to this pattern: the fifth chapter, ‘Jazz’, and 
the fifteenth chapter, ‘Booze’, are exceptions, as they deal with topics that have 
                                                 
25 It must be stated here that Kingsley Amis does not number the chapters. In an analysis, however, it  
    is useful to be aware of the order in which the chapters are arranged, which is why chapter numbers   
    will be referred to from time to time here.  
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played a role throughout the author’s life and cannot be assigned to a certain time 
period. All the chapters, we are told, largely depend ‘on a good memory of anecdotes 
and anecdotal detail’ (Memoirs, xvi). 
Kingsley Amis gives several reasons as to why he has avoided to write 
directly about himself in his own autobiography. First, he maintains that  
[m]ost writers lead dull lives whether or not those lives may be fun to lead, and 
are likely to be boring to read about in any detail. Writing directly about my 
own would anyway not appeal to me (Memoirs, xv).  
 
Yet after stating these pragmatic causes, he reveals more deeply-rooted motives 
which prevent him from disclosing too much about his private life: 
To publish an account of my own intimate, domestic, sexual experiences would 
hurt a number of people who have emotional claims on me, probably as much 
by my writing of good times as of bad, and I have no desire to cause pain, or 
further pain, to them or myself. (Memoirs, xv) 
 
This quotation deals with the author’s narrative motivation (‘the motivation of the 
narrator to narrate’ (Stanzel, 93)), even though it does so indirectly, i.e. by 
accounting for what the reader will not find in Memoirs rather than explaining why 
he has included certain materials. By admitting that there are many private, 
emotional experiences he could have told if he had been following the usual generic 
rules of autobiography, Kingsley inevitably causes curiosity in his readers. From the 
beginning of the book, the readers know that the author will be very secretive about 
his self. The heightened awareness of possible gaps is thus likely to influence the 
reading experience. In Narrative Fiction: Contemporary Poetics, Rimmon-Kenan 
maintains that gaps are absolutely central to the narrative process (cf. Rimmon-
Kenan, 127), so central indeed, that she suggests the following simile: ‘How to make 
a bagel? First you take a hole… And how to make a narrative text? In exactly the 
same way.’ (Rimmon-Kenan, 127) The reason that Rimmon-Kenan gives for the 
significance of gaps in any narrative is that  
the materials the text provides for the reconstruction of a world (or a story) are 
insufficient for saturation. No matter how detailed the presentation is, further 
questions can always be asked. (Rimmon-Kenan, 127)   
 
Kingsley asserts in the preface that it is ‘not out of self-effacement but for other 
reasons’ (Memoirs, xv) that he wants to stay in the background; nevertheless, the 
word ‘self-effacement’ sticks, and, as a reader, one inevitably wonders what these 
gaps, these absences are that the author refers to. According to Iser,  
it is only through inevitable omissions that a story will gain its dynamism. Thus 
whenever the flow is interrupted and we are led off in unexpected directions, 
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the opportunity is given to bring into play our own faculty for establishing 
connections – for filling in gaps left by the text itself. (Iser, 285, as cited in 
Rimmon-Kenan, 127) 
 
By warning his readers that they may not get what they are looking for and thus 
drawing attention to the gaps of the story, the author causes tension and suspense 
from the very first page of the book; but he also creates doubts regarding his 
reliability. How can a narrator be trusted who prevents his readers from getting to 
know the core of the story?  
As a reader, one feels that there must be a difference between a narrator who 
promises to tell his story to his best ability and a narrator who undermines the 
narrative process. Narrative theory, however, makes no such distinction between a 
willing and a subversive narrator. According to Stanzel’s A Theory of Narrative, any 
first-person narrator – and Kingsley qualifies as such – is unreliable by definition due 
to his embodiment in the characters’ world (cf. Stanzel, 90). Stanzel asserts that  
[t]he unreliability of the first-person narrator is not […] based on his personal 
qualities[…], e.g. character, sincerity, love of truth, and so on, but on the 
ontological basis of the position of the first-person narrator in the world of the 
narrative. The presence of such a narrator in the world of fictional characters 
and his endowment with an individuality which is also physically determined 
leads to a limitation of his horizon of perception and knowledge. For this 
reason he can have only a subjective and hence only conditionally valid view of 
the narrated events. (Stanzel, 89) 
 
Despite the fact that Stanzel’s argument is based on narrative fiction, the concept of 
the embodied narrator is also applicable to autobiography. In fact, the narrator’s 
embodiment is even heightened in autobiography, as it is not only the narrator who is 
part of the characters’ world, but also the author. Thus, the narrator-protagonist of 
first-person fiction becomes an author-narrator-protagonist in the referential context 
of autobiography. The reader is always aware of this referentiality, because all the 
characters of an autobiography also have an existence outside the book, namely in 
real life. One place where these ties between writing and the real world become 
visible in Memoirs is the dedication page. Kingsley Amis has dedicated his 
autobiography to a number of his family members: Hilly (Hilary Ann Kilmarnock, 
nee Bardwell, his first wife) is at the top of the list. Furthermore, the book is devoted 
to his three children, Philip, Martin, and Sally, as well as his first wife’s new 
husband and their son, Ali and Jaime (Alistair Boyd, 7th Baron Kilmarnock and 
James Boyd). It is not hard to establish a connection between the family members 
Kingsley lists in the dedication and the ‘people who have emotional claims on me’ 
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(Memoirs, xv), whom he mentions in the preface and in consideration of whom he 
covers details of his private life with a cloak of silence.  
Due to the narrator’s embodiment inherent in an I-narrative, the motivation to 
narrate is existential for every first-person narrator26 (cf. Stanzel, 93). ‘It is directly 
connected with his practical experiences, with the joys and sorrows he has 
experienced, with his moods and needs.’ (Stanzel, 93) This is the case because the 
narrative process and the narrator’s experience are inseparable, – they form an entity. 
(cf. Stanzel, 93) No matter how big or small the narrative distance between the 
experiencing and the narrating selves may be, ‘the reader is constantly invited to 
keep in mind this existential unity’ (Stanzel, 93) of the two selves. Stanzel even goes 
as far as to suggest that ‘the consummation of the life of a first-person narrator is 
only attained with the completion of the narrative act.’ (Stanzel, 93) For this reason, 
it is important to bear in mind that ‘[e]verything that is narrated in the first-person 
form is somehow existentially relevant for the first-person narrator’ (Stanzel, 98). In 
this respect, Memoirs is a special case: it is not only the narrated events that are 
relevant, but also the narrative gaps the author creates. By mentioning an absence 
while at the same time refusing to fill it with the missing information, Kingsley Amis 
assigns existential relevance to what he does not write, thereby inviting us to read 
between the lines. In the third chapter, ‘Oxford’, in which the author reports how he 
met his first wife, Hilly, the largest narrative gap of the book is torn open:  
In May 1946 I met Hilary (always Hilly) Bardwell, a student at the Ruskin 
School of Art, and here we come to one of those difficult bits. I said in my 
preface that I intended to leave out as much as possible of potentially hurtful 
topics, and here is the biggest of such omissions. In the relevant parts of what 
follows I mean without apology to be severely reticent and factual, after just 
one mention of the word love. (Memoirs, 47) 
 
It is indeed the only time in this autobiography that the word love is mentioned. Once 
one has absorbed the meaning of this paragraph, one cannot help but notice that the 
cavity that is announced in the preface runs through the whole book. The crack starts 
on the dedication page, hits rock bottom in the above-quoted passage and still leaves 
nothing but a hole after one has read the last page; in ‘Instead of an Epilogue’, 
Kingsley has included a poem addressed ‘To H.’ (Memoirs, 337), of which the third 
and last stanza is the most outspoken in its expression of regret:  
In ’46 when I was twenty-four 
I met someone harmless, someone defenceless, 
                                                 
26 In the authorial narrative situation, by contrast, the narrative motivation is ‘literary-aesthetic’  
    (Stanzel, 98) and not existential, as the authorial narrator is not part of the characters’ world.  
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But till then whole, unadapted within; 
Awkward, gentle, healthy, straight-backed, 
Who spoke to say something, laughed when amused; 
If things went wrong, feared she might be at fault, 
Whose eye I could have met forever then,  
Oh yes, and who was also beautiful. 
Well, that was much as women were meant to be, 
I thought, and set about looking further. 
How can we tell, with nothing to compare?  
(Memoirs, 338) 
 
If Kingsley Amis had not ‘spent a great deal of his life in the public eye’ 
(Anon., ‘Obituary: Sir Kingsley Amis’), his perforated, achronological and highly 
selective narrative approach would not have been possible. But because he was and 
still is a literary celebrity, at least in Great Britain, he was in a position to assume that 
his readers already know a lot about him when he set out to write Memoirs. Only 
owing to this precondition can the author limit the account of the most important 
stages of his life to as little as two paragraphs in the preface (cf. Memoirs, xvi). It 
takes other autobiographers a whole book to narrate the main events of their lives; 
Kingsley, however, reduces them to a CV-like enumeration of dates and facts, which 
he introduces with the telling sentence:  
It will save space further on if I say here that I was born in 1922 in South 
London and brought up in Norbury, S.W.16, the only child of William Robert 
and Rosa Annie Amis.’ (Memoirs, xvi, emphasis added)  
 
Due to the fact that a great deal of his private life was – and still is – grist for the mill 
of British newspapers, it is almost common knowledge that Kingsley Amis was born 
in 1922 and that he went to Oxford. Not only were all of his books reviewed by the 
press, but his marriage breakup with Hilary Ann Bardwell in 1965 and the 
subsequent marriage with Elizabeth Jane Howard, as well as their divorce in 1980, 
were covered in all major newspapers. Most readers probably start reading Memoirs 
hoping to find out more about these events that they have read about in the 
newspapers, and most importantly, get to know the author’s own perspective, his 
personal, private side of the story. As a result of the unconventional announcements 
in the preface, however, all such illusions are destroyed before the book has even 
properly started. Interestingly, Kingsley maintains that it is not necessary to reveal 
his private persona, as he has ‘already written an account of [him]self in twenty or 
more volumes, most of them called novels’ (Memoirs, xv), as he points out in the 
preface: 
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Novels they fully are, too, and those who know both them and me will also 
know that they are firmly unautobiographical, but at the same time every word 
of them inevitably says something about the kind of person I am. ‘In vino 
veritas – I don’t know,’ Anthony Powell once said to me, ‘but in scribendo 
veritas – a certainty.’ (Memoirs, xvf.) 
 
In this quotation, the author establishes a philosophical truth-value which he applies 
to his fiction as well as his autobiography. By extension, he suggests that the true 
core of a text does not necessarily lie in what is written but in how it is written.  
Instead of chronicling the author’s life, Memoirs may primarily be about 
other people. Nevertheless, the author feels that ‘even as they are, there is probably 
quite enough about me in these pages, more than I intended or realise.’ (Memoirs, 
xv) The ultimate judgement about this is of course up to the reader, and – as we will 
see in a later section of this chapter – most reviewers have a different opinion on this 
point. In any case, no matter how little of himself the author has intended to pack 
into his Memoirs, it is still he as the author-narrator-protagonist who functions as the 
narrative lynchpin and holds together everything which is narrated. According to 
recent findings in autobiography theory, it is indeed no rarity in modern 
autobiography that narrators try to find alternatives to the traditional model of simply 
telling the story of their lives from early childhood to old age. Rebutting critics of the 
memoir who have derogated the genre for being self-indulgent, Miller thus 
emphasises that ‘the memoir is not about ‘terminal moi-ism’ (as it’s been called) but, 
rather, a rendezvous with others’ (Miller, 2). No person, as has been established in 
chapter two, lives in a social vacuum, for the human self is relational rather than 
autonomous. From this standpoint, it could be argued that Memoirs is a highly 
innovative autobiography, since it leaves the traditional focus on the author’s self 
behind. Despite its unconventional structure, however, it is debatable, how modern 
Memoirs really is, given its denial of emotion. Before this question can be settled – if 
it can be answered at all – several essays and sketches have to be looked at in detail.  
 
 
4.2. From macrostructure to microstructure 
 
Due to the fact that the individual chapters in Memoirs are independent narrative 
units, they will be analysed separately here on an exemplary basis. The narrative 
techniques that Kingsley Amis uses will thus be examined in a number of both 
essays and sketches by way of close reading. 
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4.2.1. The essays 
 
4.2.1.1. ‘Family’ 
Unsurprisingly, Kingsley does not begin his Memoirs conventionally, say, by relating 
his very first memory as a child. Instead, he chooses to introduce his most important 
relatives – one by one – in a series of portraits, thus painting an overall picture of the 
family at large and his situation as a child. He starts with his grandparents on his 
father’s side, ‘Pater or Dadda’ (Memoirs, 1) and ‘Mater’ (Memoirs, 4), and his uncle 
Leslie who thought he was homosexual and only discovered his heterosexuality after 
his mother – ‘Mater’ – had died. Subsequently, the maternal grandparents, ‘Grandad’ 
(Memoirs, 5) and ‘Gran’ (Memoirs, 5), and his aunt Dora (his mother’s sister) are 
portrayed. Kingsley calls Dora his ‘knockout relative’ (Memoirs, 6), as she suffered 
from an anxiety disorder with obsessions. The list is completed by his father and 
mother.  
All of these portraits follow a narrative pattern which includes two types of 
characterisation: ‘direct definition’27 (Rimmon-Kenan, 60) and ‘indirect 
presentation’28 (Rimmon-Kenan, 61). The author’s paternal grandfather, for example, 
is depicted as a ‘small fat red-faced fellow with starting moist eyes and a straggly 
moustache’ (Memoirs, 1). Apart from this physical description, ‘Dadda’ is referred to 
as ‘a great teller of jokes’ (Memoirs, 1) and as ‘a jokey, excitable, silly little man’ 
(Memoirs, 2). Having established his paternal grandfather’s humorous side, the 
author narrates two anecdotes which exemplify and specify this quality. The 
emphasis of this analysis lies in the narrative techniques of the first anecdote 
(according to the appearance in Memoirs), which is why the content of the second 
anecdote shall briefly be recapitulated beforehand: The second anecdote relates an 
incident in which ‘Dadda’, who was a glass merchant by profession and sold 
‘unbreakable’ glass, bounces one of his glass plates across the carpet and unwittingly 
causes it to burst in the fire place. Having liked the effect of his stunt a lot, he 
performs it all over again in front of one of his clients. (cf. Memoirs, 2f.), which 
induces Kingsley to make a rather sardonic comment about his grandfather’s 
eccentric behaviour: ‘I like to think that this demonstration did its tiny bit to bring on 
the decline of J.J. Amis & Co. at the hands of Woolworth’s.’ (Memoirs, 3) This 
                                                 
27 Direct definition is ‘the naming of a character’s qualities […] if it proceeds from the most  
    authoritative voice in the text.’ (Rimmon-Kenan, 60)  
28 ‘ A presentation is indirect when rather than mentioning a trait, it displays and exemplifies it in  
    various ways.’ (Rimmon-Kenan, 61)  
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humorous account serves as an example of the author’s ‘good memory for anecdotes 
and anecdotal detail’ (Memoirs, xvi). In the first anecdote, Kingsley Amis also 
illustrates ‘Dadda’’s qualities as a buffoon:  
He enjoyed eating out, with I suspect plenty to drink, and I used to admire him, 
if nothing else, for sticking his napkin in the neck of his shirt, then thought a 
vulgarity. At these feasts he was a great teller of jokes, typically without any 
preamble, to trap you into thinking you were hearing about some real event. 
One of these horrified me so much that I have never forgotten it. A Scotsman (I 
was still so young I had not heard about Scotsmen being supposed to be mean) 
took his wife out to dinner. Both ordered steak. The wife started eating hers at 
top speed, but the man left his untouched. ‘Something wrong with the steak, 
sir?’ – ‘No, no, I’m waiting for my wife’s teeth.’ Except in greeting I cannot 
remember my grandfather addressing a word to me personally. (Memoirs, 1) 
 
This passage starts off with a general statement about the grandfather’s liking of 
dinner parties or restaurant visits and the aforementioned direct definition (‘a great 
teller of jokes’), which merges into the actual anecdote and the re-telling of the joke. 
As the past simple tense of the general statement (‘He enjoyed eating out’) is 
combined with the habitual past (‘I used to admire him’), it becomes clear that such 
jokey behaviour on the grandfather’s side was not a one-time experience but 
occurred frequently. The use of the adverb ‘typically’ also helps to foster this 
impression. Furthermore, it is obvious that the narrating self is the dominant voice 
here, since the author has included several narratorial comments: ‘with I suspect 
plenty to drink’, ‘if for nothing else’, ‘then thought a vulgarity’, ‘I was still so young 
I had not heard about Scotsmen being supposed to be mean’. These comments, which 
either occur between commas (or – at the end of a sentence – between a comma and 
a full stop) or in brackets, draw attention to the narrating self. The use of the present 
tense in one of the comments (‘with I suspect plenty to drink’) and in the last 
sentence also indicates the supremacy of the narrating self over the experiencing self. 
Another important aspect is that the author thematises the process of remembering (‘I 
have never forgotten it’ and ‘I cannot remember my grandfather addressing…’). The 
fact that Joseph James Amis never gave any attention to Kingsley does not only say 
something about the kind of person ‘Dadda’ was, but it also characterises the 
relationship between the author and his grandfather: thus, it appears only logical that 
Kingsley Amis did not like him, as the following quotation shows: ‘I find it hard to 
remember him smiling. I have only realised since preparing to write this how much I 
disliked and was repelled by him.’ (Memoirs, 1) It seems a legitimate interpretation if 
one deduces from this that Kingsley’s dislike of his grandfather was renewed and 
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aggravated by the narrative process, which confirms Stanzel’s aforementioned claim 
that – due to the embodiment – the life of a first-person narrator is not consummated 
until it is brought to the page. 
Similarly, Kingsley Amis’s other three grandparents are portrayed with the 
use of the same techniques. His paternal grandmother, for example, is described as a 
‘large dreadful hairy-faced creature who lived to be nearly ninety and whom I 
loathed and feared in a way I had never felt towards Dadda.’ (Memoirs, 4) The only 
grandparent that the author really cared for was his mother’s father, because he had a 
literary bent and collected books, of which a few volumes were left to Kingsley when 
he died. (cf. Memoirs, 5)  
An interlude about religion and sex education in the Amis family serves as a 
narrative bridge between the portraits of the grandparents and the parents. Religion 
played a very minor role in Amis’s childhood, for his parents ‘considered themselves 
religious apostates, which meant among other things that they gave me no religious 
instruction’ (Memoirs, 10). Nevertheless, the chapel must have cast some shadow 
over Kingsley’s parents, as his father still believed in ‘masturbation-mania’ 
(Memoirs, 11) and was quite uptight in this respect, as the following passage 
illustrates: 
But – because it has to come in somewhere, and this paragraph may need a bit 
of livening up – he neither directly nor indirectly offered me any enlightenment 
at any age about sex, with the exception of a short course of harangues about 
what happened, in some detail, to boys who played with themselves. Every 
ejaculation (though my father put it differently, I am sure) thinned the blood 
and the victim eventually fell into helpless insanity.  
Before you start grinning, reader, if that’s what you feel like doing, let me tell 
you that a chum told me how at his school each class as it approached puberty 
was taken on a little tour of the supposed masturbation-mania ward of the local 
mental hospital. I have had no opportunity of checking this story: the date 
would have been about 1945. (Memoirs, 10f.) 
 
Similarly to the passages that have been analysed above, this quotation is 
interspersed with narratorial comments (between dashes, in brackets and between 
commas), and the dominant voice is the narrating self. When Kingsley notes that 
‘this paragraph may need a bit of livening up’ and directly addresses the reader 
(‘Before you start grinning, reader’), he is discernible as a teller-character, since the 
act of narration is emphasised and lifted to a conscious level. The section about ‘sex 
instruction in the home’ (Memoirs, 12), which is over two pages long, is interesting 
not only from a narratological point of view but also from the perspective of 
autobiography studies. By relating both his experiences as a child and as an adult and 
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father, he establishes generational ties: First, the reader learns that Kingsley was 
neither offered ‘any version at all of what he might have called the facts of life’ 
(Memoirs, 12) nor ‘given the all-clear’ (Memoirs, 12), which would have amounted 
to a permit for ‘refer[ring] to physical sex or even to let it be seen that I knew about 
it.’ (Memoirs, 12)  
Two paragraphs down, the author suddenly finds himself in the position of 
the father, trying to improve his parenting style compared to his own mother and 
father. The relevant passage shall be quoted at length: 
As I have already implied, sex instruction in the home is often – usually? I 
don’t know – not instruction but a formal permit. But it must be given. I shall 
never forget the scene when it came to my turn. I swear it began with me 
hearing my wife saying somewhere out of shot, ‘Your father wants to speak to 
you in his study’ – a room big enough, say, to accommodate a full-grown 
rhinoceros, though without giving him much room to turn round. 
Philip and Martin came in, their expressions quite blank, innocent in every 
possible way that the most expensive film-director could have put there. They 
were, I suppose, seven and six years old. The short monologue I gave them 
slipped out of my head afterwards at the first opportunity, though I know I did 
conscientiously get in a certain amount of what might be called hard anatomy 
and concrete nouns, although again I must have used the word ‘thing’ a good 
deal and talked about Dad planting a seed. Well, what would you? I have never 
loved and admired them more than for the unruffled calm and seriousness with 
which they heard me out. I knew they knew, they knew I knew they knew and 
so on to the end but never mind. They left in a silence that they courteously 
prolonged until they were out of all hearing. It was a couple of years before 
Philip confided to me that he had muttered, ‘Hold on to your hat – he’s going to 
tell us the big one’ as the two made their way to my ‘study’. But we did it. In 
no sphere is it truer that it is necessary to say what it is unnecessary to say. 
(Memoirs, 12f.) 
 
Apart from the techniques which have already been analysed above, Kingsley Amis 
makes use of two other narrative methods here: the first is related to speech 
representation, while the second is a stylistic attribute of his writing.  
Ad 1) In the above-quoted paragraphs, two incidents of ‘direct discourse’ 
(Rimmon-Kenan, 110) can be found; Kingsley directly quotes both his wife and his 
son Philip. Several aspects play a role here. On the one hand, these direct quotations 
are a method of characterisation – i.e. indirect presentation through speech (cf. 
Rimmon-Kenan, 61); on the other hand, they can be said to be a foreign body in the 
referential genre of autobiography, since direct discourse ‘creates the illusion of 
‘pure’ mimesis’ (Rimmon-Kenan, 110) and actually represents a dramatic element. 
Furthermore, the question is legitimate in autobiography how the author can have an 
exact memory of what the characters said several years in the past. In the quoted 
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passages, the direct quotations are very brief, so this aspect may not be so important 
here; however, Kingsley Amis frequently includes long stretches of dialogue in other 
chapters; in such cases, the question of where the author draws these dialogues from 
does become relevant. In the preface, he assures us that in his anecdotes he has tried 
to stay as close to the truth as possible, yet he also refers to the unavoidability of the 
fictional element with respect to dialogue: 
It is easy and tempting to improve on reality in recounting them [the anecdotes, 
annot.], which I have fairly conscientiously eschewed in what follows, and in 
remembering them too, which I can only hope I have mostly avoided. I have 
purposely invented or changed nothing of substance. Of course, in the interests 
of speed and of limiting dullness, I have invented dialogue, but nothing that is 
material or is not the sort of thing that would have been said at the relevant 
moment. (Memoirs, xvi) 
 
Ad 2) The second narrative feature is not so much a technique as a matter of 
style. The first two sentences of the long quotation (‘As I have already implied, sex 
instruction in the home is often – usually? I don’t know – not instruction but a formal 
permit. But it must be given.’) are written in the present simple tense and belong to 
the world of the narrating self. Stylistically, they could easily have been taken from a 
political or some other sort of essay, rather than serving as the introduction to an 
anecdote in an autobiography. Statements in the present simple tense that reflect the 
author’s opinion are dispersed all over the book and are characteristic of Kingsley 
Amis’s essayistic style.29 Of course, comments and opinions of this sort (in the 
present tense) occur in every autobiography, regardless of the fact that the focus is on 
the past; but Kingsley seems to make especially frequent use of the present tense as a 
vehicle for voicing his opinions, hence the clear predominance of the narrating self 
and the considerable narrative distance between the two selves of the narrator. From 
the viewpoint that every past experience can only be accessed through the eyes of the 
narrating self, it does not come as a surprise that the “chronicler” (the narrating self) 
plays at least an equally important role as the “doer” (the experiencing self). Every 
narrator has a choice as to how visible he wants to make the narrative voice of the 
narrating self, who, in Memoirs, functions as the lens of the whole narration.  
Despite the strong position of the narrating self, the past is not pushed to the 
edges of the picture. On the contrary, Kingsley Amis’s selection of anecdotes 
represents, at least for the younger reader, a series of history lessons, albeit private 
                                                 
29 Nomen est omen: the majority of the chapters in Memoirs belongs to ‘the essays’. Note that the  
    name for this category stems from the narrator himself (see 4.1. in this thesis or the preface, page  
    xv, in Memoirs.)  
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rather than public history. As the above-quoted passages indicate, we learn how 
Amis’s father, for example, handled (or did not handle) the intricate task of sex 
instruction, but his behaviour is suggestive of the general situation of J.J. Amis’s 
generation. The narrator informs us that it was ‘not uncommon’ (Memoirs, 11) for 
schools up until at least 1945 to escort their pupils to the psychiatric ward of a 
hospital, making them believe they were seeing ‘the supposed masturbation-mania 
ward’ (Memoirs, 11).  
After the excursus into the realms of sexual education, the author continues 
with his portraits of family members. Generally speaking, the sections devoted to his 
parents are a lot longer and more intimate than the ones about his grandparents. 
Kingsley Amis and his father had a loving relationship, but their tastes and opinions 
were very different, which led to a lot of arguments during the author’s adolescence. 
These quarrels mainly evolved around music and politics. While Kingsley liked 
‘Brahms’s Second Symphony’ (Memoirs, 16) and was a jazz enthusiast and ‘a 
bloody little fool of a leftie’ (Memoirs, 17), his father was fond of Gilbert and 
Sullivan and ‘an ex-Liberal […] who went Tory after the Great War’ (Memoirs, 17). 
During the author’s adolescence, these conflicts were sharpened by the fact that 
Kingsley – being an only child – was ‘short not so much of allies, of potential 
supporters, as of means of dilution and diversion, simply another body to share the 
parental attention.’ (Memoirs, 15) Nevertheless, Kingsley describes the ‘era of the 
quarrels’ (Memoirs, 18) as ‘not surprisingly, the time of greatest intimacy’ (Memoirs, 
18). In adulthood, and especially when J.J. Amis was an ageing widower, Kingsley 
removed himself more and more from his father, whose world of the ‘City office’ 
(Memoirs, 14), was totally alien to the successful writer:  
Boredom, I am sorry to say, came to be my chief reaction to my father’s 
company, though I did not want to feel like this and grew better at hiding it – I 
hope […]. It is depressing to think how persistently dull and egotistical we can 
be to those we most value, and how restless and peevish we get when they do it 
back to us. (Memoirs, 18) 
 
Kingsley’s relationship to his mother, by contrast, was not overshadowed by any 
conflicts, even though he portrays her as overprotective and she habitually made him 
eat more food than he wanted, which he absolutely detested: ‘But my mother was too 
obviously concerned for my welfare, too gentle, to arouse my resentment, only my 
fervent wish to get the meal over somehow.’ (Memoirs, 20) 
Despite the announcement of the preface, the reader gets to know quite a lot 
about Kingsley Amis in the first chapter of Memoirs. As has been pointed out in 4.1., 
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however, ‘Family’ occupies an exceptional position within the essays. Not only does 
it subsume a series of characters, it is also by far the longest essay. As far as both the 
characters’ physique and personal traits are concerned, the reader is allowed to get a 
very vivid impression of Kingsley’s colourful gallery of family members.  
 
4.2.1.2. ‘Philip Larkin’ 
The essay about Philip Larkin, the famous British poet, is a tribute to the author’s 
‘best friend’ (Memoirs, 64). A version of this mini-memoir was already published in 
1982 in a volume called Larkin at Sixty (cf. Memoirs, 51), as Kingsley Amis informs 
us with narratorial directness in the introductory paragraph. In Memoirs, however, 
the portrait of Larkin appears in adapted and appended form, for the author wanted to 
include ‘some reflections that it would not have been proper, in one sense or another, 
to publish in Philip Larkin’s lifetime or in the immediate aftermath of his death’ 
(Memoirs, 51). Throughout this chapter, Kingsley uses the same means of 
characterisation that are in evidence in ‘Family’, i.e. direct definition and indirect 
presentation.30 The main focus of this section, however, lies in a number of other 
narrative techniques which have not been examined at length yet. One of these 
devices, which can be specified as a structural pattern, is oppositionality.  
At least in those essays whose subjects the author has known fairly well, 
Kingsley Amis has consciously tried to present different sides of his characters. By 
juxtaposing contradictory traits, he creates round and complex rather than flat 
characters.31 In the essay about Philip Larkin, this device of oppositionality is 
identifiable, as different elements in the subject’s nature are contrasted with each 
other. The fact that the oppositionality operates on various levels creates a 
complexity that undermines any attempt on the reader’s part to draw a one-
dimensional comparison between two poles of Larkin’s character. 
At the beginning of the essay, Philip Larkin’s comical side is described in an 
account of how the author saw Larkin when they first got to know each other as 
students at Oxford University:  
Soon after arriving at St. John’s College, Oxford in April 1941 I met somebody 
who, a trifle comically I thought at the time, was called Philip Larkin. I was 
                                                 
30 As these techniques of characterisation have already been analysed in some detail in the last section,  
     they will only be indicated where relevant but will not be discussed extensively here. 
31 In Narrative Fiction: Contemporary Poetics, Rimmon-Kenan differentiates between flat and round  
    (or complex) characters on the one hand, and developing and static characters on the other hand.  
    (cf. the chapter ‘Story: Characters’ (29-42), and especially the section ‘Character-classification’  
    (40-42)).  
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most impressed with his self-confidence when he told me not very long 
afterwards that he had once come across, in some writers’ manual, a list of 
names not to be given to serious characters, and found ‘Larkin’ on it. His 
clothes too seemed to me not very serious: tweed jacket, wine-coloured 
trousers, check shirt, bow tie – not commonplaces then. I had already gathered 
that this sort of thing was no sign of any particular artistic bent; […] But in my 
suburban way I considered it was flashy of him to go on like that, though I 
would have had to admit that the effect was neat, the shoes clean, the tie 
carefully chosen and knotted. He always dressed well and smartly, also 
appropriately, whether in undergraduate informals or the senior librarian’s 
‘good’ suits. 
[…] Before I grew too fond of him to see him in any such light, Philip struck 
me as a little ridiculous in his appearance, anyway outlandish, unlikely, on 
one’s hasty summing-up, to be attractive to girls. (Memoirs, 51) 
 
In this passage, the subject is viewed from the perspective of the narrating self, 
which clearly distances itself from the experiencing self by using temporal referents 
such as ‘I thought at the time’ or ‘Before I grew too fond of him’ as well as the 
conditional in ‘I would have had to admit’. Furthermore, phrases such as ‘in my 
suburban way’ or ‘on one’s hasty summing-up’ are value-judgements by the 
narrating self about the experiencing self which indicate that the narrator does not 
fully support the views of his younger version. From these ‘distancing techniques’ 
(Cohn, 148)  it can be deduced that this passage is an example of what Dorrit Cohn 
calls ‘dissonant self-narration’ (Cohn, 145), in which a lucid narrator turn[s] back on 
a past self steeped in ignorance, confusion, and delusion’ (Cohn, 145). According to 
Cohn, it is characteristic of dissonant self-narration that the ‘narrative process […] is 
emphatically conscious, deliberate, intellectual’ (Cohn, 146), which has been 
observed in ‘Family’ as well as in the introductory paragraph of ‘Philip Larkin’. A 
further hallmark of this retrospective technique lies in frequent ‘reminders of the 
memory process’ (Cohn, 151), which have also been touched upon with reference to 
the first chapter of Memoirs.   
After establishing Larkin’s comical side, the author contrasts it with two other 
traits. On the one hand, his eccentric physical appearance and dress style are seen to 
conflict with his normal, student-like behaviour as an Oxford undergraduate: 
‘Otherwise, Philip was to outward view an almost aggressively normal 
undergraduate of the non-highbrow, non-sherry-sipping sort, hard-swearing, hard-
belching, etc.’ (Memoirs, 52). The introductory adverb, ‘Otherwise’ emphasises the 
oppositionality; on the other hand, - and on a different level – the young Larkin’s 
bizarre exterior as well as his ‘normal’ student-like behaviour is contrasted with the 
older Philip Larkin’s tendency towards melancholy and solitude:  
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The solitary creature of later years, unable to get through the day without 
spending a good part of it by himself, let alone the author of (say) ‘First Sight’, 
was invisible to me then; most likely I was not looking hard enough.’ 
(Memoirs, 52)  
 
 There are a number of further oppositionalities which are described both 
directly and indirectly in this essay, but not all of them can be analysed in detail here.  
Unsurprisingly, these contrasts do not only characterise the subject; they also tell us 
something about the author as well as the author-subject relationship. Thus, it is 
significant how Kingsley Amis deals with his friendship to Philip Larkin and which 
aspects he has selected to include in the memoir. It has been noted before that the 
author has tried to present multiple sides of his characters, with the result that even 
his close friends are partly shown in a rather unfavourable light. In one of his many 
anecdotes, he thus shares the story of how Larkin – by then a fully grown man and 
no Oxford undergraduate – ‘intentionally pissed himself’ (Memoirs, 59) during a 
public meeting because ‘a tremendous desire to urinate’ (Memoirs, 59) had come 
upon him. Enormously funny though it may be, Kingsley is well aware that his 
including this tale about drunken incontinence is to some extent unethical, especially 
because Larkin had told it to him in strict confidentiality. 
He went on to extract from me some sort of promise not to go round repeating 
it [this story, annot.], which I interpreted as a ban on any sort of publication. 
But now I consider myself released from that undertaking’ (Memoirs, 59). 
 
As this quotation illustrates, Kingsley Amis cannot resist the novelist’s impulse to 
make his characters as interesting as possible. In another chapter (his essay about 
John Betjeman), he touches upon this ‘difficulty that has come up more than once in 
these memoirs’ (Memoirs, 262). Ignoring the fact that some information may be 
immoral in an autobiography, he allows his  
attention and emphasis […] to go to those people, and those characteristics of 
theirs, that are suitable to an anecdotal or at least a narrative approach, as in a 
novel. Those who are merely good chaps, or fairly good chaps, with whom I 
have enjoyed some drinking and yarning, perhaps self-restrained chaps or even 
secretive by nature, or just less given to colourful behaviour, get fewer pages 
from me. (Memoirs, 262) 
 
Despite all indiscretions, the portrait of Philip Larkin is ultimately loving and 
amiable. Towards the end of the chapter, the author makes sure that the last 
impression the reader gets presents Larkin in a positive and favourable light:  
What I have written above about Philip’s ‘closeness’ [about money, annot.] and 
inclination to solitude or solitariness, emphasised from early middle age 
onwards by progressive deafness, is not exaggerated, but I must close the 
second half of this memoir as I closed the first, by emphasising his tendencies 
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in the opposite direction. As I wrote in a notice after his death, ‘he was too 
warm, too humorous, too genuinely sociable – as well as having been a little 
awkwardly so – to settle into withdrawal’ (Memoirs, 64).  
 
Another area which is interesting with regard to both the oppositionality of 
Larkin’s personality as well as Kingsley Amis’s relationship to his subject is 
literature. Thus, the author detects traces of conflicting character traits in Larkin’s 
writing. Although Philip Larkin became famous for his poetry, he had actually 
intended to be a novelist at the start of his career. He wrote parts of his first novel, 
Jill (1946), when he was still a student at Oxford (cf. Memoirs, 55). By way of 
comparing the novel’s protagonist to its author, Kingsley Amis draws a parallel 
between literature and life:  
There was another, deeper division between the experiences of the hero, John 
Kemp, in wartime Oxford, instantly attributable to the Philip I knew, visible 
Philip, and on the other side Kemp’s fantasy life, dreamy, romantic, sensitive, 
the work of someone I had never known before, invisible Philip. I found them 
hard, if not impossible to reconcile – well, so had the author. (Memoirs, 55) 
 
Even though Kingsley emphasises more than once throughout his autobiography that 
Memoirs ‘is not a book of literary criticism, or of criticism of any kind’ (Memoirs, 
230), he frequently cites extracts from his subjects’ writings and analyses them. Due 
to the fact that Kingsley was a professional writer, this occupation with literature that 
is in evidence throughout Memoirs is hardly surprising. What is interesting here, 
however, is the manner in which he draws parallels between the nature of a writer’s 
works and his personality, especially because he affirms in the preface to Memoirs 
that his own novels are ‘firmly unautobiographical’ (Memoirs, xv).  
In order to further illustrate Larkin’s multi-faceted personality, the author 
quotes a number of poems (and/or extracts from poems) which he analyses. One of 
these, an unpublished poem called ‘THE WAY WE LIVE NOW’ (Memoirs, 60), 
shows Larkin’s humorous qualities and his ‘talent for light verse’ (Memoirs, 60). 
Kingsley Amis remembers the poem from a lost letter from the 1950s (cf. Memoirs, 
60) and indicates that it is ‘to be recited in a clear Welsh voice’ (Memoirs, 60, 
emphasis original). It is quoted here in full length: 
I let a fart in the street and a woman looked round; 
I pissed on the fire, and got myself covered in ash; 
I had half an hour with a whore and came out in a rash, 
So I let my sperm fall in the brim of an old hat I found. 
 
I vomited over my shoes in the bogs at the Pheasant; 
I slipped in the road, and came down with my hand on some slime; 
Life is performing these actions time after time 
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Till Death makes our body smell worse than it does at present. 
(Memoirs, 60) 
 
Similarly to the story about incontinence, Kingsley Amis admits with reference to 
this poem that Larkin ‘would not have wanted to see [this poem] published in his 
lifetime, perhaps ever, but I think it comes in well here, before we get down to the 
serious stuff.’ (Memoirs, 60) What the author means with the ‘serious stuff’ is 
Larkin’s inclination to solitariness and depression. Given that ‘the great Larkin 
theme’ was ‘death and the fear of death’ (Memoirs, 62), it seems significant that even 
in the above-quoted humorous poem Larkin mentions the word ‘Death’ in the last 
line, however comical this reference may be. Another poem, ‘Aubade’ (1977) (cf. 
Memoirs, 62), from which Kingsley cites and analyses a passage, casts no such 
humorous light on the subject of death. On the contrary, it reveals Larkin as a poet 
with a depressive nature:  
The dread 
Of dying, and being dead, 
Flashes afresh to hold and horrify. 
(Memoirs, 62, Kingsley Amis’s emphasis) 
 
This extract from ‘Aubade’ is instantly followed by the account of an event from real 
life, namely a conversation between Larkin and Amis about death:  
On first reading these words, I at once remembered a conversation that ended 
with Philip saying, ‘I’m not only [or perhaps ‘not so much’] frightened of 
dying,’ then shouting, ‘I’m afraid of being dead!’ (Memoirs, 62, annot. 
original)  
 
After the narration of this conversation, the author quotes another passage from 
‘Aubade’ which further exemplifies his subject’s terror of being dead. By means of 
interlacing literary quotations and personal criticism with anecdotes from real life, 
Kingsley Amis brings life and literature into a close relationship. His analysis makes 
visible the reciprocal influences that the spheres of life and literature exert on each 
other, especially as far as writers’ lives are concerned. Finally, Kingsley Amis’s 
personal review of Larkin’s morbid poem ‘Aubade’ passes into a description of the 
latter’s death and funeral. Contrary to his announcement in the preface, the author 
does not spare emotion here, but allows himself to admit his loss:  
My sorrow at his death and my abiding sense of loss is tinged with regret. He 
was my best friend and I never saw enough of him or knew him as well as I 
wanted to. If I had, I might have been able to tell him, among other things, that 
he was a wonderful poet whose work would last. But as it is I have to fall back 
on hoping he knew I thought so. (Memoirs, 64) 
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4.2.2. The sketches 
 
4.2.2.1. ‘Cambridge’ 
As opposed to the ‘essays’, the ‘sketches’ deal with specific, temporally limited 
episodes in the author’s life. ‘Cambridge’ thus focuses on the period between 1961 
and 1963, when the author lived in Cambridge and taught at the university. (cf. 
Memoirs, 216) The presence of this time frame does not mean, however, that this 
sketch – or any of the other sketches – is chronologically structured, nor does the 
author apply any narrative techniques that are not in evidence in the essays. Similarly 
to the portraits, Kingsley uses ‘reportorial narration’ (Stanzel, 47) and represents a 
teller-character whose emphasis is found in the narrating rather than the experiencing 
self. The emphatically essayistic introduction, in which a newspaper article is cited, 
establishes the narrating self as the primary point of reference:  
On the morning that I sat down to draft this, I read (The Times, 28 December 
1989) that that year ‘more students joined Cambridge University from state 
schools than from the independent sector,’ after a campaign designed to show 
that the place was not a closed shop for the public schools. (Memoirs, 216) 
 
Throughout the chapter, the narrating self remains the dominant voice of the 
narration. We frequently come across narratorial comments in brackets or in between 
commas, and the use of the present tense constantly accompanies the past tense of 
retrospective narration. Furthermore, Kingsley even makes cross-references by 
means of footnotes, which inevitably stress the presence of the narrator. In 
‘Cambridge’, one of the footnotes provides additional information about Kingsely’s 
enjoyment of teaching. In the running text, he notes that, however satisfying he 
found ‘seeing your pupil take your point almost before you have formulated it’ 
(Memoirs, 227), teaching consumed so much of his time and energy that it held him 
back as a writer, which is why he ultimately left Cambridge (cf. Memoirs, 227). In 
the footnote, an additional, if secondary, train of thought about teaching is expressed, 
as Kingsley experienced a pleasure of a different order when he taught:  
I still miss those supervisions, for a rather different reason. They offered the 
only context I have found in which serious, detailed and exhaustive discussion 
of literature is socially practicable. You cannot say in your club or dining room, 
‘Let’s have a look at what Eve actually tells Adam about her conversation with 
the serpent,’ without at best seeing the other fellow’s eyes glaze over. 
(Memoirs, 227n32) 
 
                                                 
32 When the reference of a quotation is marked with the designation “n” it indicates that the  
    relevant extract is taken from a footnote rather than from the running text. 
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Apart from this conscious emphasis on the narrative process, report and dialogue 
alternate, even though reportorial narration is clearly the dominant mode. Similarly, 
descriptive passages and value judgements in both the past and present tenses are 
frequently loosened up by dialogue passages.  
 To come back to the introduction of the chapter, the initial quotation of the 
newspaper article prompts Kingsley Amis to compare the present situation (at the 
moment of narration) to the time when he still taught at Cambridge, which was 
almost thirty years before the narrative act. He notes that already then ‘a movement 
among younger dons aimed at’ (Memoirs, 216) showing that Cambridge was also 
open to pupils from state schools. These observations inspire the author to criticise 
the educational system at large: ‘Our present educational system is in a mess, but I 
am going to go on leaving it alone […] I have very little idea of what it [Cambridge, 
annot.] is like now, except uninhabitable.’ (Memoirs, 216) He does not only find 
fault with the present situation, but assures us that he was already disappointed by 
Cambridge University when he got to know it from within. As he informs us, he had 
gone to Cambridge primarily because ‘it was a whole flight of steps up the academic 
hierarchy from Swansea (although I am still not clear how that matters, if it does)’ 
(Memoirs, 217), where he had occupied a teaching post before. Contrary to his 
hopeful expectations, Kingsley did not encounter extensive literary discussions 
among the teaching staff at Cambridge University: 
I had thought, vaguely but confidently, that its common rooms and elsewhere 
would abound with original and well-grounded talk about English literature. It 
proved hard to find. What I got was talk about intra-Faculty discord and 
personal quarrels, syllabus changes and retentions, the proportion of Firsts to 
other classes, the attendance at old so-and-so’s lectures – inevitably, no doubt, 
but discussed far more exclusively than I remembered from my provincial days, 
when a not necessarily very profound remark about Traherne or Tennyson 
would come up now and then.’ (Memoirs, 217) 
 
Apart from the academic disillusionment, the author fiercely disliked the social 
atmosphere at Cambridge due to the pretentiousness among the academia (cf. 
Memoirs, 218). The anecdotes that follow indicate that it was mainly dinner parties 
with not enough alcohol and stiff ‘college feasts’ (Memoirs, 218) which upset the 
author’s sensibilities. Kingsley’s general declaration of distaste merges into a series 
of anecdotal accounts about a number of evenings either spent with horrible people 
or on dreadful occasions. In one of these anecdotes which is especially outspoken 
and provoking Kingsley describes two evenings with Andrew Sinclair, fellow don at 
Cambridge and writer, whose books Kingsley finds ‘unreadable’ (Memoirs, 220). 
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Without mincing matters, the author portrays Sinclair as an ill-mannered 
curmudgeon who cannot stand his round of drinks. The second evening proves 
especially disastrous, as Sinclair had already failed to invite the Amises to his house 
for the second time and it was then agreed that they should go to the pub. In the pub, 
however, the following scene, which the author seems to depict in meticulous detail, 
occurs:  
‘This one’s on me,’ said Sinclair firmly and unarguably as we moved towards 
the bar. ‘What will you have?’ 
‘A large gin and tonic, please.’ On this point my pub code says you must 
balance the risk of insulting the chap by asking specifically for a double against 
that of being given a single. The balance this time came out as shown. 
‘With ice?’ he pursued, inviting me to go to the whole hog. 
‘Yes please.’  
When the drinks came, Sinclair plunged his hand confidently into his top 
inner breast pocket. As I a dream I watched that confidence vanish in an 
instant, to be as quickly replaced by puzzlement, disbelief, consternation. Soon 
he was doing an imitation of a free-falling parachutist frenziedly trying to 
locate his unpulled ripcord. Finally his movements slowed, ceased, and shame 
possessed him. ‘I must have left my wallet in my other jacket,’ he said. 
[…] I was too shaken to fight back. I omitted to offer to lend him a few quid, 
cash him a cheque, ask Arthur, the landlord, to do so, and just paid up. The rest 
I forgot, but I doubt if I ever saw the house where the builders had been. At any 
rate, Sinclair’s books stopped arriving on my doormat.’ (Memoirs, 221) 
 
In contrast to his nights out with unpleasant drinking companions, Kingsley 
describes his relationship with his students as enjoyable. His ‘most memorable 
encounters in Cambridge’, he informs us, ‘were not with any kind of senior persons 
but with undergraduates’ (Memoirs, 224). A few of these students ‘had become [] 
sort of friend[s] of the family’ (Memoirs, 226) and regularly visited Kingsley’s 
house. Criticising the fact that ‘the social gap between the dons and the 
undergraduates at Cambridge (and no doubt elsewhere) was too wide’ (Memoirs, 
226), the author indicates the ‘semi-open house Hilly and I kept in Madingley Road’ 
(Memoirs, 226) in a kind of insinuation:  
No doubt their chief reason for dropping in was to catch some of the pearls of 
wisdom I might be letting fall, though the attractiveness of our au pair 
conceivably came into it. (Memoirs, 226)  
 
What Kingsley Amis does not say, but what nevertheless rises to the surface at the 
end of the chapter, is that his marriage must have been highly problematic by the 
time he was living in Cambridge. The author left Cambridge because he needed more 
time for his writing; he wanted to go to Majorca, where he had got to know the poet 
Robert Graves (cf. Memoirs, 227), but the breakup with Hilly thwarted these plans:  
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So in due course I found myself saying to the infinitely kind and decent Herbert 
Butterfield, then Master of Peterhouse, ‘Sir, with great regret I want to resign 
my Fellowship at this college.’ 
‘In heaven’s name, why?’ he asked in his unassuming way. 
I gave a selective explanation, laying stress on a writer’s need for solitude, 
being outside the hurly-burly, etc. 
‘Yes,’ said Butterfield, having heard me out. ‘Romanticism. That’s what they 
used to call it in my day. The belief that you can help yourself to become an 
artist or a better artist by going somewhere remote or in foreign parts.’ But he 
raised no difficulties, indeed wished me well. 
In the event I did not go to Majorca and lead the life of an artist like someone 
of an earlier generation. I got no further than London, where I had not lived 
since 1940, and settled there with a new wife. I have been back to Cambridge a 
couple of times for a couple of hours at a time, and felt no flicker, except of 
personal remorse. I should never have gone there. Well, it was partly 
romanticism of a different order that had taken me there in the first place, in 
1961. (Memoirs, 227f.)  
 
It may be an over-interpretation to suggest that the failed ‘romanticism’ of 
Kingsley’s trip to Majorca and the ‘personal remorse’ he feels about Cambridge are 
an indication of the regret and emotional pain connected with his first wife, Hilly, 
which is voiced in the preface and in ‘Family’, and reflected in the poem ‘Instead of 
an Epilogue’ at the end of the book. If one chooses to see this passage in such a light, 
the sentence ‘I should never have gone there’ does not only refer to Cambridge but 
may also be viewed as an allusion to his marriage breakup. The separation itself is 
not even discussed, but only hinted at through the mentioning of the ‘new wife’ and 
the author’s move to London. Despite the fact that the words ‘romanticism’ and 
‘remorse’ feature here, this passage is an extreme example of emotional 
understatement. In this context, it is certainly significant how infinitely small the 
amount of time is that the author allows in the text for these essential aspects of his 
private life, especially when they are compared to how amply some anecdotes about 
going to dinner parties or other social/public events are described.  
With reference to Genette, Rimmon-Kenan analyses the nature of time in 
narrative texts, which is expressed in ‘the relations between ‘story-time and text-
time’ (Rimmon-Kenan, 44). In this respect she distinguishes three different 
parameters, namely ‘order’, ‘duration’ and ‘frequency’ (Rimmon-Kenan, 46). Under 
duration, which is the relevant aspect here, Genette ‘examines the relations between 
the time the events are supposed to have taken to occur and the amount of text 
devoted to their narration.’ (Rimmon-Kenan, 46) In order to arrive at a measuring 
instrument, Genette suggests  
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constancy of pace, rather than adequation of story and text, as the ‘norm’ 
against which to examine degrees of duration and textual length, e.g. when 
each year in the life of a character is treated in one page throughout the text. 
(Rimmon-Kenan, 52) 
 
If constant pace is seen as the norm, two forms of modification can be made out, 
namely ‘acceleration’ and ‘deceleration’ (Rimmon-Kenan, 52). On the side of 
acceleration, which is achieved by devoting a short segment of the text to a long 
period of the story, the scale ranges from ellipsis (maximum speed) to all kinds of 
more or less drastically accelerated summaries. A summary is a condensation or 
compression of a certain story-period into a relatively brief statement of its major 
features. (cf. Rimmon-Kenan, 52f.) On the other side of the spectrum, one speaks of 
deceleration when a long segment of the text corresponds to a short period of the 
story. Here the scale ranges from the descriptive pause (minimal speed), in which 
some segment of the text refers to zero story duration to scene, which can take on the 
form of dialogue or a detailed account of an event (cf. Rimmon-Kenan, 53f.).    
According to Rimmon-Kenan, ‘acceleration and deceleration are often 
evaluated by the reader as indicators of importance and centrality’ (Rimmon-Kenan, 
56). Thus, the more important events and conversations are normally narrated in 
detail (i.e. decelerated), while the less important ones are condensed (i.e. 
accelerated). (cf. Rimmon-Kenan, 56) This rule, however, is not always observed. In 
Memoirs, for example, the conventional relationship between the time an event is 
granted in a text and its significance to the author is reversed and undermined, as can 
be deduced from the above-quoted closing paragraphs from ‘Philip Larkin’ as well as 
the author’s discussion of his narrative approach in the preface. Kingsley Amis either 
curtails and sums up highly important events such as the author’s marriage breakup 
considerably (summary), or even elides them (ellipsis), while he often narrates 
clearly secondary occasions such as dinner parties in great detail (scene). As 
Rimmon-Kenan maintains, such an inversion of importance with regard to story-time 
and text-time can result in irony. (cf. Rimmon-Kenan, 56). In Memoirs, however, this 
upside down relationship between story-time and text-time does not have a humorous 
effect, but simply draws the reader’s attention to narrative gaps the author indicates 
and refuses to fill.  
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4.3. From microstructure back to macrostructure: narrative situations and  
       narrative rhythm  
 
If one compares the ‘essays’ with the ‘sketches’, one does not detect a huge 
difference between them at first sight. As has been shown in the close readings of 
various passages, both chapter types make use of the same techniques of 
characterisation and modes of narration, juxtaposing reportorial narration with scenic 
presentation. Furthermore, both are loosely structured, comprise essayistic passages, 
heavily rely on anecdotes, and privilege the narrating over the experiencing self. 
Despite all these similarities with regard to the basic narrative techniques, however, 
there is one important discrepancy which must not be overlooked: the two chapter 
types have different foci. While the emphasis of most essays lies in the portrayal of a 
person/character other than the narrator, the sketches concentrate more on the 
author’s own experiences, although even here Kingsley talks about other people a 
great deal more than one would expect. If one tries to categorise Memoirs within 
Stanzel’s typological circle (see Stanzel, xvi), there is no doubt that the book is 
written in the first-person narrative situation, which Stanzel distinguishes from the 
authorial and the figural narrative situations. However, the first-person narrative 
situation has two sub-categories, namely the quasi-autobiographical first-person 
narrative situation (cf. Stanzel, 201) and the peripheral first-person narrative situation 
(cf. Stanzel, 202). In applying Stanzel’s terminology to Memoirs, it can be said that 
the essays tend to be written in the peripheral first-person narrative situation, whereas 
the autobiographical first-person narrative situation33 prevails in the sketches.  
 According to Stanzel, the peripheral first-person narrator is distinguished 
from the autobiographical first-person narrator insofar as ‘the narrator himself does 
not stand at the centre of the events’ (Stanzel, 205). He is located at the periphery of 
the narrated events and his function is that of a witness, biographer, observer, or 
chronicler. (cf. Stanzel, 201) The autobiographical first-person narrator, by contrast, 
‘is at one and the same time the main character, standing at the centre of the action, 
and the narrator.’ (Stanzel, 205) In other words, the hero of the story and the narrator 
                                                 
33 As Stanzel is concerned with narrative fiction in A Theory of Narrative, he uses the prefix quasi to  
    describe this type of narrative situation, thus speaking of the ‘quasi-autobiographical narrative  
    situation’ (Stanzel, 212). This thesis, however, deals with autobiography – not fiction –, which is  
    why autobiography cannot be imitated and the prefix quasi becomes redundant in the present  
    context. When the term autobiographical first-person narrative situation is used here, it therefore  
    refers to the same characteristics as Stanzel’s quasi-autobiographical first-person narrative situation.  
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are identical in the autobiographical first-person form, which Stanzel considers as the 
ideal type of first-person narration. (cf. Stanzel, 201) He maintains that the relations 
between the narrating and the experiencing self are balanced here. Although the 
experiencing self claims the greater part of the narrative, the narrating self is 
continuously present. Through the recognised importance of commentaries by the 
narrating self, an equilibrium between the two selves is achieved. (cf. Stanzel, 210) 
The most important point of departure for the interpretation of an autobiographical 
first-person narrative is thus the field of tension which establishes itself between the 
two selves of the narrator, i.e. the narrative distance. (cf. Stanzel, 210) In the 
peripheral narrative situation, by contrast, the two selves are not of equal importance, 
as mediacy and the act of narration are emphatically overt here. (cf. Stanzel, 205) 
The most significant function of the peripheral first-person narrator is  
the mediation or subjectivizing of the narrated events […]. The actual meaning 
of the narrative lies not in how the main character and his world are in 
themselves, but rather in how they are experienced at some distance by a 
narrator who observes, experiences, assesses. (Stanzel, 205f.) 
 
As a consequence, a significant feature in the personality of any peripheral first-
person narrator rests in his perception, which at least partly derives from his 
relationship with the main character(s). (cf. Stanzel, 205f.) Thus, the tension between 
the character of the narrator and that of the protagonist(s) is of primary importance 
for the meaning of any peripheral first-person narrative and must be considered in an 
interpretation. (cf. Stanzel, 207)  
 In Memoirs, the essays and the sketches are not separated into two blocks but 
appear in mixed order. The first chapter, for example, is an essay, the second and 
third chapters – ‘Schools’ and ‘Oxford’ – are sketches, the fourth chapter, ‘Philip 
Larkin’ is an essay, and so on. Consequently, the focus constantly shifts between the 
author/narrator and his characters, as the first-person narrative situation alternates 
between its peripheral and autobiographical forms. In Stanzel’s approach, this 
variation between narrative situations or between different modes of a narrative 
situation during the course of the narrative process is called the ‘[d]ynamization of 
the narrative situation’ (Stanzel, 63). If a narrative shows frequent transitions in its 
narrative situations (or in the variations of one narrative situation), it has a strongly 
pronounced ‘narrative rhythm’ (Stanzel, 69); on the other hand, if one narrative 
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situation (or one variation of a narrative situation) is noticeably dominant throughout 
the text, the narrative rhythm is considered weak34 (cf. Stanzel, 69).  
 We have established that the first-person narrative situation of Memoirs is 
mainly a peripheral one in the essays and primarily an autobiographical one in the 
sketches. But this is by no means the end of the story, as the narrative situation does 
not remain fixed within individual chapters; it may also change from passage to 
passage, depending on whether the narrator’s focus lies on his own self or on another 
character/other characters. From these frequent microstructural transitions between 
and within chapters it can be concluded that the narrative rhythm of Memoirs is 
decidedly strong. If, in a next step of the analysis, one takes a look at the grander 
picture, i.e. the book as a whole, the question arises which variation of the first-
person narrative situation prevails. Is Memoirs predominantly a peripheral first-
person narrative or an autobiographical first-person narrative? From a quantitative 
perspective, one would have to opt for the peripheral variation, as the majority of the 
chapters are essays. This answer is additionally backed up by the author’s discussion 
of his narrative approach in the preface, as he announces to focus on others rather 
than himself and to stay away from centre stage (cf. Memoirs, xvf.). It is here, 
however, that Stanzel’s differentiation of first-person narrators reaches its limits, as 
Memoirs is not a continuous narrative with a single, developing protagonist or an 
identifiable plot. If Memoirs is seen as a peripheral first-person narrative, one has to 
ask which character other than Kingsley Amis qualifies as the protagonist. Memoirs 
features a huge number of characters, who may act as protagonists within single 
chapters or passages, but none of them come close to reaching the status of a 
protagonist overall. Who, if not Kingsley Amis, is the hero in Memoirs? As has been 
noted in a different context before, Kingsley functions as the narrative lynchpin of 
his autobiography. It is he who binds together all the mini-memoirs that make up this 
book and all the characters it comprises, for all their fates entwine in nothing but his 
person and his narrative act; he weaves them into the narrative of his life, however 
discontinous, achronological and episodic this narrative may be. Consequently, the 
peripheral first-person narrative situation may dominate microstructurally as well as 
quantitatively, but on the level of macrostructure, Memoirs ultimately – and against 
all evidence – has to be classed as an autobiographical first-person narrative.  
 
                                                 
34 The terms strong and weak are no value judgements. Whether the narrative rhythm of a text is     
    strong or weak has no consequence for its quality.  
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4.4. Reception and personal reflection 
 
When Kingsley Amis’s Memoirs were published in 1991, the public interest was 
enormous. Indeed, ‘[n]o book he wrote, not even Lucky Jim [his first and most 
famous novel], attracted so much publicity on its first appearance’ (Anon., ‘Obituary: 
Sir Kingsley Amis’, The Times). Its reception, however, was fiercely divided. One 
group of reviewers was extremely critical, judging Memoirs as morally repugnant 
and depthless. John Nelson, for example, notes that ‘the list of people and objects 
that have offended the Amis sensibilities’ is ‘[e]ncyclopedic’ (Nelson, John). 
Although he admits that Memoirs is ‘not all misanthropy and –ogyny’ (Nelson, 
John), he accuses the author of having compiled the book simply to ‘settle old 
scores’ (Nelson, John). He maintains that ‘[r]eading this collection of essays and 
sketches is a bit like listening to a bristly British clubman, over whisky and sodas, 
who has been cursed with total recall’ (Nelson, John). One of the most devastating 
reviews appeared in The Times Literary Supplement; Craig Brown does not only 
criticise the content of the book, but also the style it is written in: 
Amis’s chosen tone, decked in the chumminess, tetchiness, and naughtiness of 
the lounge bar, appears relaxed and all-embracing, but is in fact extremely 
limiting. It is perfectly designed for prickly and very funny descriptions of self-
aggrandizing strangers. Among these strangers, each lampooned and dismissed 
in two or three pages, are Lord Snowdon, Arnold Wesker, Roald Dahl and Tom 
Driberg. Amis met them once or twice, found them abnormally irritating and/or 
absurd, and now wipes them out with blissfully nasty anecdotes, related with 
his singular skill for the mimicking of affection. (Brown, Craig) 
 
Even those critics who confess to having enjoyed reading Memoirs are taken aback 
by the outspokenness with which Kingsley reveals dubious details about other 
people, especially because he is so reticent about his own private life. Bakshian, for 
instance, praises the ‘mature blend of penetration, justifiable bile, humor, warmth, 
and the occasional trace of regret’ (Bakshian) he finds in Memoirs, yet also laments 
the fact that Amis shares so little about himself with the reader:  
The only thing that is slightly amiss about the author’s own Memoirs is that 
they are only very slightly Amis, a mixture of delicacy and shame keeping the 
spotlight off the narrator’s inner and private lives and on the foibles of friends 
and acquaintances. (Bakshian)  
 
In a similar vein, Conarroe praises Memoirs as ‘[p]rolific, entertaining [and] 
quotable’ but describes Kingsley Amis as ‘nasty’ (Conarroe) and warns readers to 
stay away from the author:  
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If he invites you to dinner, or more likely, for drinks, don’t go. Otherwise 
you’re apt to become grist for his satiric mill. The most thankful citizens of 
London these days, I suspect, are the ones who never downed many a few with 
Sir Kingsley, and hence don’t show up in his mischievous ‘Memoirs.’ 
(Conarroe)  
 
 Memoirs was not only commented on after its first publication, but echoed 
again in the immediate aftermath of the author’s death. As the unnamed author of an 
obituary in The Times shows, Kingsley’s autobiography started to be seen in a more 
differentiated light after a few years had passed. Noting that Memoirs ‘blew up a fine 
literary dust’, this reviewer maintains that 
[o]nly when the dust had settled did Memoirs become recognised at least by 
some for what it was, an assembly of highly collectible anecdotes which would 
have entertained any dinner party (not comprised of maiden aunts) or literary 
saloon bar. The storyteller was back at work, but revealing little about himself 
apart from his dislikes: reluctance by others to stand their round of drinks came 
very high on the list. (Anon., ‘Obituary: Sir Kingsley Amis’, The Times) 
 
 The polarised reception of Memoirs and the extreme positions some 
reviewers occupy is not just a cry of moral condemnation; more importantly, it 
shows that Kingsley Amis’s approach breaks with the conventions of the 
autobiographical genre. The public outrage can only partly be explained by the fact 
that Memoirs violates legal as well as emotional rights. It is incontestable that his 
revelation of private and partly highly embarrassing episodes of peoples’ lives is 
ethically problematic; every autobiographer has to bear in mind that the genre is 
referential and thus deals with real people whose private spheres ought to be 
respected, rather than just literary characters.35 Nevertheless, the author has not only 
caused the media’s indignation by overstepping the mark with regard to the right for 
privacy, he has also undermined readers’ generic expectations. ‘As one might 
predict, given his celebrated distaste of the obvious, the result is not your 
conventional chronological narrative’ (Conarroe). It is almost as if Memoirs were an 
anti-autobiography: instead of adhering to the confessional model of the genre, the 
author creates a multitude of narrative gaps, trying to reveal as little as possible about 
himself and as much as possible about others, which results in a kind of prose that is 
anecdotal, full of biting humour, and sometimes reads like ‘uncensored gossip’ 
(Conarroe). According to the aforementioned obituary in The Times, ‘[t]he limelight 
was there’ in Memoirs, ‘but […] the private person remained hidden.’ (Anon., 
                                                 
35 For an extensive discussion of the ‘ethics of life writing’ see Paul John Eakin’s essay ‘‘The  
    Unseemly Profession’: Privacy, Inviolate Personality, and the Ethics of Life Writing’ in his book  
    How Our Lives Become Stories: Making Selves (142-186). 
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‘Obituary: Sir Kingsley Amis’, The Times) In a sense, this observation is true, and 
yet there is no reason why the reader should come away with feeling cheated; while 
it is legitimate to accuse the author of indecency about others, he cannot be denied 
the right to keep himself to himself. Apart from that, the author’s private persona 
does not stay quite as hidden as one may think. In fact, the attentive reader learns 
quite a lot about Kingsley Amis, although this learning process occurs in a 
roundabout rather than a direct way. While the author tells other people’s stories, 
glimpses of his own self are revealed bit by bit, and can be grasped in the selective 
mirror that the narrative process provides: a profound vein for melancholy, an 
unexpected vulnerability, and a considerable portion of guilt are only a few 
examples.  
At the risk of digressing, this chapter shall be closed by way of a comparison. 
The experience of reading Kingsley Amis’s Memoirs may be echoed by a passage in 
Flaubert’s Parrot, in which the protagonist, Geoffrey Braithwaite, talks about 
reading Mauriac’s Mémoires:  
Mauriac […] writes his ‘Mémoires’, but they aren’t his memoirs. We are spared 
the counting-games and spelling-bees of childhood, that first servant-girl in the 
humid attic, the canny uncle with metal teeth and a heedful of stories – or 
whatever. Instead, Mauriac tells us about the books he’s read, the painters he’s 
liked, the plays he’s seen. He finds himself by looking in the works of others… 
Reading his ‘memoirs’ is like meeting a man on the train who says, ‘Don’t look 
at me, that’s misleading. If you want to know what I’m like, wait until we’re in 
a tunnel, and then study the reflection in the window.’ You wait, and look, and 
catch a face against a shifting background of sooty walls, cables and sudden 
brickwork. The transparent shape flickers and jumps, always a few feet away. 
You become accustomed to its existence, you move with its movements; and 
though you know its presence is conditional, you feel it to be permanent. Then 
there is a wail from ahead, a roar and a burst of light; the face is gone for ever. 
(Barnes, 108) 
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5. Martin Amis’s Experience: A Memoir (2000) 
 
5.1. Macrostructure: narrative approach and structural design 
 
5.1.1. Narrative motivation and approach 
 
‘The Amis story – senior and junior – is familiar enough to even the casual reader of 
the mid-market and broadsheet press.’ (Rusbridger) Having grown up with a father 
who was a renowned novelist, Martin Amis knows what it is like to be in the 
spotlight of the media, - ‘‘the usual stuff’, as Amis calls it.’ (Rusbridger). Following 
in Kingsley’s footsteps, Martin has become an established novelist himself, and is an 
even bigger celebrity: he has often been referred to as ‘the Mick Jagger of literature’ 
(Roe) or the ‘Bad Boy’ (Chen in Amis, ‘English Literature’s ‘Bad Boy’ Pens His 
Memoir’) of English letters. However, Martin Amis is not only known for his 
professional achievements as a novelist; unsurprisingly, his private life has also been 
widely discussed, and the media has capitalised on the public interest in his person.  
As heir to a famous father, companion from childhood to the rich and gifted, a 
successful novelist by age 24, good-looking, well-off, and, before his marriage, 
a notorious womanizer – in other words, as an extremely annoying fellow – 
Amis had long been a malice-inspiring target. (Catmull)  
 
In the years of 1994 and 1995, Martin Amis ‘underwent a technicolor, wide-
screen epic of a midlife crisis’ (Catmull), which is reflected in Experience and has 
been part of his inspiration for writing the book. During this difficult phase, the 
following events rocked the author’s world: he broke up with and divorced his first 
wife, the philosopher Antonia Phillips, with whom he has two sons, Louis and Jacob, 
and started a new relationship with the American/Uruguayan novelist Isabel Fonseca; 
his cousin, Lucy Partington, who had disappeared 21 years earlier, was revealed to 
have been one of the victims of Britain’s most notorious serial killer, Frederick West; 
he found out about the identity of his adult daughter, Delilah Seale, whom he had 
fathered some 20 years earlier in a short affair with a married woman, Lamorna 
Heath, and met her for the first time; his beloved father, Kingsley Amis, died in 
October 1995 from the consequences of a fall and possibly from the effects of 
alcoholism and early Alzheimer’s disease; he parted from his longtime literary agent, 
Pat Kavanagh, and replaced her with a new booker, Andrew ‘The Jackal’ Wylie, who 
secured a large advance for his new novel, The Information. In this process, he lost a 
close friend, the writer Julian Barnes, who is also the husband of Pat Kavanagh; on 
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top of all that, he suffered a severe dental crisis – all his teeth were pulled out and 
part of his lower jaw rebuilt after the removal of a tumour. (cf. Kakutani and 
Catmull) ‘To particularize Amis’s special hell, every one of those events was 
gleefully, sneeringly, jeeringly recounted in the British press.’ (Catmull) He was 
highly criticised for leaving his wife and sons, his change of agents was interpreted 
as sheer greed, and his expensive dental treatments were downplayed to being merely 
cosmetic. (cf. Catmull and Rusbridger) The author’s difficult relationship with ‘fame 
(otherwise known as the media)’36 (Experience, 5f.), serves as a background foil for 
the whole book. It comes to the surface again and again throughout Experience, and 
its first mention occurs as early as page five and six in a long footnote: 
Actually there’s a good reason, a structural reason, why novelists should excite 
corrosiveness in the press. When you review a film, or appraise a film-director, 
you do not make a ten-minute short about it or him (or her). When you write 
about a painter, you do not make a sketch. When you write about a composer, 
you do not reach for your violin. And even when a poet is under consideration, 
the reviewer or profilist does not (unless deeply committed to presumption or 
tedium) produce a poem. But when you write about a novelist, an exponent of 
prose narrative, then you write a prose narrative. And was that the extent of 
your hopes for your prose – bookchat, interviews, gossip? Valued reader, it is 
not for me to say this is envy. It is for you to say this is envy. And envy never 
comes to the ball dressed as Envy. It comes dressed as something else: 
Asceticism, High Standards, Common Sense. Anyway, as I said, I don’t 
complain about all that – because fame is so great. (Experience, 6n) 
 
As Rusbridger observes, the very fact that Martin Amis’s story is so familiar ‘to even 
the casual reader of the mid-market and broadsheet press’ (Rusbridger) forms an 
important point of departure for the author’s impulse ‘to write the story himself – to 
reclaim it from the unauthorised version that is out there.’ (Rusbridger) 
Consequently, this desire to ‘recover some measure of control over his own life 
story’ (Rusbridger), or, in the author’s own words, the stirring ‘to set the record 
straight (so much of this is already public)’ (Experience, 7) is one major aspect of 
Martin Amis’s narrative motivation. In the first chapter of Experience, ‘Introductory: 
My Missing’, Martin openly discusses his narrative urge, asking himself the 
following question: ‘I am a novelist, trained to use experience for other ends. Why 
should I tell the story of my life?’37 (Experience, 6) The answer he gives is more 
                                                 
36 As Linda Richards notes, Martin Amis has been described as ‚the most celebrated and vilified  
    novelist of our time.’ (Richards in Amis, ‘January Experiences Martin Amis’) 
37 The author’s self-conscious treatment of the reasons for writing Experience points to the fact that he  
    is an overt narrator, or – in Stanzel’s system of narrative theory – operates as a teller-character. (cf.  
    Stanzel, 114)  
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complicated, however, than his need to settle a few scores with ‘The Fourth Estate’ 
(Experience, 277).  
According to Moss, Martin Amis’s narrative motivation appears to be 
threefold: filial, personal, artistic.’ (Moss, ‘The Art of Autobiography’) First, he feels 
the urge to mourn his father and write about their special case of a father and a son 
both being successful writers (cf. Moss, ‘The Art of Autobiography’):  
I do it because my father is dead now, and I always knew I would have to 
commemorate him. He was a writer and I am a writer; it feels like a duty to 
describe our case – a literary curiosity which is also just another instance of a 
father and a son. (Experience, 7) 
 
Second, he wants to set the record straight with the British press – as has been 
mentioned above –, but he also seeks ‘to speak, for once, without artifice. Though 
not without formality’ (Experience, 7) (cf. Moss, ‘The Art of Autobiography’). Both 
aspects of this reason are closely linked with the author’s need to regain control over 
his own life story. On the one hand, Martin attempts to rescue it from the scavengers 
of the media, hoping that ‘this version will last longer than yesterday’s Daily Mail.’ 
(Amis, Martin as cited in Rusbridger). On the other hand, he deplores and wants to 
counteract life’s general shapelessness:  
The trouble with life (the novelist will feel) is its amorphousness, its ridiculous 
fluidity. Look at it: thinly plotted, largely themeless, sentimental and 
ineluctably trite. The twists are either predictable or sensationalist. And it’s 
always the same beginning; and the same ending (Experience, 7). 
 
This impression is reiterated towards the end of the book, which further underlines 
the longing to obtain control via narrative means:  
My life, it seems to me, is ridiculously shapeless. I know what makes a good 
narrative, and lives don’t have much of that – pattern and balance, form, 
completion, commensurateness. (Experience, 361)  
 
The third reason for Martin to write his autobiography, as Moss observes, ‘is more 
complicated, and perhaps the most intriguing: how does a novelist who, like others 
before him, is wary of autobiography set about writing it?’ (Moss, ‘The Art of 
Autobiography’) Apparently, Martin Amis was fascinated by the challenge of writing 
in this form, which is ‘alien’ (Moss, ‘The Art of Autobiography’) to a novelist, yet 
critical of it at the same time. ‘We live in the age of mass loquacity,’ (Experience, 6) 
he writes:  
[W]hat everyone has in them, these days, is not a novel but a memoir. […] We 
are all writing it or at any rate talking it: the memoir, the apologia, the c.v., the 
cri de coeur. Nothing, for now, can compete with experience – so 
unanswerably authentic, and so liberally and democratically dispensed. 
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Experience is the only thing we share equally, and everyone senses this. 
(Experience, 6) 
Naturally, these three different aspects of Martin’s narrative motivation are not 
isolated from each other; the author’s filial, personal and artistic reasons for 
composing Experience that Moss lists are all interconnected. One could argue that 
there is a fourth narrative driving force which is not part of Moss’s enumeration: the 
writing of one’s story is therapeutic, and Amis has used autobiography as a means of 
self-inspection to come to terms with the traumatic events of 1994-1995, especially 
the death of his father, as the following statement in the first chapter of Experience 
confirms: 
Someone is no longer here. The intercessionary figure, the father, the man who 
stands between the son and death, is no longer here; and it won’t ever be the 
same. He is missing. But I know it is common; all that lives must die, passing 
through nature to eternity. My father lost his father, and my children will lose 
theirs, and their children (this is immensely onerous to contemplate) will lose 
theirs. (Experience, 7) 
 
His father Kingsley is not the only person for whom he grieves; his cousin Lucy 
Partington and his daughter Delilah Seale have also left emotional gaps in Martin’s 
life. As he informs us in the last paragraph of ‘Introductory: My Missing’, Martin has 
a photograph of each of these two girls on his desk. ‘The photographs are kept 
together, and for almost twenty years their subjects lived together in the back of my 
mind. Because these are, or were, my missing.’ (Experience, 8)  
The author’s experience of the many crises he suffered in 1994-1995, which 
add up to his mid-life crisis, has made him acutely aware of the universality of death. 
Martin Amis regards the mid-life crisis as something ‘intrinsic and structural’ 
(Experience, 63) to life, through which ‘a realignment’ can take place, ‘something 
irresistible and universal, to do with your changing views about death (and you ought 
to have a crisis about that. It is critical to have a crisis about that).’ (Experience, 64)  
 
5.1.2. Themes, overall structure and structural principles 
 
The structural principles which underlie Experience, as well as its main themes, are 
closely related to the author’s narrative motivation. In order to come to terms with 
life’s ‘amorphousness and ridiculous fluidity’ (Experience, 7), he opposes it with 
structural and narrative patterns. Despite the fact that Martin Amis does not recall the 
events from his life chronologically – he moves up and down the time scale freely, 
going ‘back and forth across the years of his various growings-up’ (Meagher) – 
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Experience is a thoroughly structured book. As the author writes, he may be wanting 
‘to speak […] without artifice’, but ‘formality’ (Experience, 7) is nevertheless 
paramount to him.  
Macrostructurally, Experience is divided into two parts: ‘Part One: 
Unawakened’ and ‘Part Two: The Main Events’. In the first part, which makes up 
two thirds of the book and consists of fifteen chapters, the author jump-cuts between 
various eras and episodes of his life (cf. Roe), including the fate of his cousin Lucy, 
the death of his father, his parents’ and his own divorce, and his dental problems. In 
the second part, he picks out three ‘main events’, i.e. three exceptionally formative 
‘ordinary miracles and disasters’ (Experience, 357) of his life, and gives in-depth 
accounts of them in three respective chapters: ‘1: Delilah Seale’ deals with his 
finding out about the identity of his adult daughter Delilah and meeting her for the 
first time; ‘2: One Little More Hug’ recounts the final weeks and the death of his 
father, and ‘3: The Magics’ is about the birth of his daughter Fernanda in November 
1996. Although we already learn about these incidents throughout the first part of 
Experience, the author emphasises their centrality by retelling them separately and in 
more detail in ‘Part Two’. The main body of Experience is closed with ‘The Magics’, 
– the last chapter of ‘Part Two’, but the book does not end there. In fact, Experience 
goes on for another twenty pages, which consist of a three-part appendage: In the 
‘Postscript’ Martin reflects his trip to Poland in 1995, during which he visited 
Auschwitz and Birkenau (‘Postscript: Poland, 1995’), while in the ‘Appendix’ he 
settles accounts with the media; he criticises Eric Jacobs, his father’s former 
biographer, whom he sees as a representative of the Fourth Estate, for, among other 
things, publishing an inappropriate and disrespectful account of Kingsley’s final days  
very shortly after the latter’s death (‘Appendix: The Biographer and the Fourth 
Estate’). Finally, Experience is completed with the ‘Addendum’, which is written in 
the form of a letter to the author’s deceased aunt Miggy – Lucy’s mother 
(‘Addendum: Letter to my Aunt’). ‘This is a letter I will never send, in a book you 
will never read’, Martin writes as an introduction. ‘Still, I couldn’t conclude without 
addressing some words to you, however briefly and tentatively.’ (Experience, 383) 
He closes Experience with this letter, because it is crucially important to him to 
ensure himself of his aunt’s ‘blessing’ (Experience, 384) of his book. When he had 
already started writing it, his aunt expressed doubts about his project of ‘attempting 
to memorialise […] Lucy’ (Experience, 383), but when Miggy was introduced to 
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Martin’s baby daughter Fernanda, she finally did give her approval. Thus, Martin 
expresses his gratitude to her and sends her his love.  
Thematically, three interrelated aspects lie at the heart of Experience. First, 
the father-son relationship between Kingsley and Martin runs through the entire 
book; memories of Kingsley both open and close its main body. (cf. Keulks, 24) The 
second thematic crucible is the author’s coming of age, – his passage from innocence 
to experience (cf. Meagher), as the title indicates. Although ‘[t]he author comes of 
age not once, but repeatedly during the course of his first fifty years’ (Meagher), the 
years of 1994 and 1995 constitute an incredibly intense and condensed period of 
maturation, – his mid-life crisis: ‘The theme is clear,’ Amis says of the period: 
‘partings, sunderings, severances.’ (Experience, 198) Thus, the third main theme lies 
in the book’s focus on the years of 1994 and 1995, which form the epicentre of the 
author’s consciousness (cf. Anon., ‘Familiengeschäfte’), ‘the book’s pregnable pivot, 
the wound to which the text recurs again and again’ (Wood, ‘The Young Turk’). 
‘1994 and 1995 had not gone out of their way to persuade me that I was immune to 
disaster; and no one is spared the main events’ (Experience, 287), Amis writes in 
‘One Little More Hug’. Thus, the years of 1994 and 1995 form the temporal anchor 
of Experience, from which  
the narrative takes off in all directions: to 1973, when The Rachel Papers was 
published and Lucy disappeared; to home life at Swansea, to a Brighton 
crammer in 1967, to Majorca with his mother in flight from Kingsley’s 
infidelities, to cruising the King’s Road looking for girls and hash with his 
luckless friend Rob. (Walsh ‘Night Train Through a Dark Wood’) 
 
 Experience is an incredibly complex, digressive and dense autobiography; it 
encompasses ‘everything from F.R. Leavis and the function of literary criticism to 
Auschwitz’ (Diederick, 181) and makes use of a rich pallet of narrative techniques. 
Nevertheless, one can discern two major structural principles which inform the 
overall structural design of the book and are realised in the macrostructural as well as 
the microstructural dimension of the narration, namely oppositionality and 
parallelism. Thus, it will be discussed in the following sections how these two 
structural elements are realised in their various forms throughout Experience.  
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5.2. From macrostructure to microstructure  
 
5.2.1. Oppositionality 
 
5.2.1.1. Innocence vs. experience 
The principle of oppositionality is ubiquitous in Experience; it manifests itself on 
various structural levels as well as in different thematic areas. However, there is one 
fundamental macrostructural contrast from which all other oppositions derive, 
namely the dialectic relationship between innocence and experience. As Martin 
Amis’s autobiography is essentially about coming of age, it is informed by the 
determinism that ‘innocence will necessarily become experience, song turn to 
growl.’ (Wood) Towards the end of Experience, Martin muses about this opposition: 
‘‘Life is mainly grief and labour’’ he notes, quoting his father Kingsley:  
That’s true, Dad. Life is mainly deaths and babies; ordinary miracles and 
ordinary disasters, the white magic of growth, and then the other magic at the 
other end of the line, the black magic, just as feverish, and just as out-of-
nowhere. (Experience, 365)  
 
The dialectics between innocence and experience, which is intertextually derived 
from William Blake’s Songs of Innocence and Experience (1794), does not only 
preside over Experience, it even gives the book its title.38 (cf. Diederick, 271)  
Similarly to Blake, Martin Amis juxtaposes the innocent world of childhood 
against the darker adult world of corruption and experience. Blake’s Songs of 
Innocence and Experience work via contrasts and parallels to criticise the ways in 
which the cruel experiences of adulthood demolish what is good in innocence, while 
also conveying the weaknesses of the innocent perspective. (cf. Santos) In an 
analogous vein, Martin Amis opposes his adolescent, innocent self with his more 
experienced adult self by including his own ‘mortifying college correspondence’ 
(Handler) from 1967 to 1971.  
 
                                                 
38 Keulks makes a point that, in fact, Kingsley Amis’s Letters (2000) – and not William Blake –  
    should be viewed as the origin of the book’s title. In a letter to Robert Conquest, written eight years  
    after he had last seen his second wife, Elizabeth Jane Howard, Kingsley  reflects on marriage,  
    concluding with a statement that Keulks sees as an epitaph for Martin’s memoir: ‘Well, it’s all  
    experience, though it’s a pity there had to be so much of it.’ (Kingsley Amis to Robert Conquest,  
    Letters, 1078) (cf. Keulks, 206) Among other quotations from the Letters, Martin Amis does cite  
    this episode in Experience (214). However, considering the structural parallels between Blake’s  
    Songs of Innocence and Experience  and Martin’s Experience, it seems more likely that Blake’s  
    famous work is the title-giving source, even though the above-mentioned quotation adds a nuance.  
    Furthermore, Martin – unlike Kingsley – does not condemn the experiences he has made and  
    balances the many difficult incidents recounted in Experience with positive ones, such as the    
    finding of his daughter Delilah and the birth of Fernanda.  
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5.2.1.2. Narrative distance: Osric vs. Martin 
 
From 1967 to 1971, Martin was first a pupil at a Brighton boarding ‘crammer’ and 
later a student of English at Oxford University. During this period, he wrote frequent 
letters to his father and his stepmother, Elizabeth Jane Howard, explaining how 
‘Kafka is a fucking fool’ (Experience, 10) and how ‘I consider ‘Middlemarch’ to be 
FUCKING good’ (Experience, 11). (cf. Adams) These letters, which ‘stand for 
innocence in the Amis universe’ (Adams), punctuate the first part of Experience (cf. 
Experience, 12); they are chronologically ordered, with every letter appearing as the 
final section of each chapter in ‘Part One: Unawakened’.39 According to Packer-
Fletcher, the letters mirror the struggles of an adolescent and his coming of age. At 
the same time, however, they demonstrate how this young man begins to form his 
own point of view and his personal style as a writer. (cf. Packer-Fletcher) The letters, 
which are full of exaggerated formulations and show Martin as ‘all flop and peeve, 
head snot-full of intellectual ambition’ (Ferguson), have a genuinely humorous 
effect. They are funny in themselves, but the comedy is greatly heightened by the 
contrast of voices arising from the juxtaposition of the letters with the main text; the 
insightful, mature voice of the narrator is opposed with the daredevil, over-the-top 
voice of the letter-writer. The following extracts come from the first letter, which is 
dated 23 October 1967:  
Dearest Dad and Jane, 
 
 Thanks awfully for your letter. So we all appear to be working like fucking 
fools. I seem to be flitting manically from brash self-confidence to whimpering 
depression; the English is all very fine, but the Latin I find difficult, tedious, 
and elaborately unrewarding. It would be so boring if it buggered up my 
Oxford Entrance paper. […] 
 
[…] I do enjoy the English but I must say that I get periods of desperately 
wanting something else to occupy myself with. The prospect of teaching has 
lost its glow because it means that I will be dealing with the same sort of thing 
for the next 4 years without much of a break. I hope you don’t think I’m off the 
idea of Eng. Lit., because I find myself suffused with an ardour for sheer 
quantity of consumption. In my last few days in London I read ‘Middlemarch’ 
(in 3 days), ‘The Trial’ (Kafka is a fucking fool – in 1 day), and even here I 
manage a couple of novels a week (plus lots of poetry). Its [sic] just that I’m a 
bit cheesed off with applying myself to the same ideas all the time – but I 
shouldn’t think its [sic] anything that a paternal – or step-maternal – harangue 
won’t correct. I’m sorry to be a bore, and it’s probably merely a phase – might 
                                                 
39 Consequently, there are fifteen letters interspersing the fifteen chapters of the first part of  
    Experience.  
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even be character-building, who knows. (Experience, 9f., emphases and 
annotations original) 
 
The narrator does not allow the letters to stand for themselves. In fact, he frequently 
comments on and annotates ‘this embarrassing correspondence’ (Experience, 9) in 
footnotes and brackets, thus drawing a sharp, immediate contrast between the 
experiencing self (the letter-writer) and the narrating self (the teller-character who 
assesses the letters and their author). At the beginning of the second chapter, ‘Rank’, 
Martin Amis even devotes a whole page of the main text to evaluating the first letter. 
Despite the fact that he partly identifies with who he was in 1967, he thoroughly 
criticises the personality of the experiencing self as well as the style the letter is 
written in:  
It would be nice to say that I ‘make no apologies’ for my early letters […]. But 
I do: I make fervent apologies for them. And they get worse. It all gets worse. I 
really am very sorry. The toiling periphrases, the tally-ho facetiousness: this I 
can forgive. My dismissal of Kafka is ridiculous, and is only partly 
counterbalanced by the approximate justice of the PPS – and what was it with 
me and the word fine? But at least, here, I can recognize myself. Elsewhere this 
letter seems to have been written by a stranger: I mean its tone of pampered 
intolerance, its political stupidity; I am repelled by the thought-clichés and 
unexamined formulations, herd formulations.’ (Experience, 12, emphases 
original) 
  
In this extract, the narrative distance, that is to say, ‘the tension between the older, 
matured and more sensible ‘I’ as narrator and the ‘I’ as hero’ (Stanzel, 82) is 
indicated by the narrator’s use of the present tense on the one hand (‘make’, ‘do’, 
‘make’, ‘get’, ‘gets’, ’am’, ‘can’, ‘is’, ‘is’, ‘can’, ‘seems’, ‘mean’ ‘am’), and the past 
tense (‘was’) on the other hand. According to Stanzel, the narrative distance is a 
measure for the psychological and temporal distance from which the narrating self 
now recounts the feelings and considerations which the experiencing self had at the 
time. (cf. Stanzel, 95) Thus, ‘[t]he past tense signifies for the narrator, and therefore 
for the reader, real past time and keeps the present time of the first-person narrator 
free from these views’ (Stanzel, 95). Through the contrast between the past and the 
present tenses, the narrator emphatically dissociates himself from his previous 
conception and the reader must conclude that the ‘narratorial ‘I’’ (Stanzel, 95) has 
undergone a change since the time of the narrated events. As Stanzel explains, in 
many first-person texts40 the narrating self seems to refuse total identification with 
the experiencing self. (cf. Stanzel, 99) In Experience, the considerable narrative 
                                                 
40 Stanzel refers to ‘first-person novels’ (Stanzel, 99), but his argument is applied to autobiography  
    here, hence the generalisation. 
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distance created by the contrast between the letters and the narration as well as 
between present and past tenses (within the narration) is further augmented by the 
fact that occasionally the narrator switches to the third person when he talks about 
his young self. According to Stanzel, ‘the variation in pronoun from ‘I’ to ‘he’ with 
reference to the earlier self of the first-person narrator’ is ‘[t]he most pointed form’ 
(Stanzel, 99) which the narrating self’s attempt to distance himself from the 
experiencing self can take. Martin Amis does not say ‘he’ when he refers to his 
younger self; instead, he gives himself a different name: he calls his adolescent self 
‘Osric’ (Experience, 15, 17, 18, 34, 110, 119, 131, 153, 167n, 173n, 191n, 231n, 239, 
240n, 270n, 271n).  
Osric is not a random name; it has a famous literary source. Originally, Osric 
is a character in Shakespeare’s Hamlet, whom Martin Amis has borrowed for the 
portrayal of his adolescent self. In Hamlet, Osric is a minor figure who is introduced 
in Act 5, Scene 2 in order to summon Hamlet to the fencing match with Laertes, 
during which Hamlet dies. Osric, an inferior courtier, can be characterised as ‘a 
coxcomb, a fop, a dandy’ (Weller, ‘Summary of Act 5, Scene 2’). He is overdressed, 
pretentious, and flourishes his big hat at Hamlet when he enters the scene; he delivers 
his message in ‘highly mannered language’ (Anon., ‘The Tragedie of Hamlet, Prince 
of Denmarke: Character Directory’; also cf. Hamlet, 5.2.105-111), and tries to 
impress Prince Hamlet with his extravagant appearance and behaviour, but the latter 
makes fun of the former’s need for approval and social recognition (cf. Weller, 
‘Summary of Act 5, Scene 2’). Through the intertextual reference to Shakespeare’s 
Hamlet and the employment of the Osric persona, Martin Amis creates such a large 
gap between his earlier and his present self that at times it almost seems as if Osric 
were disconnected from the narrator. Of course one never fully succumbs to the 
illusion that Osric may physically be a different person from Martin, but the narrative 
distance is indeed extreme. With the help of narratorial comments, the author 
compares and identifies his adolescent self with Osric, the ‘attendant lord’ (Adams) 
from Hamlet. At the beginning of the second chapter, ‘Rank’, for example, he makes 
the following judgement about his teenage self: ‘The nineteen-year-old hero of my 
first novel’,41 he writes, 
‘was described in one review as ‘both a gilded and repulsive creature.’ I accept 
this description, for my hero and for myself. I was an Osric. (Hamlet: … [Aside 
                                                 
41 The Rachel Papers (1973) 
 87 
 
to Horatio] Dost know this water-fly?)’(Experience, 15, quotation from Hamlet 
and annotation as in original)  
 
In the footnote corresponding to this passage, Martin recalls that his father played 
Osric in a college theatre production in Swansea in 1953 (cf. Experience, 15n). This 
memory of his father prompts him to draw additional parallels between his 
adolescent self and the character from Hamlet:  
Now I recall his [Kingsley’s, annot.] Osric routine, very flirtatious, all eyelash 
and limp wrist. As Osric says of Laertes: ‘an absolute gentleman, full of most 
excellent differences, of very soft society and great showing.’ [Hamlet, 
5.2.107-108, annot.] That was me, in 1967.’ (Experience, 15n) 
 
Similarly to the Osric in the Shakespearean tragedy, the Osric of Experience 
is intrigued by fancy language and extravagant clothes; thus, he uses the word ‘fine’ 
extensively,42 trains himself to say ‘Mondee’ and ‘Fridee’ instead of ‘Mon-day’ and 
‘Fri-day’ (Experience, 16, emphases original), because he finds it fashionable and 
posh,43 and writes one of his letters to his father and stepmother in the form of a 
prose poem (cf. Experience, 17). Furthermore, Martin Amis has also adopted Osric’s 
eccentric style of clothing from Hamlet: Shakespeare’s Osric wears a large hat, 
showing his insecurity by taking it off and putting it back on repeatedly in order to 
please the prince, who provocatively changes his perception of the temperature from 
cold to hot and back again in order to mock Osric (cf. Hamlet, 5.2.81-104 and 
Weller, ‘Summary of Act 5, Scene 2’). Analogously, the young Martin Amis aka 
Osric also both has an extravagant dress style and is unsure of himself, as the 
following self-characterisation illustrates: ‘I was a drawling, velvet-suited, 
snakeskin-booted undergraduate’ (Experience, 131); one source of Osric’s inferiority 
complex, which he covers up with his pretentiousness, is his body; Osric has a 
problem with his lack of height:  
I was then about five-foot-two (and had only another four inches to go) […]. I 
minded being short chiefly because it seemed that about half of womankind 
was thereby rendered unapproachable. (Experience, 12) 
 
                                                 
42 Cf.: The narrator’s comment on Osric’s first letter which has already been cited above:  ‘and what  
    was it with me and the word fine?’ (Experience, 12, emphases original) 
43 The narrator comments on this habit with the help of a dialogue between him and his two sons,  
    Louis and Jacob: 
       […] 
- Then why do you say Mondee and Fridee and Sundee? 
- Jesus. I trained myself to do it in my teens because I thought it sounded posh. 
- Why d’you do that? asked Louis with sincere puzzlement. 
- Because it used to be cool to be posh. 
His head snapped round.  
- Did it?... Christ…  
(Experience, 17, emphases original)  
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5.2.1.3. Comedy vs. tragedy 
It has been noted before that the Osric letters as well as the narrative descriptions of 
his adventures are inherently comical; one cannot help but smile with amusement at 
the image Martin Amis creates of his adolescent self, of whose pretentiousness he is 
lovingly critical: 
I didn’t like working. What I liked was bunking off school and hanging out  
with my friend Rob and betting in betting shops (not the horses: the dogs) and 
mincing up and down the King’s Road in skintight velvet and grimy silk 
scarves and haunting a coffee bar called the Picasso, and smoking hash (then ₤8 
an ounce) and trying to pick up girls. (Experience, 13) 
 
Bearing in mind the intertextual reference to Shakespeare’s Hamlet, it is fair to ask 
what role the comedy of the Osric persona may play in the overall composition of 
Experience. In Hamlet, Osric’s structural function is rather limited; he is introduced 
as late as the final act, his only tasks being to deliver the King’s request that Hamlet 
meet Laertes in a fencing match and to umpire the duel. The King’s message could 
easily have been conveyed by letter and need not have been brought to Hamlet by a 
new character, which – apparently – makes Osric structurally irrelevant. 
Nevertheless, Osric fulfils an important function in Hamlet: shortly before the 
inevitably unfortunate ending of Shakespeare’s tragedy – all the major characters 
except Horatio die –, Osric’s appearance serves as comic relief. Osric does not only 
amuse Hamlet on stage, but also entertains the audience, who have to brace 
themselves for the looming catastrophe. In a similar vein, Martin Amis employs ‘the 
Osric archive’ (Experience, 173n) as well as his descriptions of Osric’s colourful 
personality as a form of comic relief, which Leonard interprets as ‘avoidance 
behaviour’ (Leonard). In the middle of one of Osric’s letters – approximately 
halfway through Part One of the book – the author elucidates the compositional 
purpose of the letters in a long narratorial comment within square brackets:  
The present letter is incomplete, so this is definitely the time and place to 
clarify the structural function of these letters […] With Osric here, what we are 
seeing is the first pass, the first lunge at language. Always a painful sight – but 
ignore it. Structurally, that’s what these letters are for: to allow the reader, hard-
pressed by the world as he is, to enjoy a few moments of vacuity, of luxurious 
inanition, before coming to the matter ahead. (Experience, 150f.) 
 
Apart from giving the reader an impression of where Martin Amis started off as a 
writer, the letters, which are interspersed throughout Part One, thus provide comic 
relief before and in between the more difficult aspects of the author’s life story. One 
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of these emotionally challenging parts of Martin Amis’s life, for example, is the fate 
of his cousin Lucy Partington. 
Apparently, the author finds it hard to talk about what happened to Lucy, as 
he foreshadows her disappearance, but then quickly drops the subject again: 
Over the Christmas of 1973, experience – in the form, as I now see it, of an 
acquaintance with infinite fear – entered my life and took up residence in my 
unconscious mind. […] 
 But before we face experience, that miserable enemy, let us have some more 
innocence, just for a while. 
(Experience, 36) 
 
The above-cited extract is followed by a light-hearted ‘Letter from School’ in which 
Osric asks his father and step mother’s allowance to move out of the residential 
home of his Brighton crammer and into a flat in order to enjoy ‘a bit of independence 
during my last days of independence, as it were’ (Experience, 37, emphasis original). 
The letter is only two pages long, but the topic of Lucy’s abduction and death is not 
resumed for another fourteen pages. At the beginning of the next chapter, ‘Learning 
About Time’, the author instead describes his travels during his gap year in 1968, 
when he went to Majorca in a Mini Moke with three friends in order to ‘disturb the 
peace of one of the world’s greatest living poets, Robert Graves.’ (Experience, 39) 
This joyful episode is ensued by a comic incident during which Martin’s half-brother 
Jaime, who was a child at the time, got drunk and suffered a fast-motion hangover 
because he refused to dilute the wine he was allowed with his supper with water: 
What followed was a stark paradigm of drunkenness, astonishingly telescoped. 
Jaime laughed, danced, sang, bawled, brawled, and passed out, all within 
fifteen minutes. Then about half an hour later we heard a parched moan from 
his room. Jaime was already having his hangover. The voice was faintly saying, 
‘Agua!...Agua!...’ (Experience, 49, emphasis original) 
 
Still delaying writing about Lucy’s disappearance, the author moves on from 
this section to depict a conversation he had with his mother in 1977; wanting his 
mother’s opinion, he informs her that Lamorna Seale, a married woman with whom 
he had an affair, claims that he is the father of her two-year-old daughter: 
- She [Lamorna, annot.] talked about her daughter. And then there was the 
photograph, Mum. She gave me the photograph. 
- Yes, dear. 
It was ready in my pocket. It showed a two-year-old girl in a dark flower dress, 
smocked at the chest, with short puffed sleeves and pink trim. She had fine 
blonde hair. Her smile was demure: pleased, but quietly pleased. 
My mother snatched it from my hand. 
- Lamorna says I’m her father. What do you think, Mum? 
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She held the photograph at various distances from her eyes. She held it at her 
arm’s length, her free hand steadying her glasses. She brought it closer. Without 
looking up she said, 
- Definitely. 
(Experience, 51, emphasis original) 
 
Only after these various digressions, so it seems, does Martin Amis feel ready to 
concentrate on Lucy’s disappearance; the following passage serves as the transitional 
link for the resumption of this topic: 
Lamorna was still some months away. As I sat at my desk in the palacio […], I 
had a different consanguineous absence on my mind. On my mind? In my 
mind. Somewhere at the back of it. (Experience, 52) 
 
The ‘consanguineous absence’ the author mentions here is of course Lucy 
Partington. In the remaining chapter, he begins to circle the subject of her 
disappearance, but he does not fully focus on it yet; he chooses a back door to enter 
the room where his memories about Lucy and her disappearance live: as an 
introduction, he narrates how his mother Hilly cleaned her house in Spain ‘with her 
usual thoroughness but with none of her usual zest’ (Experience, 52), because she 
was awaiting her sister’s (Lucy’s mother Miggy’s) visit the summer after Lucy’s 
disappearance (cf. Experience, 52). Furthermore, he describes what a typical 
Christmas looked like for the Amis family around that time, and, finally, how this 
harmony was irretrievably destroyed by Lucy’s disappearance:  
Typically around that era I would spend Christmas Eve buying all my 
Christmas presents and then drive around London in the white Mini (which 
started at least 50 percent of the time), picking up my sister, my brother, and 
perhaps my brother’s girlfriend and then heading for the big house in Barnet, 
the car full of presents, bottles, crisp bags, beercans and joint-ends, and feeling 
like a vampire racing against the sunset in his packed coffin to get to the castle 
before dusk. Christmas was a dark time in England, the lights going out 
everywhere from 24 December to what felt like late January, so that the whole 
world was as black as Aberdeen. 
 The house on Hadley Common was a citadel of riotous solvency – not just at 
Christmas but every weekend. There was a great sense of in-depth back-up, a 
cellar, a barrel of malt whisky, a walk-in larder: proof against snowstorm and 
shutdown. I think it was that Christmas morning that all four Amises, with 
breakfast trays on their laps, watched Journey to the Centre of the Earth – then 
the visit to the pub, then the day-long, the week-long lunch. And with Kingsley 
the hub of all humour and high spirits, like an engine of comedy… I felt so 
secure in that house – and, clearly, so insecure elsewhere – that I always 
experienced a caress of apprehension as I climbed into the car on Sunday night, 
any Sunday night, and headed back to the motorway and Monday, to the flat or 
the flatlet, the street, the job, the tramp dread, the outside world. And, more 
than this, the outside world now had someone missing from it. On the night of 
27 December 1973, my cousin Lucy Partington disappeared. (Experience, 52f.) 
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The above-cited passage shows a number of striking microstructural 
oppositionalities. Thus, the security provided by the author’s family, the inside 
world, is contrasted with the threat represented by the outside world. This opposition 
is enacted within the first as well as the second paragraph of the quotation. In his car, 
Martin feels safe, and the description of him going home for Christmas conveys a 
feeling of happiness, even though he uses the metaphor of a ‘coffin’. In the outside 
world, by contrast, everything is dark and menacing. Within the family circle, joy 
reigns, with his father embodying humour, ‘like an engine of comedy’, while around 
this secure island, he always experiences ‘a caress of apprehension’. This fear is 
greatly magnified by the traumatic event of Lucy’s disappearance; the author has had 
to realise that the outside world is capable of thwarting the security of the family by 
inflicting tragedy on it. Apart from the oppositionalities that are at work in this 
extract, the second structural principle, parallelism, also plays a role here: Lucy’s 
disappearance, which is articulated in the last sentence of the second paragraph, is 
prefigured in the last sentence of the first paragraph. The fact that the lights go out 
everywhere in England around Christmas symbolises and foreshadows Lucy’s 
vanishing. On an abstract level, the final sentences of both paragraphs have the same 
meaning, as the name ‘Lucy’ means light (‘the lights going out’ and ‘Lucy 
Partington disappeared’). Consequently, the contrast between the inside and the 
outside worlds is doubled with the polarity between light and darkness.  
Considering the enormous emotional impact Lucy’s disappearance must have 
had on Martin Amis, one may argue that his display of ‘avoidance behaviour’ 
(Leonard) – as Leonard terms the above-mentioned strategy of delaying a certain 
aspect of the narration – is not surprising. However, one must be careful not to fall 
prey to psychological over-interpretation. While it has been illustrated above that the 
author postpones writing about Lucy, it cannot be proven that this means he actually 
avoids it. It may take time for him to get to the core of the matter, but from a 
quantitative perspective, Martin Amis actually devotes a great deal of text-time to 
Lucy’s fate. The chapter following these various digressions in ‘Learning about 
Time’, ‘Bus Stop: 1994’, for example, concentrates almost exclusively on this 
subject, and Lucy is mentioned in various other contexts throughout Experience.44 
                                                 
44 The first mentioning of Lucy’s ghastly fate, for example, occurs as early as page five, in the form of  
    a summary: ‘The Rachel Papers appeared in mid-November, 1973. On the night of 27 December  
    my cousin, Lucy Partington, who was staying with her mother in Gloucestershire, was driven into  
    Cheltenham to visit an old friend, Helen Render. Lucy and Helen spent the evening talking about  
    their future; they put together a letter of application to the Courtauld Institute in London, where  
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It is certain that the author uses the Osric archive as a form of comic relief, 
for he even explains this technique in an above-cited narratorial comment.45 In this 
remark, Martin does not even mention his personal needs but solely refers to the 
reader; thus, it has to be doubted whether comic relief, which is a literary term, can 
be equalled with avoidance behaviour, which is a psychological mechanism. Despite 
the fact that Experience is not a novel but a work of autobiography and consequently 
has to stay true to the way things occurred in real life, the author nevertheless has 
artistic freedoms such as evading chronology and reordering events in accordance 
with his stylistic preferences. Instead of interpreting the inclusion of the Osric letters 
and the humorous narrative passages as avoidance behaviour, it may thus be 
necessary to consider an alternative explanation: Could it be the case that the 
juxtaposition between comic and tragic passages in Experience is simply Martin 
Amis’s artistic expression of the natural occurrence of events in his life? A statement 
by the author in an interview with Linda Richards decidedly points in this direction. 
In this interview, Martin Amis notes that ‘[n]atural symmetries just presented 
themselves and I followed the novelist’s instinct, stringing things together by theme 
rather than by chronology’ (Amis, Martin. Interview. ‘January Experiences Martin 
Amis’). One can thus infer that the comic episodes in Experience are simply as 
important as the tragic events, because they are also part of the author’s life, indeed 
part of his self. Seen from this perspective, Martin Amis just found oppositionalities 
to naturally occur in his life and ‘patterned’ them with the help, for example, of the 
intertextual references to Blake’s Songs of Innocence and Experience and 
Shakespeare’s Hamlet. As – from the standpoint of the literary analyst – there is no 
definite answer to the question whether it is legitimate to “diagnose” the author with 
avoidance behaviour or not, it is best to eschew psychological uncertainties and stay 
close to the text. While the existence of narrative patterns such as oppositionality can 
be verified in a text, their psychological implications lack ultimate proof.  
Psychologically, we may thus not be able to say with certainty why Martin 
Amis embedded his autobiographical narrative within such a complex system of 
oppositionalities; however, it is better to take for granted that he ‘followed the 
                                                                                                                                          
    Lucy hoped to continue studying medieval art. They parted at 10.15. It was a three-minute walk to  
    the bus stop. She never posted the letter and she never boarded the bus. She was twenty-one. And it  
    was another twenty-one years before the world found out what happened to her.’ (Experience, 5)   
    Furthermore, Lucy also appears on the very last page of the book in ‘Addendum: Letter to my  
    Aunt’ (cf. Experience, 385).  
45 Cf. ‘Structurally, that’s what these letters are for: to allow the reader […] to enjoy a few moments  
    of vacuity […] before coming to the matter ahead.’ (Experience, 151, emphasis added).  
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novelist’s instinct’ and to use the instruments of narrative and structural analysis to 
discover the patterns the author has laid out for the reader. One of these patterns, to 
come back to the original argument of this section, is the contrast between comedy 
and tragedy. Thus, the innocent, youthful tone of the Osric letters as well as the 
various humorous narrative episodes that have been discussed above stand in sharp 
contrast to the graveness with which the author talks about the tragedies in his life. If 
we recall Osric’s light-hearted style of writing his letters, we become even more 
conscious of how understandably serious, angry and full of grief the narrator’s voice 
is when he talks about what happened to Lucy. In the extract below, for example, he 
describes David Partington’s (Lucy’s brother’s) state of mind after Lucy’s fate 
became known in March 1994, echoing his situation in the aftermath of her 
disappearance in December 1973: 
David would need to nerve himself to open a newspaper. Because it was all 
ready to begin again: waking in the middle of the night getting to sit for hours 
weeping and swearing. This was his condition on the day after the 
disappearance. ‘Lucy didn’t come home last night.’ There was nobody in her 
room and the made bed had not been slept in. There was certainty of disaster. 
And there was my poor cousin (I hate thinking about this), out in the courtyard, 
crying and raising his clenched fists and saying, ‘If anyone has done anything 
to her…’ 
 Weeping and swearing, cursing and sobbing: there ought to be a word for 
that. […] ‘Grieving’ won’t quite serve. This is something anterior. It is, I think, 
not a struggle to accept but a struggle to believe. (Experience, 62)  
 
 
5.2.1.4. Lucy Partington vs. Frederick West 
The oppositionality between Lucy Partington and Frederick West is the most extreme 
variation of the all-informing contrast between innocence and experience. However, 
Frederick West, the serial killer who abducted and murdered Lucy Partington in 
December 1973, is too evil to fully belong to the realm of experience; the atrocity of 
his deeds pines for a category of its own: guilt. Talking of his idyllic childhood and 
foreshadowing West’s crimes, Martin Amis notes that ‘[i]nnocence attracts its two 
main opposites: experience and guilt.’ (Experience, 135) While Lucy personifies 
pure innocence, Frederick West is the embodiment of guilt. In his review of 
Experience, John Walsh states that  
[t]he story’s villain is Fred West, bringer of death, despoiler of innocence, 
world’s worst father. Amis returns to him again and again, unable to leave his 
ghastly shade alone, figuring him as a sadist but also a cretin, attacking him a 
monster, dismissing him as a nonce. (Walsh, ‘Night Train through a Dark 
Wood’). 
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When Martin Amis refers to guilt as the opposite of innocence, he does not only have 
in mind Frederick West, even though Lucy’s killer is the main target of his hatred. 
As the author remarks in a footnote, ‘Frederick West […] was a paedophile’ (139n), 
and Martin’s intensive narrative occupation with Lucy’s fate brought more deeply 
buried memories of his childhood to the surface, namely his own painful experiences 
of child abuse. In a subsection of the chapter, ‘The City and the Village’, called ‘It 
Im Again, Dai’, Martin recounts three incidents from his childhood, during which he 
was sexually abused by strangers: in Swansea by a Welsh boy (cf. Experience, 135-
137), in Cambridge by a number of older boys in school (cf. Experience, 138), and in 
the Amises’ house in Princeton by a guest of his parents while the latter were having 
a party downstairs (cf. Experience, 139-140). The remembering process concerning 
the paedophiles who violated Martin as a child, but also concerning Frederick West, 
who abused his own children, induces the author to consider paedophilia in a more 
general light. Consequently, he makes the following judgement about paedophiles 
towards the end of the relevant sub-section:  
Paedophilia means ‘love of children’. And paedophiles will say that that is all 
they are doing: loving children. […] Paedophiles hate children. They hate 
children because they hate innocence, and children are innocent. Look at them. 
They come here naked – but not quite. To the fit pair of eyes they come here 
thoroughly armoured: with native honour clad. (Experience, 141) 
 
This extract contains a twofold opposition: on the one hand, the apparent ‘love of 
children’ by paedophiles is contrasted with their real hate of children, while on the 
other hand, the innocence, nakedness and honour of children is opposed with the hate 
and the implied guilt of paedophiles. 
Martin Amis, who has read all the books about Frederick West, one of which 
is Brian Masters’s She Must Have Known: Trial of Rosemary West (cf. Experience, 
63), characterises ‘Frederick West [] [as a] childkiller, [a] seeder of nighmares’ 
(Experience, 171n), as someone who ‘lied as unstoppably as he stole.’ (Experience, 
196n) Furthermore, he notes that West had ‘Quilpian eating habits’ (Experience, 71). 
Despite the fact that West apparently had very bad teeth, which Martin Amis 
interprets as an unjust irony in view of his own dental problems, they seem to have 
been strong enough for the following procedures:  
He would take the hind end off a loaf of bread and top it with a brick of cheese. 
He would stroll around the house eating an onion like you’d eat an apple. An 
onion? (Experience, 71)  
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Lucy Partington, by contrast is portrayed as an extraordinarily religious, spiritual (cf. 
Experience, 170-171) and ‘powerful’ (Experience, 149, emphasis original) person 
whose ‘presence was somehow infinitely self-sufficient and self-determining’ 
(Experience, 149). Apart from that, she ‘understood the innocence and mystery of 
animals, and she wrote about them with a clairvoyant eye, even as a child’ 
(Experience, 148). Thus, Lucy clearly and emphatically belongs to the realm of 
innocence, while West represents the extreme version of experience, i.e. guilt. 
 Throughout the whole book, Martin Amis keeps coming back to the wound of 
Lucy’s disappearance, as John Walsh observes in his review of Experience:  
The ghastly fate of Lucy Partrington at the hands of Fred West spreads its icy 
fingers through all the book’s relationships, as if everything warm and domestic 
and safe were inevitably headed for risk and entropy. (Walsh, ‘Night Train 
through a Dark Wood’) 
 
Lucy’s strong narrative presence in Experience is striking. It may be observed, for 
example how the image of Christmas being ‘a dark time in England’ (Experience, 
52), which has already been cited in a different context is picked up again several 
chapters later, namely at the beginning of ‘Him Who Is, Him Who Was!’ (cf. 
Experience, 110-111). Here the author returns to the contrast between light and 
darkness; noting that St. Lucy’s Day is the shortest day of the year, he refigures 
Lucy’s disappearance with the help of the vanishing-light metaphor which he has 
used before. (cf. Experience, 52 and 110f.):  
December 23 is now established as the shortest day – the year’s midnight. Lucy 
Partington disappeared on December 27. There was an energy crisis that year, 
and no street illumination that night. The year was 1973 but the darkness was 
seventeenth-century. (Experience, 111) 
 
 The contrast between light and darkness, personified by Lucy Partington and 
Frederick West respectively, is a variation of the all-informing oppositionality of 
innocence and experience. With regard to Lucy, the author notes that ‘[e]verything 
about her, even her name, pointed towards the light. Given this, I cannot find order or 
meaning in a darkness so deep and durable.’ (Experience, 172) While ‘Lucy was 
gentle, was kind, was sane’ (Experience, 61), Frederick West ‘had been a colossus of 
mendacity, the enemy and the opposite of truth.’ (Experience, 196) Martin Amis is 
unable to find a reason behind the fate that was inflicted upon his cousin; it is 
impossible for him to comprehend the circumstances that allowed such complete, 
diametrical opposites to meet, as the following quotation demonstrates: 
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My family cannot understand the extraordinary collision that allowed him to 
touch our lives, and I have no wish to prolong the contact. But he is here now, 
in my head; I want him exorcised. (Experience, 71) 
 
In order to illustrate the total polarity between Lucy and West, and their respective 
mindsets of light and darkness, and in order to perform the exorcism, Martin Amis 
compares two pieces of writing with each other at the end of the chapter ‘The 
Problem of Reentry’: 
The death of Lucy Partington represents a fantastic collision (collide: ‘from 
col- “together” + laedere “to strike”). It is what happens when darkness meets 
light, when experience meets innocence, when the false meets the true, when 
utter godlessness meets purity of spirit, when this – 
 
Hi May it your Dad Writeing to you. Or lette me have your telephone 
number…or Write to me as soon as you can, please may I have to sort out watt 
Mr Ogden did to me, my new Solicitors are Brilliant I Read What you sead 
about me in News of the that was loyalty you read what Scott canavan sead he 
had –  
 
– meets  this: 
 
things are as big as you can make them – 
I can fill a whole body, 
a whole life 
with worry 
about a few words 
on one scrap of paper; 
yet the same evening, 
looking up, 
can frame my fingers 
to fit the sky 
in my cupped hands. 
 
(Experience, 172) 
 
As Joyce correctly notes, Martin Amis ‘juxtaposes an articulate juvenile poem of 
Lucy’s against a comically misspelled and Neolithic missive that the hideous West 
scratched out in his prison cell.’ (Joyce) One critic, an unnamed reviewer in Die Zeit, 
maintains that the author’s stylisation of the contrasts between innocence and 
experience, light and darkness, truth and lie represents literature’s answer to an 
incomprehensible crime (cf. Anon., ‘Alle Haben Geweint’). It is important to note 
that the death of Lucy Partington is not only a tragedy for the author and his family, 
because Lucy was only one of at least eleven victims. When the West murder series 
became known in March 1994, it had a huge public impact; it was a trauma that 
affected the whole of Great Britain, which is why the crimes of Frederick West are 
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not just ‘public knowledge’, but ‘national knowledge’ (Experience, 61, emphasis 
original).  
On the one hand, Martin Amis writes about Frederick West because he needs 
to exorcise him from the orbit of his family and from his thoughts; on the other hand, 
however, his narration of Lucy’s fate represents a public rebuttal, because the media 
did not handle the subject responsibly. Martin explains that late in 1995, West’s 
interrogation tapes were played, and the press allowed his version to appear 
unchallenged. (cf. Experience, 72) Consequently, Lucy’s sister Marian campaigned 
against the press and ‘won a public rebuttal’ (Experience, 72). Martin Amis notes 
that his book, too ‘is a rebuttal’ (Experience, 72). As a writer, he feels the need to 
‘confirm, solidify, perpetuate’ Marian’s rebuttal, [b]ecause otherwise these things are 
lost in the daily smudge of newsprint’ (Experience, 72). After quoting and criticising 
extracts of the newspaper coverage, in which it was said, inter alias, that Lucy and 
West had had an affair, the author reiterates the fact that he refutes both such claims 
and this style of journalism: ‘That is what it said, in the press, unchallenged. I rebut 
it. This book rebuts it.’ (Experience, 72)  
 As a structural principle, oppositionality is ubiquitous in Experience, which is 
why not all of the forms it takes can be analysed here. One may be tempted to think 
that this omnipresence of the contrast between innocence and experience paints a 
black-and-white picture, but this is not the case; on the contrary, through the 
numerous variations in which Martin Amis compares and distinguishes the realms of 
innocence and experience he adds many shades of colour and consequently never 
simplifies matters. As will be seen in the next section, the same complexity adheres 
to the second major structural principle, i.e. parallelism. 
 
5.2.2. Parallelism 
 
Similarly to oppositionality, parallelism is also omnipresent throughout Experience. 
Prefatorily, it is important to distinguish between two different categories within 
parallelism, namely referential-thematic parallelism and thematic-structural 
parallelism.  
The first group comprises parallels which have been directly transferred from 
life to the page, which means that the parallelism exists a priori, as it derives from 
the narration of inherently similar events. Thus, referential-thematic parallelism 
comprises parallels in which similarity is already present in the nature of the events 
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themselves (in real life) and is only thematically mirrored in the text through the very 
fact that more than one such event is narrated.46 Death and loss, for instance, 
constitute an important topic in Martin Amis’s memoir because he has had to deal 
with the passing of many loved ones, such as Lucy Partington, Lamorna Heath, 
Bruno Fonseca, Sally Amis (his sister), and most importantly, Kingsley Amis. 
Through recounting his experiences regarding these various deaths, the author tells 
parallel tales of loss and bereavement, which – by accumulation – draw a general 
picture of death. Another example of referential-thematic parallelism in Experience 
is Martin’s narration of the three sexual assaults he suffered as a child.47  
The second category of parallelism, on the other hand, encompasses those 
parallels, in which a thematic aspect is reflected in the structure of the text, hence the 
self-explanatory term thematic-structural. The most prominent thematic-structural 
parallelism in Experience evolves from the relationship between Martin and his 
father Kingsley,48 whose parallel development is narratively mirrored in the book 
with the help of two narrative techniques, namely narrative oscillation and 
repetition.  
 
5.2.2.1. Parallel lives: father and son  
Martin and his father ‘forged a strong, enduring bond of love’ (Begley), and 
Experience is in part an act of filial commemoration (cf. Begley) triggered by 
Martin’s experience of his father’s death.49 This ‘father-son-ness at the heart of the 
book’ (Rusbridger) is already established on the very first page of Experience.  
Significantly, Martin Amis’s memoir opens with the word ‘Dad.’ 
(Experience, 3) However, it is not spoken by Martin, as one may expect, but by the 
author’s eleven-year-old son Louis. The child’s utterance is followed by the father’s 
reply – ‘Yes?’ (Experience, 3), which is itself ensued by a paragraph explaining how 
his own father would have responded: ‘‘Yeeeess?’ with a dip in it, to signal mild but 
invariable irritation.’ (Experience, 3, emphasis original) (cf. Diederick, 181) As 
James Diederick observes in his monograph Understanding Martin Amis, ‘[t]his 
                                                 
46 Despite the fact that referential-thematic parallelism may be a fascinating object of study, it will not  
    be discussed in detail here, as the focus of this thesis lies in narrative and structural analysis. Thus,  
    the ensuing sections concentrate on the second group of parallelism, i.e. thematic-structural  
    similarities. 
47 Cf. section 5.2.1.4. 
48 In section 5.1.2. the relationship between Amis père and fils has been identified as one of the three  
    core themes of the memoir.  
49 For a detailed discussion of Martin Amis’s narrative motivation see also section 5.1.1. 
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opening precisely establishes the patriarchal focus and preoccupation of the memoir 
that follows.’ (Diederick, 181) But it does more than that; it also introduces the 
technique of narrative oscillation which the author uses throughout the whole book, 
constantly shifting the focus of the narration between Kingsley’s life and family on 
the one hand and Martin’s life and his own family on the other hand. (cf. Anon., 
‘Alle Haben Geweint’) In order to demonstrate this pendular movement of the 
narration, the opening of Experience shall be quoted at length: 
 
- Dad. 
This was my older son, Louis, then aged eleven. 
- Yes? 
My dad would have said, ‘…Yeeeess?’ – with a dip in it, to signal mild but 
invariable irritation. I once asked him why he did this and he said, ‘Well I’m 
already here, aren’t I?’ For him, the Dad-Yes? interlude was a clear 
redundancy, because we were already in the same room together and 
established as having some kind of conversation, however desultory (and 
unenlivening, from his point of view). I saw what he meant; but five minutes 
later I would brace myself for an especially vehement affirmative. I was a 
teenager until I broke the habit. Children need a beat of time, to secure attention 
while the thought is being framed. 
 
This is from I Like It Here (1958), Kingsley’s third and most close-to-life 
novel: 
 
  
‘Dad.’ 
‘Yes?’ 
‘How big’s the boat that’s taking us to Portugal?’ 
‘I don’t know really. Pretty big, I should think.’ 
‘As big as a killer whale?’ 
‘What? Oh yes, easily.’ 
‘As big as a blue whale?’ 
‘Yes, of course, as big as any kind of whale.’ 
‘Bigger?’  
‘Yes, much bigger.’ 
‘How much bigger?’ 
‘Never you mind how much bigger. Just bigger is all I can tell you.’ 
 
There is a break, and the discussion resumes: 
 
… ‘Dad.’ 
‘Yes?’ 
‘If two tigers jumped on a blue whale, could they kill it?’ 
‘Ah, but that couldn’t happen, you see. If the whale was in the sea the tigers 
would drown straight away, and if the whale was…’ 
‘But supposing they did jump on the whale?’ 
… ‘Oh, God. Well, I suppose the tigers’d kill the whale eventually, but it 
would take a very long time.’ 
‘How long would it take one tiger?’ 
‘Even longer. Now I’m not answering any more questions about whales or 
tigers.’ 
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‘Dad.’ 
‘Oh, what is it now, David?’ 
‘If two sea-serpents…’  
 
How well I remember those vastly stimulating chats. My tigers weren’t just 
ordinary tigers, either: they were sabre-toothed tigers. And the gladiatorial 
bouts I dreamed up were far more elaborate than I Like It Here allows. If two 
boa constrictors, four barracuda, three anacondas and a giant squid…I must 
have been five or six at the time. 
In retrospect I can see that these questions would have played on my 
father’s deepest fears. Kingsley, who refused to drive and refused to fly, who 
couldn’t easily be alone in a bus, a train or a lift (or in a house, after dark), 
wasn’t exactly keen on boats – or sea-serpents. Besides, he didn’t want to go to 
Portugal, or anywhere else. The trip was forced on him by the terms and 
conditions of the Somerset Maugham Award – a ‘deportation order’ he called it 
in a letter to Philip Larkin (‘forced to go abroad, bloody forced mun’). He won 
the prize for his first novel, Lucky Jim, published in 1954. Twenty years later I 
would win it too. (Experience, 3) 
 The Rachel Papers appeared in mid-November, 1973. […] 
 
- Dad. 
- Yes? 
 
Louis and I were in the car- the locus of so many parental dealings, after a 
while, when the Chauffeuring years begin to stretch out ahead of you like an 
autobahn. 
- If nothing else was changed by you not being famous, would you still 
want to be famous? 
 A well-executed question, I thought. He knew that fame was a necessary 
by-product of acquiring a readership. But apart from that? What? Fame is a 
worthless commodity. It will occasionally earn you some special treatment, if 
that’s what you’re interested in getting. It will also earn you a far more 
noticeable amount of hostile curiosity. I don’t mind that – but then I’m a 
special case. What tends to single me out for it also tends to inure me to it. In a 
word – Kingsley. 
- I don’t think so, I answered. 
- Why? 
- Because it messes with the head. 
And he took this in, nodding. 
     *  *  *  
(Experience, 3-5, emphases original) 
 
From the very beginning of Experience, the narrator takes on the role of a teller-
character: he quotes dialogues from both real life and fiction (Kingsley’s novel I Like 
It Here), cites a passage from a document (one of Kingsley’s letters to Philip Larkin), 
uses abstract language and concepts (cf. for instance ‘clear redundancy’, 
‘commodity’ and ‘fame’), and emphasises the remembering process with the help of 
mnemonic expressions (cf. ‘I remember’, ‘In retrospect’). Consequently, it can be 
inferred that the narrative distance in this passage is considerable and that the 
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narrating self dominates over the experiencing self. Furthermore, the narrator asserts 
his strong presence by means of the above-mentioned technique of narrative 
oscillation: The opening conversation between Martin and his son Louis prompts the 
narrator to recall the conversations he had with his father when he was a child. These 
memories are followed by a long quotation from I Like It Here (1958) and a 
comparative analysis of the dialogue between the fictitious David and his father on 
the one hand and the real-life conversations between Martin and Kingsley on the 
other hand. The trip to Portugal from I Like It Here seems to have been inspired by 
real life events, as Martin later informs us that his family went there after Kingsley 
had won the Somerset Maugham Award for his first novel, Lucky Jim, in 1954. After 
drawing a parallel between himself and his father by referring to the fact that he won 
the very same prize for his own first novel, The Rachel Papers, in 1973, there is a 
break and the narrative focus shifts back to the original conversation between Martin 
and Louis: the author repeats the initial Dad-Yes? interlude50 (cf. Experience, 5), and 
continues their exchange. Similarly to David in I Like It Here (and, by inference, to 
Martin as a child), Louis asks multiple questions and his father answers them 
dutifully. Their conversation is interrupted again by some general thoughts about 
fame, which brings the narrator’s attention back to Kingsley for a short moment, but 
then the dialogue is resumed. 
The unnamed reviewer of the German newspaper Die Zeit, who also observes 
the shifts between Martin’s and Kingsley’s respective lives and families in the 
opening of Experience, notes that this oscillation of the narrative focus, which 
structurally implements the father-son theme, continues in bigger circles throughout 
the whole book. (cf. Anon., ‘Alle Haben Geweint’) Through these ongoing narrative 
shifts, Experience features the parallel development of a father and a son: While 
Kingsley declines from middle age – his prime as a family patriarch – to his final 
physical incapacitation and ‘awkward lurch towards death’ (Ferguson), Martin 
progresses ‘from adolescence […] to the double edged rewards of early middle age: 
success, fatherhood, self-knowledge, new teeth’ (Ferguson). The parallel between 
Martin and his father’s respective developments is of course not absolute: in one 
sense, it is an example of inverted symmetry, as Experience features Martin’s and 
Kingsley’s respective first and last halves of life. Nevertheless, the similarities are 
undeniably striking; Kingsley’s development ends with illness and death, while 
                                                 
50 The Dad-Yes? interlude is again repeated on pages 15 and 16 in Experience. 
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Martin’s maturation from the pretentious, youthful Osric to a renowned middle-aged 
writer is completed by his own physical crisis and a heightened awareness about 
death: Martin painfully gains his insights about the fugacity of human existence from 
his mid-life crisis.51 His lifelong dental problems, which culminate in the loss of all 
his teeth and painful dental reconstruction, constitute an important part of his mid-
life crisis. Following the painful extraction of his upper teeth, the author voices his 
feelings of desperation in face of his new physical reality:  
Hopelessly compromised and contingent, my lower teeth were still there. But in 
the new space above them, impossible to misidentify, was a darkness, a void, a 
tunnel that led all the way to my extinction. (Experience, 85) 
 
As this quotation illustrates, Martin Amis’s dental trauma, which parallels Kingsley’s 
final illness, leaves him with a new awareness and a fear of death. Unsurprisingly, 
this anxiety about human fugacity is greatly magnified by his father’s death. Gavin 
Keulks identifies ‘[d]eath and absence [as] the existential fulcrums upon which 
Experience rests’ (Keulks, 219), and observes how the subject of Kingsley’s death is 
repeated in two different contexts of the book: In the first chapter, Martin describes 
the void his father’s passing created within him:  
Someone is no longer here. The intercessionary figure, the father, the man who 
stands between the son and death, is no longer here; and it won’t ever be the 
same. He is missing. (Experience, 7)  
 
In the second part of Experience, this idea is taken up again and elaborated just 
before Martin describes Kingsley’s final moments:  
It is 1995 and he has been there since 1949. The intercessionary figure is now 
being effaced, and there’s nobody there between you and extinction. Death is 
nearer, reminding you that there is much to be done. There are children to be 
raised and books to be written. You have got work to do. (Experience, 345) 
 
Here, the technique of repetition is used both to give emphasis to the passage/s and to 
make a connection between the two extracts. Despite the fact that over three hundred 
pages lie between the first and the second mentioning of the phrase ‘The 
intercessionary figure’, the reader knows immediately that Martin is talking about his 
father; furthermore, the word ‘death’ also reoccurs in the second extract. Within the 
first quotation, the phrase ‘is no longer here’ is reiterated, and the phrases ‘there’s’, 
‘there is’ and ‘There are’ also qualify as repetitions.  
The relationship between Amis père and fils owes a great deal of its strength 
to the fact that they have taken similar decisions in life: Not only does Martin follow 
                                                 
51 Also see section 5.1.1. on Martin Amis’s mid-life crisis. 
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into his father’s professional footsteps by becoming a novelist himself,52 but his path 
is also analogous to his father’s with regard to one important aspect of his private 
life: both Kingsley and Martin leave their respective wives for another woman when 
their children are still young. Because Martin experienced the pain of his parents’ 
divorce as a teenager, he is painfully aware of the emotional consequences his 
separation has on his sons. Knowing that his father is the only one who can fully 
understand what he is going through, Martin turns to Kingsley for solace (cf. 
Kakutani). In a moving passage about Kingsley’s and his own experiences with 
divorce, Martin describes how his father supports him through this difficult phase 
after he has left Antonia Phillips:  
‘Stopping being married to someone,’ he [Kingsley, annot.] had written, ten 
years earlier, ‘is an incredibly violent thing to happen to you, not easy to take in 
completely, ever.’ He knew I was now absorbing the truth and the force of this. 
And he knew also that the process could not be softened or hastened. All you 
could do was survive it. That surviving was a possibility he showed me, by 
example. But he did more. He roused himself and did more. ‘Talk as much as 
you want about it or as little as you want’: these words sounded like civilization 
to me, in my barbarous state, so dishevelled in my body and mind. Talk as 
much or as little…I talked much. Only to him could I confess how terrible I 
felt, how physically terrible, bemused, subnormalised, stupefied from within, 
and always about to flinch or tremble from the effort of making my face look 
honest, kind, sane. Only to him could I talk about what I was doing to my 
children. Because he had done it to me. 
And he responded, and he closed that circle: his last fatherly duty. 
(Experience, 99) 
 
The various repetitions that occur in this extract (‘He knew’ – ‘And he also knew’, 
‘survive’ – ‘Surviving’, ‘did more’ – ‘did more’, ‘‘Talk as much […] or as 
little[…]’’ – ‘Talk as much or as little…’, ‘Only to him could I’ – ‘Only to him could 
I’, ‘terrible’ – ‘terrible’, ‘And he’ – ‘And he’) are used both for the effect of 
emphasis and to draw attention to the parallel experiences of Kingsley’s and Martin’s 
divorces. When Martin Amis has to go through the process of divorce, it ‘deepens 
[his] bond with his father’ (Diederick, 184). While Martin learns to understand what 
Kingsley first went through in the 1960s when he separated from his first wife Hilly 
and again in the 1980s when his second wife Elizabeth Jane Howard left him, he can 
also fully forgive his father for causing a childhood trauma with his departure from 
                                                 
52 The notion of a father and a son both being successful writers is already introduced in the opening  
    with the discussion about the Somerset Maugham Award. Different aspects of this professional  
    parallelism between Kingsley and Martin is taken up again and again throughout Experience. Note,  
    for example, the repetition which symbolises this similarity in their lives in the following sentence  
    towards the end of the first chapter:  ‘He was a writer and I am a writer’ (Experience, 7). 
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the family and expresses his gratitude for his father’s support through this difficult 
phase.    
 
5.2.2.2. Repetition in other contexts 
Repetition has been analysed here on an exemplary basis within the father-son 
theme, but this is not the only thematic context in which Martin Amis makes use of 
this device. In fact, he applies repetition with regard to all kinds of topics and on both 
the level of macro- and microstructure. In Martin’s long discussion about his dental 
problems, for example, repetition plays an important role: Throughout his memoir, 
Martin spends a lot of time in the dentist’s chair, and the recurrence of these medical 
sessions is echoed by the fact that the phrase ‘the hands of Mike Szabatura’ is 
repeated time and again (cf. 76 (twice), 84 (twice), 85, 113, 337). Furthermore, the 
author uses repetition to emphasise the importance of certain events, such as the 
moment when he is thirteen years old and learns from the Welsh house keeper Eva 
Garcia that his father has an affair with a ‘Fancy Woman’53 (Experience, 100, 
emphasis original).  
- You know your father’s got this fancy woman up in London, don’t you? 
- No. I didn’t know. 
My informant was Eva Garcia (pronounced Gahcia). […] Eva was terrible and 
great; she was one of the divinities of my childhood, and so it was quite right, I 
suppose, that she should be the one to end it, at a stroke, with that sinister 
sentence… (Experience, 104) 
 
The conversation continues a page later, after some general information about Eva 
and her role as the family’s nanny in Swansea: 
 - No. I didn’t know. 
[…] 
- Has he really? 
She addressed me with the narrowed stare and flat smile of reckoning I 
remembered from my childhood in the valleys. She said gauntly, 
- Ooh aye. 
(Experience, 105) 
 
This cruelly casual moment, which ends Martin’s childhood and introduces him to 
the realm of experience, constitutes an ‘emotional watershed in Martin’s life’ 
(Diederick, 183), a wound to which he keeps returning (cf. Experience 104, 105, 129, 
142). As the author notes some thirty pages after the first narration of this crucial 
moment, ‘Eva Garcia (‘You know your father’s got this fancy woman up in 
London…Ooh aye’) hoisted me out of my childhood, in Cambridge in 1963.’ 
                                                 
53 Elizabeth Jane Howard. 
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(Experience, 129) Abruptly, Martin’s innocence is destroyed by a single question, 
but he also observes that  
[i]t was not Eva’s fault, of course, but […] her peculiarly Welsh privilege, in 
Cambridge, in 1963, to tell me that all this was over. The first act was over. 
Only when I came to write the present book did I realise how much I lost and 
how far I fell in the course of that brief sentence: ‘You know your father…?’ 
Childhood, the grandparents, the Partingtons, the village, the animals, the 
garden, innocence, even Eva herself: all wiped out.  (Experience, 142) 
 
The author’s continuous employment of the technique of repetition has an 
important effect on the structure and the language of Experience, which is very 
stylised and at times seems even poetic. James Diederick also observes how this 
poetic quality is created through repetition: ‘Experience is a profoundly literary 
book’, he writes. ‘[E]schewing chronology, it employs the poetry of recurrence and 
return to deepen its themes’ (Diederick, 182). Joan Acocella, whom Diederick cites, 
goes even one step further and compares Experience to ‘a Symbolist poem’, because 
‘[t]he great points are made not symphonically but by accumulation’ (Acocella, 186, 
as cited in Diederick, 183). 
 
 
5.3. From microstructure back to macrostructure 
 
5.3.1. The role of the narrator 
 
It has been demonstrated throughout the previous sections of this chapter that Martin 
Amis takes on a very active role as a narrator. In the truest sense of Stanzel’s use of 
the term, Martin is a ‘teller-character’ (Stanzel, 144), for he constantly displays an 
acute awareness of the narrative communication process, within which he self-
knowingly functions as a ‘transmitter’ who conveys information to a ‘receiver,’ the 
reader’ (Stanzel, 146): he frequently cites documents (mostly letters and works of 
literature), comments on his own narration, and eschews chronology by continuously 
performing fast-paced, ingenious shifts between scenes and narrative foci; 
occasionally, he even addresses the ‘gentle reader’ (Experience, 45) and allows the 
audience precious insights into his narrative techniques. In the following quotation, 
for example, he openly discusses the reason behind his use of parallels and footnotes:  
My organisational principles […] derive from an inner urgency, and from the 
novelist’s addiction to seeing parallels and making connections. The method, 
plus the use of footnotes (to preserve the collateral thought), should give a clear 
view of the geography of a writer’s mind. If the effect sometimes seems 
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staccato, tangential, stop-go, etc., then I can only say that that’s what it’s like, 
on my side of the desk. (Experience, 7) 
 
Footnotes are a standard technique in academic writing, but only very rarely occur in 
creative texts. In Experience, they accompany the running text from start to finish, 
functioning as a ‘constant bottom-of-the-page descant to the main action’ (Walsh, 
‘Night Train through a Dark Wood’); it is not uncommon to find as many as three 
footnotes on a single page in Martin Amis’s memoir, and sometimes they even 
spread to the next page. As John Walsh observes in his review of Experience, the 
sub-plots Martin unravels in his footnotes are ‘full of chatty bits and pieces, family 
details, literary nods’ (Walsh, ‘Night Train through a Dark Wood’). The author uses 
this ‘profusion of asterisks, daggers, double daggers, gloss and cross-reference’  
(Walsh, ‘Night Train through a Dark Wood’) as a tool to create a separate space for 
minor details such as ‘another memory that doesn’t actually belong in the real text’ 
(Amis, Martin. Interview. ‘January Experiences Martin Amis’). This ‘grading 
system’ between ‘primary interest’ and ‘secondary interest’ (Amis, Martin. 
Interview. ‘January Experiences Martin Amis’) makes sure that the flow of the main 
narrative is not obstructed by long digressions within parentheses or dashes in the 
running text; furthermore, it echoes the dense complexity of the author’s thought 
processes and reflects the mindboggling simultaneity with which multiple memories 
present themselves in the human mind (cf. Walsh, ‘Night Train through a Dark 
Wood’). 
In texts written in the first-person narrative situation, the relationship between 
the two personas of the narrator, i.e. the narrating and the experiencing selves, is 
determined by the mode of the narration. Within the concept of narrative mode, 
Stanzel distinguishes between overt mediacy of narration (telling) and covert 
mediacy of narration (showing), which creates the illusion of immediacy in the 
reader. (cf. Stanzel, 141) As far as the figure of the narrator is concerned,  
[t]he opposition mode [ ] refers to the contrast between transmission by a teller-
character and transmission by a reflector-character, or between teller and 
reflector, for short. (Stanzel, 144)  
 
While a teller-character informs, records and, most importantly, narrates by making 
the communication process overt, a reflector-character never verbalises his 
perceptions, feelings and thoughts in an effort to communicate them. (cf. Stanzel, 
144) In contrast to a teller, a reflector never narrates, but only ‘reflects, that is, he 
mirrors events of the outer world in his consciousness, perceives, feels, registers, but 
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always silently’ (Stanzel, 144, emphasis added). In the first-person narrative context, 
the function of the teller-character is common to those kinds of protagonists in whom 
the narrating self is clearly visible. By contrast, protagonists who are ‘actualized only 
as an experiencing self, and who therefore restrict themselves to the reflection of 
experiences not overtly communicated, are reflector-characters.’ (Stanzel, 145) 
From the insights we have gained so far it can doubtless be asserted that the 
author-narrator-protagonist of Experience functions as a teller-character. Too 
emphatic and self-aware is his narrative presence, too discernible and prominent the 
narrating self to assume anything else. However, in some passages throughout the 
book, Martin Amis steps out of his role of the wise, lucid narrator, and does not view 
his experiencing self from a distance and with self-knowledge. The relevant 
passages, in which the narrative distance between the two selves of the narrator is 
considerably reduced, all deal with events from the period of the author’s mid-life 
crisis around 1994 and 1995.  
In Part One of the memoir, most of these sections where the narrating self 
loses its ‘privilege over the experiencing self’ (Cohn, 151) are concerned with the 
subject of the author’s teeth. In the following passage, which is an example of the 
withdrawal of the narrator, Martin Amis sits in the dentist’s chair, facing the 
imminent extraction of his upper teeth:  
Millie [the dental assistant, annot.] stands by with her secondary implements. 
The smocked shoulders of Mike Szabatura [the dentist, annot.] bend into their 
work. First the sour tweakings and piercings of the jabs, one after another 
(twelve, fifteen?), until my eyes seem to be brimming with them. Next Mike 
Szabatura produces the deep plastic horseshoe and starts lining it with the 
potent adhesive. A civilised pause as we wait for things to solidify, things to 
liquefy.  
Goodbye. Goodbye. This is goodbye. You hated me. I hated you. I loved 
you. Be gone. Stay! Goodbye. I love you, I hate you, I love you, I hate you. 
Goodbye. 
The hands of Mike Szabatura, with the horseshoe now wedged against my 
palate, bear down, and tug. In the rhythmical creaking something gives and 
something catches. My right forefinger flickers up to indicate the right canine: 
unwilling to abjure its talent for pain, this tooth will fight to the very end. 
Another trio of injections. And Millie is close, with her rinser, her vacuum-
cleaner, her masked face. Another San Andreas of wrenching and tearing – of 
ecstatic sundering. 
- Wait. Your teeth are still there. 
I cannot control my tongue which dances up to meet the dangling bridge. 
Something light drops on to it – a piece of severed root – and slithers off 
sideways. The aromatic hands of Mike Szabatura are now exerting decisive 
force. And it is gone – the gory remnant whisked from my sight like some 
terrible misadventure from the Delivery room. 
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Clearly and firmly I said, 
- I find I can talk. 
 
(Experience, 84f.) 
 
In this quotation, the voice of the narrator is not discernible; the person who says 
goodbye to his teeth is the one in the dentist’s chair rather than the one in front of his 
computer writing the memoir. What is so striking in this extract is that both the past 
and the present tense belong to the experiencing self.54 As Dorrit Cohn informs us, 
this specific use of the present tense is called ‘historical, or narrative present’, but in 
a first-person context she prefers the term ‘‘evocative’ present’ (Cohn, 198); it 
represents a ‘peculiar grammatical make-believe’ in which ‘‘the speaker, as it were, 
forgets all about time and recalls what he is recounting as vividly as if it were before 
his eyes’’ (Jespersen, 239, as cited in Cohn, 198). Even though this evocative present  
must logically refer to a past experience, [it] momentarily creates an illusory 
(‘as if’) coincidence of two time-levels, literally ‘evoking’ the narrated moment 
at the moment of narration. (Cohn, 198) 
 
Through this ‘apparent synchronization’ (Cohn, 198) of two time levels generated by 
the evocative present as exemplified in the above-quoted passage from Martin 
Amis’s ‘gruesome dental saga’ (Catmull), the author temporarily switches from 
dissonant to consonant self-narration. Thus, the narrative distance between the two 
selves is bridged because Martin presents his painful experience of the tooth 
extraction ‘without corrective hindsight’ (Cohn, 157). It is not until the very end of 
this extract that the narrator reappears, as the experiencing self is directly quoted 
(‘Clearly and firmly I said, - I find I can talk.’); this use of direct discourse 
announces the return of the narrator. Through the author’s employment of the 
evocative present tense, the reader is brought extremely close to the scene and feels 
as if he or she were experiencing the agonising dental treatment side by side with the 
protagonist. Instead of telling us about this ordeal by giving an analytic description 
of the event, Martin Amis really shows us what it is like to have your teeth extracted 
by letting us perceive it through his eyes.  
                                                 
54 By contrast, in passages where the voice of the narrator is clearly discernible, the present tense is  
    assigned to the narrating self so it can distance itself from the actions, thoughts and feelings of the  
    experiencing self. In the following quotation, for example, the present tense clearly belongs to the  
    narrating self, as the  narrator voices an opinion in essayistic fashion: ‘I claim that a writer is three  
    things: literary being,  innocent, everyman. Well, this thought was all everyman. Not every man  
    will have to see what I saw; but every man will think this if he does’ (Experience, 85, emphasis  
    original). The thought the author is talking about here refers to how the hollow space in his mouth,  
    where his upper teeth had been, made him aware of death.   
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In the second chapter of Part Two, ‘2: One Little More Hug’, which deals 
with the final illness and death of Martin’s father Kingsley, the passages where the 
experiencing self takes centre stage are much more frequent than anywhere else in 
Experience. On first sight, the structure of this chapter does not differ from the other 
chapters in Martin’s memoir, as the author continues to make temporal digressions 
and to include footnotes and quotations. If one takes a closer look, however, one 
notices that ‘2: One Little More Hug’ has a unique diaristic quality. Not only does 
Martin Amis frequently quote his private notebook,55 but the whole chapter reads 
like a diary itself: paragraphs are often introduced by extremely short sentences that 
only give the date or the day of the week, as one would do in a diary entry:56  
Sunday, 17 September. I have just learned how Kingsley spent Saturday night. 
He was, as my mother said, ‘very active’. Whereas I can feel the essential 
family flaw – passivity – seeping over the rest of us. Mum is a ghost. Shouldn’t 
I be the strong one? Kingsley needs to go to hospital. I don’t want to frighten 
him. I don’t want him to frighten me. 
Who is in charge? Where’s the doctor? His bowel specialist will not 
make housecalls – he is too grand, too gastroenteritic. We are reduced to 
looking in the Yellow Pages – for the jobbers and cowboys. Mum got a quote 
for a home visit: sixty quid…We are an articulate family but we are heading 
towards speechlessness. We are doing what Kingsley is doing. We are 
becoming speechless. (Experience, 302) 
 
While autobiography is a public text, a diary is usually a private document not 
intended for publication (cf. Randall, 148); thus, the author-narrator-protagonist of an 
autobiography communicates with his audience, whereas a diarist first and foremost 
communicates with his or her own self and is consequently often engaged in an inner 
monologue. As we can see in the above-cited passage, Experience, which is 
obviously a published autobiography, includes diaristic elements. Apart from the 
dating at the beginning and the use of the evocative present, this passage contains 
                                                 
55 Cf. the following passage:  
 
Here is a notebook entry for Wednesday, 27 September: 
 
K’s agitation. Some internal psychodrama that he will never say anything about you or 
anyone else. He hasn’t got the words. Though he might do it on the page, if he gets back. 
 
This is strenuous moonshine. He wasn’t coming back. Words and memories were leaving him: 
like banks of lights and switches, sighing as they closed down. 
(Experience, 319f.) 
       Also note that Martin Amis occasionally includes notebook entries in Part One of the memoir  
    (cf. Experience, 204, 205, 209, 236 and 237). 
56 Cf. ‘A week later.’ (297), ‘Sunday, 17 September.’ (302), ‘Wednesday, 20 September.’ (313),  
    ‘Sunday, 24 September.’ (319), ‘Tuesday, 3 October.’ (323), ‘Saturday, 7 October.’ (325),  
    ‘Thursday, 12 October.’ (339), ‘Tuesday, 17 October.’ (346), ‘Friday.’(351), ‘Saturday.’ (351),  
    ‘Sunday.’ (353).  
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three rhetorical questions, which indicate that Martin is trying to make sense of and 
handle the situation of his father’s imminent death.57 
If we recall Stanzel’s definition of narrative distance as ‘the temporal and 
psychological distance’ (Stanzel, 95) that separates ‘the two phases of the narratorial 
‘I’ (Stanzel, 212f.), it is not surprising that the gap between the narrating and the 
experiencing selves is bridged in those passages in Experience that deal with the 
author’s dental trauma and his father’s death. Martin Amis started undergoing dental 
reconstruction in 1994, and his father passed away in 1995; Experience was 
published in 2000, which means that a maximum of five years lie between the  
occurrence and the narration of those events. In relation to the fifty years the book 
covers overall,58 this is very little time. As a general rule, the narrative distance 
becomes smaller or larger depending on how much time and learning lies between 
the moment of experience and the narrative act. Stanzel points out that ‘confusion 
and lack of orientation of experience’ become an integral part of the narrative 
process if the narrator ‘has not yet attained this distance from the experiencing self of 
the surveyed life or has attained it only partially’ (Stanzel, 214). The closer the 
experiencing self stands to the narrating self temporally, the more limited is the 
power of ‘memory as a catalyst capable of clarifying the substance of experience’ 
(Stanzel, 214).  
In Experience, the narrative distance is narrower in passages about events 
from the author’s mid-life crisis in 1994-1995 than in sections dealing with Osric’s 
adventures. This does not mean, however, that the gap between the two selves of the 
narrator becomes smaller and smaller as the narration progresses. Even though 
Experience features the process of Martin Amis’s maturation, his development is not 
                                                 
57 With regard to life writing theory, it is interesting that Martin Amis imitates the notebook form only  
    in connection to his father’s illness and death. As Bryony Randall informs us in her article ‘Britain:  
    20th-Century Diaries’ in the Encyclopedia of Life Writing, there is a specific form of diary writing  
    called illness diary. (cf. Randall, 149) In the 20th century, Randall observes a striking increase in       
    ‘illness diaries, particularly those with terminal illnesses’ (Randall, 149). Even though Randall’s  
    use of the term illness diary refers to a diary written by the sufferer rather than a person close to the  
    patient, the following argument appears to be relevant in context with Martin’s diary of his father’s  
    final weeks. If a diary records someone’s terminal illness, it is ‘written with the mortality of the  
    author very much in mind. The diary as a genre is particularly suited to such life stories where  
    chronology is crucial; the specific duration of the illness and the timing of its development is  
    recorded in detail since much of the purpose of such texts is to express the importance of time for  
    those who are only too acutely aware that their own is limited.’ (Randall, 149f.)  As Martin Amis  
    has to watch his father die, his time is limited too, and his acute awareness of the fact that he is  
    running out of time to spend with his dying father is registered in Experience through the imitation  
    of the notebook form.  
58 Experience deals with the first fifty years of Martin Amis’s life, i.e. from shortly after his birth in  
    1949 to 1999, when he was writing his memoir.  
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traced chronologically. As the author tacks and darts at the various stages of his life, 
he contracts and expands the narrative distance according to the momentary focus of 
the narration. Furthermore, it is important to bear in mind that, predominantly, 
Experience is a highly self-conscious and literary book. However, by interspersing 
the prevailing mode of dissonant self-narration with passages of consonant self-
narration, Martin Amis adds nuance to the narrative texture of Experience. The 
occasional withdrawal of the narrator grants the experiencing self recurrent moments 
of independence and allows the reader precious insights into the history of the 
author’s self.  
 
5.3.2. Generic hybridity  
 
The structural complexity resulting from Martin Amis’s ingenious employment of 
narrative techniques makes it difficult to assign Experience to a single generic 
category. Indeed, Experience is ‘not an autobiography in any strict sense’ (Walsh, 
‘Night Train through a Dark Wood’), but ‘a hybrid’ (Diederick, 181), as it 
incorporates elements of various literary genres. One major generic ingredient that 
adds to the book’s hybridity is biography: Apart from tracing the author’s own 
development from childhood to age fifty, Experience includes a moving memoir 
about Lucy’s fate and, most significantly, an extended portrait of the author’s father, 
‘the irascible Sir Kingsley’ (Begley). It would be a simplification, however, to claim 
that Martin writes a biography of his father within his own autobiography, because 
he interweaves his own and his father’s life stories rather than telling them 
separately. Furthermore, Martin Amis does not give a complete account of 
Kingsley’s life, but concentrates on his relationship with his father as both a son and 
a writer. In her study of postmodern autobiography, Borderlines: Autobiography and 
Fiction in Postmodern Life Writing, Gudmundsdóttir claims that autobiographies in 
which the narrator writes about his or her parent’s life create a unique generic 
scenario. (cf. Gudmundsdóttir, 190) These texts are necessarily hybrids, as they 
neither fully comply with the conventions of autobiography nor biography. The 
parent-child relationship informs these autobiographies both thematically and 
structurally, she maintains, for the lives of the narrator and his subject ‘are so 
intertwined, the nature of family history is such that […] the perspective inevitably 
shifts back and forth from autobiography to biography.’ (Gudmundsdóttir, 190). 
Viewing the conflation of autobiography and biography in a more general light, 
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Eakin remarks in How Our Lives Become Stories that the type of autobiography in 
which the writer dedicates a considerable part of the text to telling someone else’s 
story has blossomed in late twentieth century life writing. He notes that modern-day 
autobiographers demonstrate an increasing awareness of the fact that ‘[i]dentity […] 
is always negotiated interpersonally, relationally’ (Eakin, How, 40) and that ‘the self 
is defined by – and lives in terms of – its relations with others’ (Eakin, How, 43). In 
order to provide a theoretical tool for the analysis of this trend in modern 
autobiography, Eakin comes up with a new sub-genre, classifying autobiographies 
which highlight the relational dimension between individuals as relational 
autobiographies (cf. Eakin, How, 85) or relational lives (cf. Eakin, How, 69).  
 Since Martin Amis both commemorates his father and features their parallel 
developments in his memoir, Experience clearly falls into this category of the 
relational life. Apart from biography and the relational life, the book contains two 
more generic ingredients, namely the diary and the letter: As we have seen in the 
preceding sections, Experience incorporates both diary entries and letters,59 and the 
second chapter of Part Two of the book, ‘2: One Little More Hug’ echoes the 
structure of a notebook. Furthermore, certain passages throughout the book create the 
impression that Experience is a private ‘letter to his family and closest friends’ 
(Wood). This resemblance to the genre of the letter is particularly emphasised when 
‘at times the apostrophing word ‘you’ crops up in the text’ (Walsh, ‘Night Train 
through a Dark Wood’). This ‘you’ (Experience, 125, 155, 182, 199, 208, 210) refers 
to the dedicatee of Martin’s autobiography, i.e. his second wife Isabel Fonseca.60 
Due to these sudden, unexpected switches from the first to the second person, it feels 
‘as if the whole 400-page cat’s cradle of reminiscence were an extended appeal for 
understanding’ (Walsh, ‘Night Train through a Dark Wood’) devoted to Martin’s 
wife. Another reviewer, Katherine Catmull, also makes this connection between the 
apostrophing ‘you’ and Isabel Fonseca. To Catmull, the passages where the author 
‘addresses himself to ‘you’’ are especially ‘deeply felt moments’ (Catmull) which 
strengthen and deepen the book: ‘These odd, daring shifts startle like sudden small 
                                                 
59 Apart from Osric’s college correspondence, Martin includes and quotes other letters too (e.g. a letter  
    to Julian Barnes, the fictive letter to his aunt Miggy or his father’s letters).  
60 Cf. ‘That night you came bellydancing out of the bathroom wearing (a) your silk bathrobe and (b)  
    my teeth. Both were then removed. This was the war against shame.’ (Experience, 125, emphasis  
    added) This passage refers to the day on which Martin Amis first got his dental prosthesis, with  
    which he felt very uncomfortable.  
 113 
 
explosions – but something softer than explosions: like a tenderness bursting into 
bud. (Catmull)  
Despite the fact that Martin Amis conflates so many different genres, 
Experience does at no point seem awkwardly pieced together. On the contrary, this 
generic complexity in no way hinders the narrative flow of the book, for Martin 
manages to interweave the generic components with remarkable elegance.  
 
 
5.4. Reception and personal reflection 
 
The photograph on the cover of Experience shows Martin Amis as a small child, 
holding a cigarette in his mouth and staring fiercely at the camera.61 The illegal act of 
a young boy smoking (or its allusion) echoes the author’s media image as the enfant 
terrible of English Literature. Thus, the angry look Martin gives in this picture is 
directed at the British press, and he continues to glare ferociously at The Fourth 
Estate throughout his memoir. In fact, part of Martin’s motivation for writing 
Experience originates from his desire to settle accounts with the press62 and its 
notoriously bad treatment of his person. Despite the fact that he severely criticises 
the media in Experience, the book was – surprisingly – predominantly well received. 
Upon first publication in 2000, however, it ‘once again kicked up the sulphur of 
disdain’ (Brown, Allan); early reviews of Martin’s memoir criticise the passages 
describing Lucy’s death. Alleging that Martin did in fact not know Lucy as well as 
he claims, they accuse him of utilising her tragic fate as a means of increasing book 
sales and impute that his hurt and anger about her death is contrived. (cf. Ferguson) 
Later reviews, by contrast, are more lenient concerning Martin’s treatment of Lucy’s 
death, conceding that ‘[t]hese passages add spirit and nuance’ (Ferguson). Ferguson, 
for example, does not see why Martin’s display of anger should be manufactured:  
And yes, the anger Amis exudes can seem at times more of a writerly than a 
cousinly anger – but it’s still anger, hot and glinting, and his job is, after all, to 
be a writer, not a cousin, so why on earth not? (Ferguson) 
 
Putting the criticism about Lucy’s death aside, most reviewers unanimously 
agree that Experience is a literary masterpiece, commending Martin Amis not only 
for his writerly expertise, but also for his emotional openness. Ferguson, for 
                                                 
61 See Appendix II. 
62 Also see section 5.1.1. 
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example, praises Experience as a ‘unique tale, consummately told, of age, change, 
filial love and mortality’ (Ferguson), in which ‘[t]he spirit of honesty lunges at you’ 
(Ferguson). Reviewers are particularly impressed by how Martin Amis recaptures a 
certain degree of innocence in a memoir which is haunted by the unavoidable loss, 
betrayal and pain inherent in human life (cf. Diederick, 192). At some point in 
Experience, Martin Amis remarks with amazement of his mother that, by some 
miracle, she regained her innocence after experience had come upon her: ‘My mother 
was innocent. Then experience came, and she experienced it. And then she got her 
innocence back again. I have always wondered how she did that.’ (Experience, 106) 
Through the writing of this memoir, Martin manages to perform a similar miracle: In 
the face of death and loss, Experience surprises the reader by preserving a spirit of 
reconciliation and recompense. (cf. Keulks, 223) As Katherine Catmull writes in her 
review,  
somehow innocence meets experience and yet becomes innocence again. His 
marriage dies, father dies; but a new marriage and a new child are born. A face 
is rebuilt and becomes his face. (Catmull)  
 
In 2001, Experience was awarded the James Tait Black Memorial Prize for 
Nonfiction, and it is now generally recognised as Martin’s finest work yet. (cf. 
Diederick, 182n, and Brown, Allan). This ‘fluidly structured meditation on love and 
loss’ (Adams) is a very moving book, ripping right into the heart of its readers. 
Moreover, Experience is a work of remarkable artistry. Through amalgamating and 
conflating various literary genres and narrative techniques, it expertly ‘navigate[s] 
the shadowed alleys and sinuous canals of memory’ (Keulks, 205). Martin Amis 
does not hide behind the ‘highly structured, deeply patterned aestheticism’ (Keulks, 
205) he displays in Experience, instead utilising it as an instrument to ‘allow[] the 
reader access to some of the most private recesses of [his] mind’ (Keulks, 207). 
Thus, Experience evokes an image of the author’s self that resembles a palimpsest, 
made up from countless layers of memory and experience.  
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6. Elizabeth Jane Howard’s Slipstream: A Memoir (2002) 
 
6.1. Macrostructure: narrative approach and structural design 
 
Having published thirteen novels and several books in other genres, Elizabeth Jane 
Howard is a successful and established writer. However, she ‘shares a common fate 
with many women, in that she is better known for her attachment to a famous man 
than for her own achievements.’ (Merritt) Despite the fact that several of her novels 
have been made into films, most notably the ‘Cazalet Chronicle’, a series of four 
novels about family life in Britain during the Second World War, more people 
undoubtedly know her for her affair and subsequent marriage to Sir Kingsley Amis 
than could name any of her books. (cf. Merritt) Due to the heavy news coverage of 
their relationship as well as its fairly recent discussion in the three biographies about 
Kingsley,63 his son Martin’s memoir, Experience (2000) and Kingsley’s Letters 
(2000) this literary couple is not only familiar to those readers with a special interest 
in the arts, but in fact to most people in Great Britain. In her autobiography, 
Slipstream, which was published in 2002, Elizabeth Jane Howard gives her side of 
the story, describing her eighteen-year relationship with Kingsley from their first 
encounter at the Cheltenham Literary Festival in 1962 (cf. Slipstream, 334) to their 
break-up in 1980 and subsequent divorce in 1983. Contrary to Kingsley, who hardly 
features Jane in his Memoirs (1991) as he never overcame his resentment towards her 
caused by her departure, Jane paints a forgiving, in-depth picture of her third 
husband and their marriage. Despite the fact that a considerable amount of text-time 
is devoted to that part of Jane’s life in her autobiography, however, Slipstream is 
much more than the account of a literary marriage and its slow implosion; in fact, it 
covers a remarkable time span of almost eighty years, tracing the author’s 
development from shortly after her birth in 1923 to the point just before the book’s 
publication in 2002.  
As reviewers have observed, Slipstream is ‘an old-fashioned kind of memoir, 
recalling a long life of privilege and impressive connections’ (Merritt). Due to its 
strict chronological structure, Slipstream is by far the most traditional autobiography 
out of the three works discussed in this thesis. Preceded by a preface and a ‘‘cast of 
                                                 
63 Eric Jacobs’s Kingsley Amis: A Biography (1995), Richard Bradford’s Lucky Him: The Life of  
    Kingsley Amis (2001), and Zachary Leader’s The Life of Kingsley Amis (2006). 
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characters’ that reads like a who’s who of the postwar art, theatre and literary worlds’ 
(Merritt), the book falls into four parts:64  
Featuring her wealthy but isolated middle-class upbringing, Part One starts 
with Jane’s first memory and ends with her wedding to Peter Scott, the naturalist and 
wildlife painter (and son of the Antarctic explorer) in 1942. Part Two deals with the 
author’s struggles as a wife and mother – her daughter Nicola was born in 1943 – 
and her decision to leave her family in order to become a writer, which constitutes 
one of the three most important turning points in the book. Parts Two and Three 
consequently allow insights into Jane’s efforts of making a living as a woman writer, 
which were repeatedly obstructed by financial pressures and lack of time due to her 
various jobs as a model for Vogue, books reviewer, and TV correspondent. Apart 
from information about her career, Parts Two and Three also give a detailed account 
of Jane’s unhappy love life – her many affairs with married men, especially her 
relationships with Romain Gary, Laurie Lee, Arthur Koestler and Cecil Day-Lewis, 
and her brief second marriage to Jim Douglas-Henry, the Australian correspondent 
and writer of ghost stories. While still married to Jim, Jane fell in love with Kingsley 
after first meeting him at the Cheltenham Literary Festival in 1962, of which she was 
director (cf. Slipstream, 334); this incident, which led to her third marriage, 
represents the second significant turning point of her life. Part Three describes Jane’s 
relationship with Kingsley from its beginning as ‘a coup de foudre’ (Experience, 33, 
emphasis original) to many years of happy marriage and its slow disintegration in the 
late nineteen-seventies, closing with their move from Lemmons, their large Georgian 
country estate in Hadley Common, which Jane ran by herself, to Gardnor House in 
Hampstead. Finally, Part Four outlines the last few years of Jane and Kingsley’s 
crumbling marriage up to her decision to leave him in 1980, which is the third 
turning point of this autobiography. After her breakup with Kingsley, Jane slowly 
regained her energy and had a lot more time to write, which led to her long-awaited 
financial breakthrough as a writer: the ‘Cazalet Chronicle’,65 which she published in 
a period of only seven years, finally made her rich. With regard to the author’s 
private life, Part Four includes a frightful episode occurring in her early seventies: 
after a TV appearance, she received a letter from a fan declaring his interest in her. 
After extended letters on both sides she met him and fell in love with him, but he 
                                                 
64 Part One consists of eleven, Part Two of fourteen, Part Three of thirteen, and Part Four of seven  
    chapters. Both the four parts, and the forty-five chapters overall are unnamed.  
65 The Light Years (1988), Marking Time (1991), Confusion (1993), and Casting Off (1995). 
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turned out to be a conman. Due to the fact that she has since made a novel out of this 
incident, Falling (1999), she does not go into detail, instead describing the pleasures 
and pains of old age and her quiet life in her large country house in Suffolk, Bridge 
House, where she enjoys her spacious garden.  
In the preface of Slipstream, Elizabeth Jane Howard openly discusses her 
narrative approach and her motivation for writing this book. Opening with a series of 
rhetorical questions, she asks herself why one should embark on the project of 
writing one’s autobiography: 
Why write about one’s life? Because of the times one has lived through, the 
people met and known and loved? To show how interesting, virtuous, or 
entertaining one has been or become? Or to trace one’s inward journey – 
whatever kind of evolution there has been between the wrinkled howling baby 
and the wrinkled old crone? (Slipstream, xiii) 
 
After this general inquiry, which enumerates a series of general reasons for writing a 
memoir, the author moves on to the more personal motives behind her 
autobiographical enterprise. While for many writers, she explains, their art is ‘their 
chief means of communication with their readers’, she has found that for her, 
‘writing is often my chief means of communication with myself. I write to find 
things out as much as, and sometimes more than, to tell them to other people.’ 
(Slipstream, xiii, emphasis original)  
Jane’s view of writing as a way of self-examination and a quest for the real 
self attests to Stanzel’s claim that in the first-person narrative situation, the narrative 
represents a continuation of the experience of the self, which is why any first-person 
narrator’s motivation to narrate is existential rather than barely aesthetic. (cf. Stanzel, 
213) Despite the narrator’s manifold transformations on the journey from ‘the 
wrinkled howling baby’ to ‘the wrinkled old crone’ (Slipstream, xiii), he or she 
remains connected to his or her earlier self ‘by numerous existential threads’ 
(Stanzel, 213). Furthermore, Stanzel claims that if a first-person narrator ‘looks back 
at the mistakes and confusion of his or her life from the distance of mellow age’, he 
or she ‘can usually recognize some kind of pattern’ (Stanzel, 213f.). Echoing 
Stanzel’s argument, the following quotation from the preface of Slipstream, in which 
Elizabeth Jane Howard explains the title66 of her autobiography, proves that it is not 
                                                 
66 Referring to Jane’s explanation of the title of her autobiography, one reviewer asks whether there is  
    ‘an oblique reference here to the title chosen by Martin Amis for his own memoirs, Experience’  
    (Carpenter). This question seems legitimate, especially considering Jane even refers to ‘Martin’s  
    admirable book Experience’ (Slipstream, 406). She points out that his description of her and  
    Kingsley’s moving house from Lemmons to Gardnor House is incorrect: He ‘thought I was trying  
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a contradiction to both elucidate the confusions of one’s younger self and still feel 
connected to it no matter how dramatically one may have changed over time: 
Speaking as a very slow learner, I feel as though I have lived most of my life in 
the slipstream of experience. Often I have had to repeat the same disastrous 
situation several times before I got the message. That is still happening. I do not 
write this book as a wise, mature, finished person who has learned all the 
answers, but rather as someone who even at this late stage of seventy-nine 
years is still trying to change, find things out and do a bit better with them.’ 
(Slipstream, xiv) 
 
The adverbial phrases ‘most of my life’ and ‘several times’ and the words ‘repeat’ 
and ‘same’ are an indication that Jane identifies a pattern within herself, i.e. being a 
slow learner. Maintaining that it is important to assume ‘responsibility for what one 
is’ (Slipstream, xiii), Jane takes this behavioural pattern as the starting point for her 
narrative inquiry of herself. Through her autobiographical account of her life, which 
she compares to ‘a household book of accounts’ (Slipstream, xiii), she seeks to find 
out how much she has gained from her experiences. Thus narratively weighing the 
debits and credits sides against each other towards the end her life, Jane intends to 
clarify the following questions:  
what has been acquired, to what purpose has it been put, was too much paid for 
it and did it teach anything? How much has been learned by experience? Have 
patterns of behaviour and responses changed? Have I discovered where I am 
useful and useless, how I am nourished and starved? Have I tried to change 
those faults and weaknesses in me that are open to alteration? Have I learned to 
accept realistically what is immutable? (Slipstream, xiii) 
 
Both the chronological structure of Slipstream as well as the simile of the ‘household 
book of accounts’ conform to the generic model of autobiography proper which is 
based on Gusdorf’s early thoughts about the genre. Gusdorf points out that 
‘autobiography properly speaking assumes the task of reconstructing the unity of a 
life across time’ (Gusdorf, 37). This chronological retracement serves ‘the most 
secret purpose’ (Gusdorf, 39) of the autobiographical enterprise, which Gusdorf 
identifies as an attempt of salvation through self-justification at the end of life: 
The man who recounts himself is himself searching for his self through his 
history; […] Autobiography appeases the more or less anguished uneasiness of 
an aging man67 who wonders if his life has not been lived in vain, fritted away 
haphazardly, ending now in simple failure. In order to be reassured he 
undertakes his own apologia. […] The literary work in which he offers himself 
                                                                                                                                          
    to be a martyr by not using professional movers’ (Slipstream, 406), but she actually did employ  
    people to help.  
67 Despite the fact that Gusdorf speaks of ‘man’ only, I maintain that this argument can equally be  
    applied to a woman’s autobiography. 
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as example is the means of perfecting his identity and of bringing it to a 
successful conclusion.’ (Gusdorf, 39) 
As Gusdorf has us know, autobiography’s systematic search for the true self 
originates from the Christian tradition of self-examination through the confession of 
sins (cf. Gusdorf, 33). Due to the fact that Christian destiny represents a dialogue of 
the soul with God, autobiography developed in the spiritual context as a tool for 
confession and self-improvement, for ‘every action, every initiative of thought or 
conduct, can call everything back into question’ (Gusdorf, 33). In his brief review of 
Augustine’s Confessions, Gusdorf observes that ‘Augustine’s great book is a 
consequence of this dogmatic requirement’ (Gusdorf, 33) of confessing one’s sins. 
Interestingly, he compares Confessions to a ‘balance sheet’ (Gusdorf, 33, emphasis 
added), with the help of which Augustine presents himself before God.  
Similar to Augustine’s religious ‘balance sheet’ (Gusdorf, 33), Elizabeth Jane 
Howard’s secular ‘household book of accounts’ (Slipstream, xiii) is an attempt at 
justification and reassurance towards the end of a life. Instead of offering her balance 
sheet to God, she acts as her own judge, providing ‘witness that [s]he has not existed 
in vain’ by narratively reconstructing ‘a destiny that seems to [her] to have been 
worth the trouble living.’ (Gusdorf, 39) 
At the very end of Slipstream, after narrating the hallmarks of her long life on 
more than 470 pages, Elizabeth Jane Howard returns to the simile of the household 
accounts she establishes in the preface. However, before completely closing the 
accounts book, she draws a different kind of comparison, juxtaposing two opposing 
summaries of her journey, made at different points in her life:   
When I was about eight, I remember lying in bed in Scotland one night and 
saying to myself, ‘You have ridden on an elephant, you’ve worn puttees, and 
you’ve been out in a boat to catch sea trout,’ and being deeply impressed with 
my wealth of experience. This zenith of sophistication was soon overtaken. If I 
were to lie in bed now with a more recent list, I would say, ‘You’ve written 
twelve novels and as much again in other forms, you’ve travelled to seventeen 
countries and you’ve planted nearly a thousand trees.’ I am less impressed, 
because now I know I could have done much better and more. (Slipstream, 
475f.) 
 
Despite the fact that Jane wishes she had made better use of her time and learned 
from her mistakes more quickly, the ultimate balance she draws is positive. Noting 
that her lifelong emphasis on learning is still intact, since she is still trying to better 
herself at her old age, she is adamant that she does not ‘want to live with […] 
nostalgia and regret wrapped round me like a wet blanket. I want to live enquiringly, 
with curiosity and interest for the rest of my life.’ (Slipstream, 476) As writing 
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represents her chief means of communication with herself and a tool for self-
improvement, she is grateful that she can still write at the age of seventy-nine. 
Drawing her ultimate conclusion, Elizabeth Jane Howard looks at all the plusses and 
minuses of her life, which are now enshrined in the book she has just completed, and 
she is able to deliver a lenient verdict:   
When I do look back, as indeed I’ve had to do to write this book, the household 
accounts don’t seem so bad. I’ve made a good many mistakes, some rather 
expensive, but I think I’ve more or less paid for them. I’ve slowly learned some 
significant things – perhaps most of all the virtue, the extreme importance of 
truth, which, it seems to me now, should be continually searched for and 
treasured when any piece of it is found. This book has been in search of some 
of that. (Slipstream, 476f.)   
 
Interestingly, writing is not the only means with which the author presents her 
development to the reader; supporting the written text, there is a photographic text 
that adds another nuance to the impression the recipient gets of Jane’s 
autobiographical journey: the front cover of Slipstream features a photograph of the 
young Elizabeth Jane Howard, with her dark, intense eyes gazing at the reader. On 
the back of the book are ‘the same eyes, but 60 years on, in a face lined with 
experience of life.’68 (Colvin) As Colvin remarks in her review of Slipstream, ‘All 
Your Life You Are Changing’, this is the picture the readers of Jane’s novel series, 
the ‘Cazalet Chronicle’, will be familiar with, while the ‘raving beauty’ is ‘the image 
her lovers would remember – if any were still alive.’ (Colvin) 
 
 
6.2. From macrostructure to microstructure: the turning points 
 
According to the autobiography theorist Michael Sheringham, analysing the turning 
points of a text can bring powerful insights into the structure of its narrative. In his 
entry ‘Conversion and Turning Points’ in the Encyclopedia of Life Writing, he 
informs us that in autobiography, ‘conversion is inevitably bound up with the way 
lives are given narrative shape.’ (Sheringham, ‘Conversion and Turning Points’, 233) 
Consequently, it is ‘fruitful to view turning points as part of the language of 
autobiography’ (Sheringham, ‘Conversion and Turning Points’, 233). Responding to 
this notion of the turning point as a structural element of narrative, the three most 
important turning points in Elizabeth Jane Howard’s Slipstream will be discussed in 
                                                 
68 See Appendix II. 
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detail in the ensuing sections; thus, the causes, circumstances and consequences of 1) 
her decision to leave Peter Scott and become a writer, 2) her meeting Kingsley Amis, 
and 3) her leaving Kingsley Amis will be examined closely. As remains to be shown, 
all three of these turning points are closely connected with the main themes that lie at 
the heart of this autobiography, namely the author’s life-long quest for love and her 
development and daily struggles as a woman writer.  
 
6.2.1. Leaving Peter Scott and becoming a writer 
 
Soon after her wedding to Peter Scott in 1942, Elizabeth Jane Howard discovered 
that she did not love her husband. She felt trapped in the relationship to Peter, who 
was fourteen years her senior and did not know how to handle the responsibility of 
her young age: ‘As he was so much older, I assumed that he knew a great deal that he 
didn’t’ (Slipstream, 122), Jane writes. Despite their comfortable life style, she was 
unhappy as she found it difficult to relate to her husband. Their lack of progress ‘in 
intimacy’ (Slipstream, 122) was partly due to Peter’s frequent absences during the 
war; his career as a naval officer forced Jane into leading a ‘hotel life’, making her 
feel ‘bored and lonely’ (Slipstream, 126). Furthermore, the marriage was 
overshadowed by the attitude of Jane’s mother-in-law, ‘the sculptor Kathleen Scott, 
who had married Lord Kennet after her first husband died’ (Andrew Brown). ‘K’, as 
she was called in the family, made Jane feel unwelcome and was a bully. At one 
point, when they were taking a walk together, K delivered the following shocking 
speech to Jane: 
‘I suppose you’ve realized now that Pete only married you to have a son.’ I 
said, no, I hadn’t, but my heart began to pound. She looked me straight in the 
eye and then said, ‘If you ever make Pete unhappy I shall want to stab you. I 
should enjoy doing it.’ […] Then she put her arm in mine and said, in a quite 
different voice, ‘Oh Jenny, you’re very young. Let’s go home.’ And we went. 
(Slipstream, 140) 
 
After Jane had given birth to her daughter Nicola in 1943, things did not become 
easier. Not only did K force her to ‘return to the charge as soon as possible’ 
(Slipstream, 139), since she had not had a son, but Jane also had complicated feelings 
of guilt about Nicola. Due to the fact that Nicola had been taken away from her and 
into the care of nannies straight after her birth, the nineteen-year-old Jane had 
difficulties in bonding with her baby daughter; she had ‘bouts of depression about 
motherhood’ (Slipstream, 139). As she had no one to confide in, she concealed her 
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‘fear and anxiety about motherhood and the guilt that’ she ‘didn’t have the maternal 
feelings that were expected’ (Slipstream, 126) of her. 
Although Jane observes that ‘Pete was a gifted and interesting man’ 
(Slipstream, 190), she felt essentially isolated within the marriage, because he did not 
take a serious interest in her as a person:  
I could never really talk to him seriously about anything – he wasn’t interested 
in me, really, or in anyone else, in that way. As so many men do, he wanted me 
to settle down to marriage and a family, so that he could pursue matters that did 
interest him. (Slipstream, 190) 
 
After a series of unhappy extramarital affairs, Jane realised that she would not 
find self-fulfilment while married to Peter, and decided to leave him after only five 
years of marriage. This decision does not so much constitute a significant turning 
point in this autobiography because Jane took the initiative in the separation, but 
because she did so for a significant reason: she wanted to be a writer. In the last year 
of her relationship to Peter, she had written half a novel and – despite considerable 
anxieties about the unfinished book (cf. Slipstream, 178) and feelings of extreme 
guilt about Nicola (cf. Slipstream, 190) – she was firm about pursuing her career: ‘I 
wanted to be a writer and I couldn’t do it married to him.’ (Slipstream, 199f.) Due to 
the fact that she refused to ask Peter for financial support, it was not possible for her 
to both keep Nicola and be a writer, for ‘[i]n those days, a woman could not get a 
mortgage, nor was there childcare for working mothers.’ (Colvin); she had no choice 
but to leave Nicola behind in the family home, visiting every week, ‘miserably aware 
of how unsatisfactory this was’ and feeling ‘guilty’ (Slipstream, 198). 
After making arrangements to live with her father and his mistress Ursula for 
the first few months, Jane left Peter Scott in the summer of 1947, ‘in a taxi, with two 
suitcases and ten pounds.’ (Slipstream, 195) When she moved into a flat of her own 
in Blandford Street after some time, it was apparent to her that she had given up all 
the comforts of middle-class married life and was in immediate financial trouble, as 
the following description of her first night in the new apartment illustrates:  
I remember my first night there, a bare bulb in the ceiling, wooden floors full of 
malignant nails, the odour of decay that seeped through the wet paint smell and 
the unpleasant feeling that everything was dirty except my bedclothes. Above 
all, I felt alone, and the only thing I was sure of was that I wanted to write. 
(Slipstream, 196) 
 
In order to get by financially, Jane, who was now ‘chronically short of money’ 
(Slipstream, 201) had to take on several jobs, such as modelling for Vogue or 
working night shifts at a radio station (cf. Slipstream, 197). Despite these 
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distractions, she was ‘determined to be a writer at any cost, to put it first’ 
(Slipstream, 198), and continued writing her novel. It was finished in 1950, and she 
found a publisher immediately: After chasing her around the table in his office, 
threatening that he would not publish The Beautiful Visit, Jonathan Cape agreed to 
represent her and paid her an advance of ₤50. (cf. Slipstream, 202) The following 
year, The Beautiful Visit was awarded the ‘John Llewellyn Rhys Prize’ (Slipstream, 
214) for any young novelist under thirty. Cape tried to claim ten percent of the prize 
money, but Jane ‘had become a professional’ (Brown, Andrew) and ‘kept my riches 
to myself’ (Slipstream, 214). 
During the following decade, Elizabeth Jane Howard continued writing and 
publishing novels, but she could not make a living from writing alone; although her 
books were well received, she still had to keep part-time jobs (cf. Brown, Andrew). 
Apart from financial adversaries, she had difficulties on another front of her life, 
namely love.  
 
6.2.2. Meeting Kingsley Amis 
 
Throughout the 1950s, Elizabeth Jane Howard had a series of relationships with – 
mostly married, and famous – men ‘who regarded her talents as very much less 
interesting than theirs’ (Brown, Andrew). As she repeatedly notes throughout her 
autobiography, Jane considered love as ‘the most important thing in the world’ 
(Slipstream, 155, also cf. 178, 216). However, none of her affairs satisfied her ‘great 
hunger to be loved, to be in love.’ (Slipstream, 178, emphasis original) 
Notwithstanding the fact that she tended to fall for married men who ultimately 
stayed with their wives, she wanted nothing more than a conventional relationship: 
‘intimacy, affection, being first in each other’s lives – I wanted, as much as I wanted 
to write.’ (Slipstream, 216) Due to her extraordinary beauty which Jane finds hard to 
acknowledge (cf. Slipstream, 273) but which is documented in the many photographs 
in this autobiography, ‘men queued to fall in love with Howard’ (Brown, Andrew). 
Nevertheless, she had little confidence in herself and in love, as all of her liaisons 
were short-lived and ended unhappily, as the following quotation demonstrates:  
I thought I was cut out just to be a kind of extra for people. There would never 
be anyone who would take me seriously or put me first in his life. I wanted 
much the same as everyone else – to love one person, to live with them, to have 
their children. But I also wanted to be a writer, and it was here that the most 
serious difference between the sexes revealed itself to me. Men could be 
novelists, prime ministers, doctors, lawyers and fathers. It was a much trickier 
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combination for women. None the less, tricky or not, it was what I wanted. 
(Slipstream, 251) 
 
Unexpectedly, in October 1962 she found a partner with whom it seemed she could 
combine both her desire for love and her career as a woman writer: Kingsley Amis. 
She first met him at the Cheltenham Literary Festival, which she had been appointed 
to organise. The Sunday Telegraph team, who were sponsoring one evening of the 
festival, had invited Kingsley Amis to participate in a panel on ‘Sex in Literature’69 
(cf. Slipstream, 334). Jane was furious that they had contacted him without 
consulting her, for she ‘felt slightly frightened at the prospect of him coming; I 
thought he would be an ‘Angry Young Man’ who would think the whole thing was 
silly.’ (Slipstream, 334) After the event, Jane kept Kingsley company, as he ‘wanted 
to stay up and drink. […] What had begun as a social duty turned, during the ensuing 
hours, into something quite different.’ (Slipstream, 338) They talked until four in the 
morning, and immediately fell in love, as Kingsley’s love letters and poems of the 
time prove.70 At the end of the evening, Kingsley asked her to meet him in London; 
‘When he kissed me, I felt as though I could fly.’ (Slipstream, 338) 
 After the festival, Jane told herself  
it was no good falling in love with Kingsley, who was married with three 
children. I’d simply be back in the familiar peripheral position, waiting for 
phone calls: surely I’d learned enough about what that was like to know it 
deflected me from writing and made me miserable. Surely by now I’d learned 
that. When I got back to London, and was winding up festival business, 
Kingsley rang me. And I found myself instantly agreeing to meet him in a bar 
in Leicester Square. (Slipstream, 339, emphasis original) 
 
Despite the fact that they were both married with other partners, ‘theirs was an 
established liaison’ (Brown, Andrew) by the winter. The following summer, they 
eloped on a holiday to Spain, and were discovered by a journalist.71 Consequently, 
Kingsley’s already wrecked marriage dissolved and they set up in London together. 
Soon after that, Philip and Martin, Kingsley’s teenage sons, were living with them 
and Jane became their stepmother.72 In 1965, they were married, and ‘for the first 
few years, they were wonderfully happy.’ (Brown, Andrew)  
                                                 
69 Martin Amis comments on Kingsley and Jane’s first meeting in the following way: ‘The panel  
    discussion which Jane had organised and which Kingsley attended was on ‘Sex in Literature’: one  
    of God’s dud jokes.’ (Experience, 33n) 
70 Cf. ‘Kingsley Amis wrote poems, in which Howard appeared as a fairytale princess, and exquisite  
    love letters.’ (Brown, Andrew) 
71 Cf. ‘[W]e knew that our unofficial elopement was common knowledge’ (Slipstream, 348). 
72 In his memoir, Experience, Martin Amis memorably expresses his gratitude to Jane for having been  
    his ‘wicked stepmother: she was generous, affectionate and resourceful; she salvaged my schooling  
    and I owe her an unknowable debt for that. […] When I see her now I resent our vanished  
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 Elizabeth Jane Howard had finally found what she had longed for: ‘At last,’ 
she writes, ‘I thought, life was everything I could ever have hoped for and it had 
come about in a situation that had seemed to have no chance of any permanence.’ 
(Slipstream, 354) Both Jane and Kingsley were successful novelists, and their 
relationship was filled with ‘affection and approval’ (Slipstream, 354), but 
unfortunately, this state of affairs was not to last.  
 
6.2.3. Leaving Kingsley Amis 
 
A few years after they had moved into Lemmons,73 ‘a Georgian house set in three 
acres in London’s northern suburbs’ which ‘sheltered a rambling collection of family 
and friends’ (Brown, Andrew), Jane and Kingsley’s marriage started to crumble. As 
Jane sees it, their relationship was gradually undermined by Kingsley’s drinking and 
his disinterest in domestic matters (cf. Brown, Andrew), which eroded all intimacy 
and affection (cf. Slipstream, 377). In the eight years they lived there, the author 
explains, she wrote less and less and felt constantly tired (cf. Slipstream, 375) 
because Kingsley did not share any responsibilities:  
Kingsley being unable to drive, and having absolutely nothing to do with our 
finances, meant I was a part-time secretary and chauffeur, as well as getting in 
food, cooking it and clearing it up. (Slipstream, 375) 
 
She felt isolated in a household with five men and her aging mother, and suffered 
from fatigue and depression. While commending Kingsley for being ‘one of the most 
disciplined workers’ she had ever known, getting up and writing every morning ‘[n]o 
matter how bad a hangover he had’ (Slipstream, 379), Jane herself experienced a 
severe ‘writing block’ (Slipstream, 413). Slowly but surely, she began to realise that 
‘Kingsley no longer loved me’ (Slipstream, 395). Having grown dependent on her 
because of his phobias and his enjoyment of domestic comfort, ‘he needed me, but 
he no longer wanted me’ (Slipstream, 395), as Jane recognises.  
Elizabeth Jane Howard paints a tender and painful picture of her 
disintegrating marriage with Kingsley. Where there had been so much love in the 
beginning, only resentment was left towards the end. ‘There was one moment’, she 
writes, however, 
                                                                                                                                          
    relatedness, cancelled by law but not by feeling. I also admire her as an artist, as I did then.’  
    (Experience, 215, emphasis original). In the a footnote on the same page, he further compliments  
    her on her achievements as a writer: ‘As far as I am concerned she is, with Iris Murdoch, the most  
    interesting woman writer of her generation. An instinctivist, but an elegant one (like Muriel Spark),  
    she has a freakish and poetic eye, and penetrating sanity’ (Experience, 215n). 
73 They had bought Lemmons in 1969 (cf. Brown, Andrew). 
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when all this was different. I was standing by the window in our bedroom one 
morning, looking out the window and feeling very sad. He came to me, put his 
arms around me and gave me a long, gentle kiss, and said, ‘I used to be so 
much in love with you.’ Before I could say anything, he turned and walked out 
of the room. It was like meeting a loving ghost suddenly, who vanished before I 
could respond. I stayed by the window until I stopped crying. But that evening, 
after work, when I tried to talk to him, he’d retreated. Insulated by whiskey, he 
was withdrawn and dismissive. (Slipstream, 417) 
 
Not only was Kingsley’s affection gradually swept away by alcohol, but he even 
turned misogynist towards the end of their relationship: ‘he had little use for 
women’, Jane explains. ‘He regarded them as intellectually inferior, and often as 
‘pests’[…]. Women were for bed and board, and he’d ceased to be interested in 
either.’ (Slipstream, 413f.) 
Deciding that she no longer wanted to be trapped in this loveless marriage, 
Jane left Kingsley in December 1980. Once again, she had no money, nowhere to go, 
and only a half-finished novel74 to take with her. Sadly, Kingsley ‘maintained an 
implacable resentment’ (Slipstream, 438) towards Jane for the rest of his life, even 
refusing to see her when he was dying. Despite the fact that she does not conceal 
Kingsley’s weaknesses in her portrait of him, she is lenient and forgiving; noting that 
he had ‘once said in a newspaper interview that the worst thing that had happened to 
him was meeting me’ (Slipstream, 447), Jane points out that that is not the case for 
her: ‘there were many things about him that I still loved – and shall always love.’ 
(Slipstream, 447) She does point out, however, that it was heartbreaking for her 
when he died,75 because this ‘second parting’ (Slipstream, 447) entailed that there 
was no chance of reconciliation (cf. Slipstream, 447). 
After the breakup of her third marriage, Elizabeth Jane Howard settled down 
to a more quiet life and concentrated entirely on her writing. Yet again facing 
monetary difficulties at first – her novel Getting It Right (1982) was politely received 
but did not sell very well –, she was finally able to restore her finances (cf. 
Slipstream, 456) with the bestselling novel quartet the ‘Cazalet Chronicle’, and her 
next book, Falling (1999), which were also adapted for television and film 
respectively.76 
 
                                                 
74 Getting It Right (1982) 
75 Curiously, Jane gets the year of Kingsley’s death wrong, stating that ‘Kingsley had died on 22  
    October 1990’ (Slipstream, 447), while in fact he died five years later than that, namely on 22   
    October 1995. 
76 Krishnamma, Suri, The Cazalets. UK, 2001, and Powell, Tristram. Falling. UK, 2005. 
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6.3. From microstructure back to macrostructure: women’s autobiography 
 
From the perspective of autobiography theory, women’s autobiographies constitute a 
variation of the genre that includes specific traits which need to be considered 
separately in the process of analysis. According to Gudmundsdóttir, these so-called 
‘autogynographies’ (Stanton, 13, as cited in Gudmundsdóttir, 129), as women’s 
autobiographies are called in the jargon of autobiography studies, ‘add an extra 
dimension to the autobiographical project’ (Gudmundsdóttir, 128), namely ‘the 
subject of gender’ (Gudmundsdóttir, 97).  
As Gudmundsdóttir has us know, theoretical publications on women’s 
autobiographies have proliferated in the last two decades (cf. Gudmundsdóttir, 112) 
and focus mainly on three aspects: ‘self-representation, questions of identity 
(collective versus individual), and the public versus the private (male versus female)’ 
(Gudmundsdóttir, 112). It is an acclaimed fact that gender plays a decisive role in 
women’s life narratives, for the female ‘autobiographers’ lives, social positions and 
relationships are all formed by it.’ (Gudmundsdóttir, 138) As Eakin points out 
however, it is faulty to maintain that the process of women’s identity formation is 
inherently different from men’s, credibly arguing that ‘the criterion of relationality 
applies equally if not identically to male experience’, arguing that ‘all selfhood […] 
is relational despite differences that fall out along gender lines’ (Eakin, How, 50, 
emphasis original). Consequently, the difference that feminist theorists of 
autobiography find in women’s life writing does not lie in female selfhood per se but 
in the themes that occur frequently in autogynographies. According to 
Gudmundsdóttir, these thematic concepts specifically observed in women’s 
autobiography are a) accounts of ‘how the authors became writers’ and b) of ‘how 
the autobiographers write on their relationship with the mother’ (Gudmundsdóttir, 
97). In an analysis of an autogynography – and Slipstream qualifies as such – it is 
thus paramount to examine how the author structures her autobiography around the 
moment of becoming a writer and around her relationship with her mother (cf. 
Gudmundsdóttir, 98). Therefore, it shall be questioned in the ensuing sections 
whether Gudmundsdóttir’s claim that women’s autobiographies are ‘preoccupied 
with writing and the mother’ (Gudmundsdóttir, 101) holds true for the specific 
instance of Elizabeth Jane Howard’s Slipstream. 
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6.3.1. The writing life and struggles of a woman writer 
 
As Gudmundsdóttir has found out through studying a large number of women’s 
autobiographies, ‘[b]ecoming a writer’ in these texts ‘is usually linked with freedom 
from the mother, from madness and/or from traditional female roles.’ 
(Gudmundsdóttir, 101) She maintains that  
[t]he pattern the accounts often follow can be described in terms of 
unhappiness, struggle, or depression until they start writing. […] The move the 
writers describe is from being defined by others (family, tradition, doctors) to 
self-expression and liberation (Gudmundsdóttir, 101f.). 
 
As can be deduced from the analysis of the turning points in Slipstream, this 
argument certainly holds true for Elizabeth Jane Howard’s decision to become a 
writer, which necessitated her separation from her husband and child: ‘I was [] 
determined to be a writer, at any cost, […] and I had to do it alone.’ (Slipstream, 198) 
Gender most definitely plays an important role in Jane’s self-fulfilment as a writer, 
for she was caught up in female, domestic stereotypes from which she needed to rid 
herself several times in her life. Furthermore, Gudmundsdóttir argues that in many 
women’s autobiographies, ‘[e]very other event in their lives is subordinated by the 
story of how they became writers’ (Gudmundsdóttir, 139). In Slipstream, however, 
this cannot be said to be the case; while it is true that her description of becoming a 
writer constitutes an important moment – indeed a turning point – within the 
narrative, it would be an exaggeration to claim that every other event has to be 
viewed with regard to this single aspect of her life. It is important to bear in mind 
that Jane’s memoir covers a time period of almost 80 years and consequently touches 
upon a wide range of topics. As far as the theme of writing itself is concerned, 
Gudmundsdóttir’s theory is not reflected, for Jane does not only focus on the starting 
point of her writing career, but on the writing life as a whole: Slipstream is 
interspersed with comments about the day-to-day struggles of being a writer, 
especially a woman writer.  
Jane’s journey of becoming a writer already begins in her childhood, when 
she wrote ‘an interminable book about a horse’ (Slipstream, 44) for English 
composition with her governess as well as several theatrical plays (cf. Slipstream, 
64). Despite the fact she ‘never had the slightest intention of becoming a writer’ 
(Slipstream, 64) in her childhood and adolescence, for acting was her first career 
choice, she certainly benefited from her exercises in creative writing while growing 
up. When she did decide to become a writer and leave the conventional path of being 
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a full-time wife and mother, she had to overcome several obstacles: her lack of 
formal education – she was home-schooled and never went to university (cf. 
Slipstream, 79f.) –, the financial trials involved in surviving as a writer (cf. Wade), 
and her socially disadvantaged role of being a divorced woman starting her career in 
an era before the arrival of feminism and a wife partly putting her career on hold for 
the wellbeing of her husband and family (cf. Carpenter). Apart from realistically 
describing ‘the salad days of a writer’s creative life’ (Slipstream, 244), which 
involves a lot of ‘solitary, difficult work’ (Slipstream, 295) and a struggle to find a 
continuity in writing while having to keep other jobs (cf. Wade), Jane also includes 
the rare moments of magic which the writer is occasionally granted. When she 
describes the feeling of just having completed a novel, for example, one instantly 
knows how much joy it can bring to see one’s own creation in its finished state:  
I finished After Julius on a dark grey evening in November. The feeling after 
completing a novel is for me like no other. It’s as though with the last sentence, 
I have released a great weight that falls away, leaving me so empty and light 
that I can float out of myself and look down at the pattern of the work I’ve 
made. I can see all at once what I have been pursuing for so long. It’s a timeless 
moment, a kind of ecstasy – a state of unconditional love – that has nothing 
whatever to do with merit or criticism. Of course it goes, dissolves into 
melancholy and a sense of loss. Parting with people one has been living with 
for so long and know so intimately is poignant: they are more lost to you than 
anyone you meet in life. They remain crystallized exactly where you left them. 
Altogether, it’s an occasion that makes one feel very strange for some time 
afterwards. (Slipstream, 355) 
 
 
6.3.2. The mother-daughter relationship 
 
Gudmundsdóttir observes that most women autobiographers ‘represent the mother as 
an obstacle on the way to self-representation and they tend to define themselves 
against the mother’ (Gudmundsdóttir, 101). Thus, so her line of argument, the 
mother is seen as ‘the main obstacle towards the freedom they desire’ and the 
autobiographers ‘are writing against the mother, but also for her and with her.’ 
(Gudmundsdóttir, 138) While Elizabeth Jane Howard had a poor relationship with 
her mother due to the latter’s lack of love for her daughter, it cannot be said that Jane 
presents her mother as an obstacle on her path to becoming a writer. However, 
Gudmundsdóttir voices a second argument in connection with the mother-daughter 
theme in women’s autobiographies, which can be said to be echoed – with slight 
variation – in Slipstream: she observes how the descriptions of women 
autobiographers’ feelings towards the mother follow a similar pattern: ‘the mother is 
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a constant presence; then evokes repulsion or even hatred; and finally denotes an 
absence of strong feelings or pity’ (Gudmundsdóttir, 101). 
 Reading Slipstream, one is aware from the very beginning that Jane spent 
much more time with her nanny in her childhood than with either of her parents. 
Born in 1923, Jane was raised according to the standard of middle-class England 
between the wars, namely in material comfort but emotional frigidity. (cf. 
Slipstream, 12) Particularly in her early childhood, Jane felt ‘inferior’ to her brother 
Robin, who ‘was younger, infinitely more attractive and a boy’ (Slipstream, 4), and 
who was everybody’s favourite, particularly her mother’s (cf. Slipstream, 11). 
Detecting a generational parallel in this behaviour, she notes that her mother was 
treated in exactly the same manner by ‘her mother’, coming ‘a poor last’ (Slipstream, 
15, emphasis original) compared to her siblings. As a child, Jane felt that her 
‘desperate love for [her] mother’ was ‘unrequited’ (Slipstream, 26); furthermore, her 
family subscribed to the then quite normal ethos that ‘parents didn’t openly admire or 
extol their children’s behaviour and talent’ (Slipstream, 61). It is painful to read 
when Jane remarks how, slowly but surely, she realised that  
I would not get from my mother what I wanted – the kind of uncritical affection 
that transcends everyday mishaps, arguments or wrong-doing on my part. Now, 
I think that she made efforts to love me, but she couldn’t do anything without 
criticism, and I suspect she experienced it herself from her mother. I felt 
constantly on trial: her approval had to be earned and I wasn’t much good at 
earning it. (Slipstream, 60, emphasis original) 
 
Conforming to Gudmundsdóttir’s pattern, Jane’s feelings for her mother changed 
from unreciprocated love to ‘a fog of boredom and impatience’ (Slipstream, 260) 
when she was grown up; for as long as her mother lived, the emotional barriers never 
broke down between them. (cf. Slipstream, 199f.) After her death – Jane had taken 
care of her at Lemmons – the feeling of impatience was replaced by grief and ‘self-
recrimination’ (Slipstream, 394), and Jane shed tears ‘for my mother, for the loss of 
her love and mine’ (Slipstream, 404). 
 The biggest source of recurring regret and guilt in Jane’s autobiography (cf. 
Merritt), however, is not her behaviour as a daughter but her own failure as a mother, 
as she sees it. She reproaches herself continually throughout the memoir for having 
followed the practice of her parents by leaving her daughter in the care of a nanny, 
only visiting once a week. As a consequence, Nicola ‘remained a stranger to her until 
adulthood’ (Merritt), and Jane ‘felt guilty about her, as I’d never felt about anything 
 131 
 
else in my life’ (Slipstream, 137). Her reflections on the subject of her daughter 
show, however, that she has learned from her mistakes:  
I see now that Nicola and I had the worst possible start in life, and that most of 
what happened to me wouldn’t happen now, but this is hindsight, which, by its 
nature, is no good at the time. I can say now, and could have said for many 
years, that I love my daughter as much as I love anyone in the world, but the 
bad start led to much unhappiness for both of us, and I, being the elder, must 
accept the blame. (Slipstream, 139) 
 
Luckily, Jane’s relationship with Nicola, to whom Slipstream is dedicated, has grown 
to be a very loving one over the years, so the generational spell of unrequited love 
between mothers and daughters has been broken in the family.  
 
6.3.3. The narrative form 
 
A lot of early feminist texts about women’s autobiographical writing claim that 
autogynographies are formally different from men’s autobiographies in that they are 
more experimental and that women are bound to question generic rules more than 
male autobiographers. (cf. Gudmundsdóttir, 99) Scholars from this early period in 
feminist autobiographical theory, such as Jelinek, tend to describe women’s 
autobiography as ‘fragmented, formless, anecdotal, disruptive, subversive’ 
(Gudmundsdóttir), while more recent scholarly literature point out that these 
descriptions may equally apply to men’s autobiography, countering that  
such claims limit the study of autobiography and are not open to the many 
possibilities life-writing offers; a mode of writing which has always been a 
hybrid one (Gudmundsdóttir, 99).  
 
Felicity Nussbaum, for example, criticises Jelinek’s opinion that women’s 
autobiographies are inherently fragmented, anecdotal, disruptive and interrupted, 
even when basically linear (cf. Gudmundsdottir, 99, referring to Nussbaum, 
‘Eighteenth-Century Women’s Autobiographical Commonplaces’, 153). Similarly to 
Nussbaum, Gudmundsdóttir points out that – contrary to its themes – the generic 
conventions of autobiography are not gender-based, even though it may be tempting 
to think so (cf. Gudmundsdóttir, 100). Interestingly, Slipstream proves this point 
precisely, for its narrative is in no way fragmented or disruptive. Although this 
autobiography includes many anecdotes, its narrative approach is straightforwardly 
chronological, conforming entirely to the generic conventions of autobiography 
proper. True to Cohn’s concept of dissonant self-narration, Elizabeth Jane Howard 
takes on the role of the old, ‘enlightened and knowing narrator who elucidates [her] 
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mental confusions of earlier days’ (Cohn, 143). Despite the fact that Jane frequently 
points out that she is ‘trying to write [] without hindsight’ (Slipstream, 291), the 
narrating self displays superior knowledge over the experiencing self (cf. Cohn, 143) 
and is thus clearly the dominant force. In fact, her very usage of the word ‘hindsight’ 
draws attention to the presence of the narrating self and the considerable distance 
between the two selves of the narrator that is so characteristic of Stanzel’s model of 
the classic autobiographical first-person narrator.  
 
 
6.4. Reception and personal reflection 
 
When Elizabeth Jane Howard’s autobiography was published in 2002, its reception 
was ‘rather muted’ (O’Brien), as one reviewer of the paperback edition of Slipstream 
observes. Many commentators deplore the fact that ‘Slipstream is not a fancy 
memoir that concerns itself with the problems of remembering and forgetting, the 
putting down a life on paper’ (Anon., ‘Her Psychiatrist Fell in Love with Her’), 
instead presenting the reader with ‘a direct and factual’ (Chisholm) account of the 
author’s life. Apart from finding fault with the structural simplicity of this 
‘straightforward’ (Anon., ‘Her Psychiatrist Fell in Love with Her’) autobiography, 
they also criticise the amount of literary ‘gossip’ (Annan) Jane includes in her 
memoir, noting that they ‘could have done without some of the lists of who was at 
which party or who came to stay’ (Thwaite). Nevertheles, there are other reviewers 
who admire Jane’s skills as a ‘documentarist’ (Wade), with which she chronicles the 
goings on of the artistic and intellectual circles in London from the 1940s onward. 
No matter how much Jane is criticised for the traditional narrative design of her 
memoir, critics cannot help but admire the courageously self-revealing honesty (cf. 
Thwaite and Mathieson) with which she discloses her experiences. Furthermore, 
there is a consensus among reviewers that Slipstream is a ‘compulsively readable’ 
(Wade), ‘brave […] and vulnerable book’ (Thwaite). Due to her talent for anecdotal 
detail and her ‘gift for drily comic observation’ (Thwaite), Jane manages to 
constantly entertain her readers, for which she is given credit by the critics (cf. 
Carpenter). 
 When Elizabeth Jane Howard started writing her third novel, The Sea Change 
(1958), she drew her inspiration from a philosophical question: ‘How could one 
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change, and how much?’ By way of exploring this question fictitiously, Jane 
intended to find out ‘what people could change in themselves, and what was 
immutable’ (Slipstream, 294). In her autobiography, she also displays a constant 
interest in the idea of change, and her life-long desire for self-improvement shines 
through on every page. Interestingly, this emphasis on self-development is reflected 
stylistically in Slipstream, for Jane speaks with a voice of someone ‘who has ‘done’ 
therapy’ (Anon., ‘Her Psychiatrist Fell in Love With Her’). As one reviewer notes, 
the ‘book’s style and content is […] influenced by what she painfully learned about 
facing up to uncomfortable truths’ (Chisholm). Due to her desire to continue learning 
even towards the end of life, Jane ‘comes across as an enormously resourceful and 
sympathetic figure’ (O’Brien). Despite the fact that it is quite obvious to the reader 
how much Jane has grown as a person throughout her life, she ‘repeatedly asks 
questions of herself’ (Wade) and even has a tendency to ‘belittle herself’ (Thwaite) 
in her memoir. Jane may feel that she has lived ‘in the slipstream of experience’ 
(Slipstream, xiv), but her self-doubt and self-deprecation are unnecessary, for the 
fascinating account of her industrious and bohemian life offers ample evidence that 
she has lived life to the full and ‘has carried something valuable away’ (Thwaite). 
Her desire to continue learning despite her old age is incredibly admirable. As she 
still embraces change and regards it as a learning opportunity, she can see the 
positive side of the aging process, and thus retains an optimistic outlook on life:  
I can still learn. One of the good things about living longer is that we have 
more time to learn how to be old. It’s clear to me now that inside the conspiracy 
of silence about age – because of the negative aspects of the condition – there is 
the possibility of art: that is to say that it can be made into something worth 
trying to do well, a challenge, an adventure. (Slipstream, 476, emphasis 
original) 
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Conclusion 
 
Autobiography theory is a vibrant academic discipline, which has constantly been 
growing and adapting to both new findings in other fields of research and changes 
and developments in the practice of the genre. Not only have theories of the self been 
revised to account for the intersubjective nature of identity (cf. Egan, 1), but the 
ubiquity of narrative has also been acknowledged, leading to the recognition of 
narrative as an integral part of selfhood. Thus, the construction of identity is now 
generally perceived as ‘intimately interwoven with the autobiographical process [], a 
process that appears to be narrative in nature’ (Brockmeier, ‘Identity’, 456). Due to 
the fact that ‘autobiography is an ‘extension of the life-long process of identity 
formation’ (Smith, Thomas R., 28), autobiography does not merely reflect identity, 
but is one of its very construction sites. (cf. Brockmeier, ‘Identity’, 456)  
In the process of narrating our lives, we create and hold up a mirror against 
our selves. When analysing texts of autobiography, it is paramount to bear in mind, 
however, that this mirror is anything but an objective surface picturing an unbiased 
truth. Contrary to the physical mirror image, the autobiographical mirror is not 
mimetic. Thus, it is subject to limitations of selectiveness, subjectivity and distortion. 
On the one hand, autobiographers have to select their material, shaping it into a 
specific narrative form that is only capable of telling one version of their lives. On 
the other hand, their vision is impeded by the imperfection of memory and the 
consequent inaccessibility of the past. However, these limitations of the 
autobiographical process are not necessarily a disadvantage. On the contrary, they 
allow autobiographers to utilise their creative powers and find innovative ways of 
narratively representing and (re)constructing their identities. Because of the inventive 
forces that are intrinsic in the autobiographical process,  
[every] autobiography is a work of art and at the same time a work of 
enlightenment; it does not show us the individual seen from the outside in his 
visible actions but the person in his inner privacy, not as he was, not as he is, 
but as he believes and wishes himself to be and to have been. (Gusdorf, 45) 
 
The very distortion of the autobiographical mirror is in fact an expression of 
one of the most fascinating qualities of the genre, namely the co-existence of 
referential and fictional elements. According to Gudmundsdóttir, who studies life 
writing from a postmodern perspective, autobiography operates on the ‘borderlines’ 
(Gudmundsdóttir, 263) between the historical and the imaginary, for it is a ‘creator of 
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both fact and fiction’ (Gudmundsdóttir, 272). As opposed to poststructuralist 
scholars who have claimed that autobiography is indistinguishable from and 
dissolves into fiction (cf. de Man, as cited in Prosser, 249), she maintains that   
[f]iction is not a negative term in autobiography, it does not diminish 
autobiography’s truth-value, or the referential aspects of autobiography. Rather, 
fiction is used […] as a vehicle for the telling of a life, as a tool for making 
memories come alive, and for fashioning some sort of self-image. 
(Gudmundsdóttir, 273) 
 
Despite the fact that fictional elements in the autobiographical process have 
been widely investigated and acknowledged by scholars of autobiography,77 
Gudmundsdóttir’s dynamic metaphor of the borderline seems to open up new ways 
of studying autobiographical texts. One of the areas she recognises as a zone of 
cross-fertilisation between fact and fiction78 is in fact ‘narrative structure’ 
(Gudmundsdóttir, 263), which is particularly interesting in relation to the approach of 
this thesis. Based on my experiment of analysing three autobiographical texts from 
the double perspective of autobiography studies and narrative theory, I believe that 
narratology – and especially models of first-person narrative fiction as well as 
theories on the representation of consciousness – has a great deal to offer to the study 
of the autobiographical process. In the act of translating their selves into stories, 
autobiographers make use of narrative techniques and structural principles, which are 
the very building blocks of narrative identity construction. As narratology holds a 
blueprint for decoding these structures, it should be embraced as a powerful tool that 
can help us increase our knowledge of the relation between narrative and the self in 
autobiography.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
77 See for example Lejeune, ‘Pact’, 11; Lejeune, L’autobiographie en France, 33; Prosser, 249;  
    Blowers, 115; Eakin, ‘Foreword’, ix. 
78 Other borderlines between fact and fiction Gudmundsdóttir  names are the relationship between  
    remembering and writing, the treatment of gender, the writing on experience of crossing cultures,  
    the presence of biography in autobiography, and the use of photographs in autobiography. (cf.  
    Gudmundsdóttir, 263) 
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Appendix I – Photograph of the primary authors 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Image source: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-486941/Spicier-novel-
literary-feud-raging-Amis-dynasty-Marxist-critic.html (Accessed 7 October 2008) 
 
 
Geoffrey Levi: 
 
‘Family of controversy: From left: Martin Amis, his stepmother Elizabeth Jane 
Howard and her husband Kingsley Amis’ (Levi, ‘Spicier than a novel’) 
 
 
Martin Amis: 
 
‘I and my father are flanking Elizabeth Jane Howard. Hampstead, late 1970s: 
towards the end. (Dmitri Kasterine/Camera Press)’ (Experience, first section of 
photographs, emphasis original)  
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Appendix II – The title covers
79
 
 
 
1. Kingsley Amis’s Memoirs (1991) 
 
 
Image source:  
 
Electronic scan of the front cover.  
 
Also see:  
http://www.guardianbookshop.co.uk/BerteShopW
eb/viewProduct.do?ISBN=9780099461067 
(Accessed 8 February 2009) 
 
 
 
2. Martin Amis’s Experience: A Memoir (2000) 
 
 
Image source:  
 
http://ecx.images-
amazon.com/images/I/41DD0HHCK9L.AA480.jp
g (Accessed 8 February 2009) 
 
 
 
                                                 
79 Referring to the editions used in this thesis (see bibliography). 
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3. Elizabeth Jane Howard’s Slipstream: A Memoir (2002) 
 
 
Image Source of the front cover:  
 
Shelburne Studios, New York.  
 
http://ecx.images-
amazon.com/images/I/411QV09 
M4JL._SL500_AA240_.jpg 
(Accessed 8 February 2009) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Image source of the back cover:  
 
Michael Trevilion, Trevillion Picture 
Library. Electronic scan.  
 
Also see: 
http://www.richmond.gov.uk/home/leisu
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German summary – Deutsche Zusammenfassung 
 
Die vorliegende Diplomarbeit befasst sich mit dem Thema der britischen Autoren-
Autobiografie, wobei die Rolle des Erzählaktes und der Identitätsbildung im 
autobiografischen Prozess besondere Berücksichtigung findet. Die Arbeit gliedert 
sich in zwei Teile, die aus je drei Kapiteln bestehen: einen Theorieteil, in dem 
Konzepte der Autobiografietheorie und der Erzähltheorie präsentiert werden, und 
einen Analyseteil, in dem drei Autobiografien von britischen Autoren – Kingsley 
Amis, Martin Amis und Elizabeth Jane Howard – mit Hilfe der im Theorieteil 
erarbeiteten Konzepte untersucht werden. Die drei Primärtexte bieten sich zur 
gemeinsamen Analyse an, da die Autoren in einem familiären Verhältnis zueinander 
stehen: Martin Amis ist der Sohn von Kingsley Amis, und Elizabeth Jane Howard ist 
Kingsleys Exfrau und Martins ehemalige Stiefmutter.  
Das erste Kapitel präsentiert die Wurzeln der Autobiografie und die 
Entwicklung der Autobiografietheorie, geht aber vor allem auf die generischen 
Charakteristika der Autobiografie ein, die sie von anderen literarischen Gattungen 
abgrenzen. Im Hinblick auf den Analyseteil wird eine Arbeitsdefinition des 
autobiografischen Genres entworfen, die speziell auf die Merkmale der britischen 
Autoren-Autobiografie und auf die zu untersuchenden Primärtexte zugeschnitten ist. 
Als Ausgangspunkt dient dabei Philippe Lejeunes Definition von Autobiografie als 
eine von einer realen Person verfasste retrospektive Prosaerzählung, deren 
Schwerpunkt die Geschichte des Lebens und der Persönlichkeit des Autors ist. 
Das zweite Kapitel setzt sich mit Konzeptionen der menschlichen Identität 
und deren Einfluss auf die autobiografische Praxis auseinander. Sowohl traditionelle 
als auch moderne Modelle des Ich werden vorgestellt. Ein spezielles Merkmal 
zeitgenössischer Subjektivitätstheorien ist, dass sie das Erzählen als einen 
wesentlichen Bestandteil menschlicher Identität betrachten. Sowohl im Bereich 
zwischenmenschlicher Interaktion als auch gedanklich wendet der Mensch 
fortwährend narrative Techniken an, die Teil des Prozesses der lebenslangen 
Identitätsbildung sind.  
Im dritten Kapitel geht es um die Funktion des Erzählens in der 
Autobiografie, wobei der Zusammenhang zwischen dem Erinnerungsprozess, dem 
Phänomen Zeit und der Tätigkeit des Erzählens beleuchtet wird. Weiters werden 
erzähltheoretische Konzepte von Franz Karl Stanzel, Shlomith Rimmon-Kenan und 
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Dorrit Cohn vorgestellt, die als Untersuchungswerkzeuge für die Analyse der 
Primärtexte dienen, wie z.B. die Erzählmotivation eines Autors oder die narrative 
Distanz zwischen dem erzählenden und dem erlebenden Ich des Erzählers. 
Im vierten Kapitel wird die Autobiografie von Kingsley Amis, Memoirs 
(1991), mit Hilfe von erzähltheoretischen und autobiografietheoretischen Konzepten 
analysiert. Die Erzähltechniken, derer sich der Autor bedient, werden sowohl makro- 
als auch mikrostrukturell betrachtet. Kingsleys Autobiografie weist eine genre-
untypische Erzählstruktur auf, da sie nicht aus einer zusammenhängenden Erzählung 
sondern aus einer Reihe von Mini-Memoiren besteht, die exemplarisch untersucht 
werden. Ferner ist der ungewöhnliche Zugang des Autors dadurch ersichtlich, dass er 
wenig Privates von sich selbst – dafür aber umso mehr intime Details seiner 
Zeitgenossen – preisgibt und sein Stil eher essayistisch als erzählerisch ist.  
Das fünfte Kapitel widmet sich der Autobiografie von Martin Amis. 
Experience: A Memoir (2000) weist eine hoch komplexe, achronologische 
Erzählstruktur auf und bedient sich intertextueller Referenzen zu Shakespeares 
Hamlet und Blakes Songs of Innocence and Experience. Obwohl der Autor zwischen 
verschiedenen Perioden seines Lebens hin- und herspringt und im ersten Teil des 
Buches nach jedem Kapitel einen Brief aus seiner Schul- oder Studienzeit einstreut, 
kristallisieren sich die Jahre 1994 und 1995 als zeitlicher Schwerpunkt heraus. In 
dieser Zeit, in der der Autor seine Midlife Crisis durchlebte, starb auch sein Vater 
Kingsley, dem in der Erzählung eine zentrale Position zukommt. Experience ist ein 
autobiografisches Hybrid, das Elemente verschiedener Genres wie der Biografie, des 
Briefes oder des Tagebuches beinhaltet.  
Gegenstand des sechsten und letzten Kapitels ist Elizabeth Jane Howards 
Autobiografie Slipstream: A Memoir (2002). Howards Buch weist von allen drei 
Primärtexten die traditionellste Struktur auf, da die Autorin ihr langes Leben strikt 
chronologisch Revue passieren lässt. Besondere Aufmerksamkeit kommt in diesem 
Kapitel jenen thematischen Schwerpunkten zu, welche die Autobiografietheorie als 
spezielles Merkmal der Frauen-Autobiografie betrachtet, wie z.B. das Ergreifen des 
Schriftstellerberufs und die Mutter-Tochter-Beziehung.  
Die Analyse der drei Primärtexte verfolgt keinen vergleichenden Zugang; 
vielmehr wird jede Autobiografie einzeln untersucht. Die verwendeten Werkzeuge 
aus der Autobiografie- und der Erzähltheorie orientieren sich dabei an den 
spezifischen Anforderungen des konkreten Textes.  
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